201 F. Supp. 2d 93 - Jacobsen v. Oliver’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 district · 7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “At the time [of plaintiffs initial suit], the availability of legal remedies was problematical, because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act granted immunity from lawsuits to foreign states with only limited exceptions. Nonetheless, defendants brought suit in this Court in October 1992 on behalf of [Mr. Jacobsen and others] against the Islamic Republic of Iran under the FSIA. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 92-cv-2300 (D.D.C.1992) (hereinafter “Cicippio /”). In 1993, Judge Jackson dismissed the suit without prejudice, concluding that defendants had not presented a viable legal claim under the FSIA. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1993 WL 730748 (D.D.C.1993), aff'd, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C.Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1078 , 115 S.Ct. 726 , 130 L.Ed.2d 631 (1995). Subsequent to this dismissal, Jacobsen and defendants actively lobbied Congress and the Clinton administration to pass legislation that would allow for lawsuits against foreign states that sponsored terrorism. Ultimately, these efforts were successful. In April 1996, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ... which amended the FSIA to allow for lawsuits against foreign states that sponsor terrorism.... [I]n July 1996, defendants refiled their suit against Iran on behalf of [plaintiff and others] (hereinafter “Cicippio II ”).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 555 F. Supp. 2d 72 - Jacobsen v. Oliver

2. “On October 28, 2000, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 became law. See Pub.L.No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1541 (2000). It established procedures for collecting on judgments against terrorist states by allowing a victim of terrorism, who held, as of July 20, 2000, a final judgment against a terrorist state to receive compensation directly from the United States government. Section 2002(a)(1)(A) of the Act permitted a victim of terrorism to collect “110 percent of compensatory damages” provided he or she “relinquish all rights and claims to punitive damages,” and section 2002(a)(1)(B) allowed compensation of “100 percent of compensatory damages,” but permitted a victim to continue to pursue the recovery of punitive damages that had been awarded. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.R.D. 5,10-11 (D.D.C.2001).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 451 F. Supp. 2d 181 - Jacobsen v. Oliver

3. “(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s— (1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia; (3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia; (4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia ....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Helmer v. Doletskaya