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201 Ga. 833

41 S.E.2d 539

Powell v. Price

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided February 6, 1947

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1947-02-06

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“In Wheeler v. Fargo School District, 200 Ga. 323 ( 37 SE2d 322 ), this court held that the Constitution of 1945, as it related to our Comprehensive School Law of 1919 (Ga. L. 1919, p. 288; Code, § 32-901, et seq.), changed the status of our several county boards of education from statutory to constitutional boards.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Roberts v. Deal

Relies on Wheeler v. Board of Trustees of Fargo Consolidated School District · Saxon v. Bell

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1947-02-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently March 2012

4 state decisions

2019471950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Candler, Justice.

¶1 (After stating the foregoing facts.) By their briefs counsel agree that the only question for decision is whether or not the Constitution of 1945 authorized a grand jury, convening in Johnson County next after its adoption, to reorganize the county board of education under art. 8, sec. 5, par. 1 (Code, Ann. Supp., § 2-6801), by electing new members for the staggered terms therein provided for.

¶2 In Wheeler v. Fargo School District, 200 Ga. 323 (37 S. E. 2d, 322), this court held that the Constitution of 1945, as it related to our Comprehensive School Law of 1919 (Ga. L. 1919, p. 288; Code, § 32-901, et seq.), changed the status of our several county boards of education from statutory to constitutional boards. And we have held in Saxon v. Bell, 201 Ga. 797 (41 S. E. 2d, 536), that the Constitution of 1945 did not purport to disturb our comprehensive code of statutory school laws other than to make the offices of county school superintendent and county boards of education constitutional offices rather than statutory offices; and that a member of the board of education, whose term had not expired at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, was entitled to hold his office until his successor was elected and qualified. In this case the stipulation shows that, the incumbent’s term had not expired when the relator was elected as his successor; and the grand jury being without authority to select his successor, the court erred in its judgment ousting the incumbent.

¶3 Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.
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