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← 201 Md. 158 - Webb v. State

Webb v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1952

Citation profile

72
cited by 72 later decisions
1
states following
June 2008
most recently cited

72 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 72 later decisions — most recently June 2008 · most notably Chisley v. State (1953), State v. Jenkins (1986)

72 state decisions

270195219601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Neusbaum v. State · Wood v. State · Heath v. State · Delnegro v. State · State of Rhode Island v. Fenik

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 72 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““In Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th Ed.) Section 79, it is said: ‘If intent is an element, the State must introduce evidence to show it. However, since intention is a fact which cannot be positively known to other persons, no one can testify directly concerning it and the matter must be an inference which the jury must find from established facts.’ “In Fenwick v. State, 63 Md. 239 , recognizing that intent to murder was ‘a material fact set forth in the indictment,’ it was held that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the accused to be interrogated as to his purpose in obtaining the weapon, in that case an ax. That an accused is competent to testify as to his intent is generally recognized. See Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th Ed.) Section 135. It does not follow that such testimony is conclusive upon the trier of facts. “In the instant case it can hardly be denied that the accused drew his weapon in the first instance to intimidate and enforce compliance with his orders and to resist interference. It may also be inferred from the fact, if believed, that he twice threatened to shoot unless the victim desisted from her efforts to drag Reba into the house, that he intended to carry out the threat. We cannot find that the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, was clearly wrong in disbelieving the story of the accused, who had spent several years in the army and was presumably familiar with firearms, that the discharge of the weapon was accidental, or that he did”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““To support a charge of assault with intent to murder it is generally recognized that there must be proof of both an assault and an intention to murder. The intent cannot be inferred from the mere fact of the assault, although the character of the assault and the use of a deadly weapon are factors to be considered. Acers v. United States, 164 U.S. 388 , 17 S.Ct. 91 , 41 L.Ed. 481 , and note. Neither can the intent be established as a matter of law from the mere use of a deadly weapon. Lanier v. The State, 106 Ga. 368 ; Hochheimer, Criminal Law (3rd Ed.) Section 29.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.