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← 201 F.2d 635 - Dabney v. Chase Nat. Bank

Dabney v. Chase Nat. Bank’s Empirical Analysis

201 F.2d 635 · 1953

Citation profile

19
cited by 19 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
May 2002
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 19 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2002

9 federal appellate · 1 district ·

70195319601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 11 U.S.C. § 110

Relies on Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. · Moore v. Bay Estate of Sassard & Kimball · Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist · American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co. · Insurance Company v. Bailey

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “* * * It seems likely that the proper interpretation of the section is that it applies only to occasions where the “Federal or State law” “under” which the “transfer” is “avoided” directly nullifies it ex proprio vigore, and not indirectly by creating rights (e. g. a lien) out of some transaction between one creditor and the bankrupt which the “transfer” would defeat, if it were valid; in short that the “creditor’s” right must be conferred upon him simply because he is a creditor. * * ******* * * * the bondholders may not invoke any “law” that created rights arising out of a transaction between them and the bankrupt. 29”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “We think that its purpose also precludes its application to the facts at bar. The bondholders’ claim arises because the bank’s collection of the loan was a violation of a fiduciary relation that they derived, not from [the debtor], but from the bank. They not only had no right in 1932 to “avoid” the payment [by debtor to the bank] merely as creditors of [the debtor]; but they had no such right by virtue of any interest that [the debtor] had given them as security for their rights as creditors; they remained simple creditors. Their right to treat the payment as a constructive trust had as little to do with any right derived from [the debtor], as though the bank had made an outside agreement with them that it would not collect its debt until the bonds were paid. * * *”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.