Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.’s Empirical Analysis
201 F.2d 123 · 1953
Citation profile
20 federal appellate · 12 district · 19 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 67 later decisions — most recently August 2016 · most notably Geary v. United States Steel Corp. (1974), Christy v. Petrus (1956)
20 federal appellate · 12 district · 19 state decisions — followed in 11 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 77B (§ 2 of the Securities Act of 1933) · 18 U.S.C. § 1503 · 29 U.S.C. § 201 (American Samoa Labor Standards Amendments of 1956) · 45 U.S.C. § 1
Relies on St Paul Mercury Indemnity Co v. Red Cab Co · Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby · 69 F. Supp. 512 - Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. · Catrino v. United States · United States v. Perlstein
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 67 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"It is the universally recognized rule that in the absence of a contract or statutory provisions an employer may discharge an employee without cause or reason or for any cause or reason. (Citing authority). So also it has been held by the overwhelming weight of authority that the discharge of an employee in violation of his contract irrespective of the motive therefor constitutes only a breach of contract and not a tort and that the recoverable damages are limited to those flowing from the contractual breach and that no punitive damages are recoverable no matter what the motive that prompted the discharge. (Citing authorities). Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. (10th Cir.1953), 201 F.2d 123, at 128 .”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Courts possess the power and it is their duty to interpret and determine legislative intent but in doing this we must not over-indulge or unduly speculate with respect to meanings not clearly reflected in the language of the statute. Courts are quick to find that the penal provisions of a criminal law making a crime of an act, which if committed at common law would give a cause of action, was not intended to be the exclusive remedy for a violation and that in the absence of clear language it was not the intent of Congress by the passage of such act to wipe out a civil cause of action one would have had for tort at common law for the commission of the prohibited act. But there should be clear and compelling reasons for holding in the absence of expressions in the law itself that one has a cause of action because of a violation of a criminal law passed for the protection of the public, when he would not have had such cause of action at common law for the same act. “We accordingly conclude from a consideration of the authorities that where a penal act is passed for the benefit of a class a violation of the criminal statute resulting in injury to one of such class gives him a cause of action which he may assert in any court of competent jurisdiction, notwithstanding that no reference is made to such a right in the act, and also that where a cause of action exists at common law for the commission of a tort the passage of a penal statute in the interest of the public and providing”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, in any court of the United States or before any United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, or any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, ... or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.