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*455OPINION

SULT, Judge.

¶ 1 Defendant Christopher Lee Cecil appeals his first-degree murder conviction. His only argument on appeal is that the definition of “premeditation” found in Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1101(1) (2000) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to adequately distinguish first-degree murder from second-degree murder and thus allows for arbitrary and discriminatory application of the statute. Because we find that the statute as applied in this case resulted in • harmless error, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to natural life in prison. The trial court defined “premeditation” for the jury as follows:

[T]he defendant acts with either the intention or knowledge that he will kill another human being, when such an intention or knowledge precedes the killing by any length of time to permit reflection. Proof of actual reflection is not required, but an act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

During closing arguments, the state explained that premeditation means “you thought about it. You knew what you were going to do and you thought about it for some period of time. It doesn’t have to be a day. It doesn’t have to be five minutes. It doesn’t have to be a minute. Some period of time, which allows you to reflect or think what you’re going to do.”

ANALYSIS

¶ 3 We recently addressed the constitutionality of § 13-1101(1) in State v. Thompson, 201 Ariz. 273, 34 P.3d 382 (App.2001). We determined that the statute, while constitutional on its face, was nevertheless unconstitutionally vague because of the judicial construction of the statute by the Arizona Supreme Court to the effect that premeditation could be “as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind.” Id. at 280-81, ¶ 27, 34 P.3d at 389-90. We affirmed the conviction, however, because the offending “instantaneous” language was not introduced into the case in any way and the Thompsondefendant was convicted solely using the constitutional portion of the statute. Id. at 283, ¶ 41, 34 P.3d at 392.

¶ 4 The same situation exists here. We have searched the record and find that the jury was instructed on premeditation using only the statutory definition that Thompsonfound constitutional. Neither the court nor the prosecutor expressly or impliedly suggested that the statutory “length of time to permit reflection” could be as instantaneous as successive thoughts. We therefore conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the application of a vague statute.

CONCLUSION

¶ 5 Because the “instantaneous as successive thoughts” concept was not used to convict defendant, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

CONCURRING: CECIL B. PATTERSON, Jr., Judge.

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