Bell v . HC DOC 09-CV-135-SM 01/11/10
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Wayne F. Bell,
Plaintiff
v. Civil N o . 09-cv-135-SM
Opinion N o . 2010 DNH 006
James M. O’Mara, Jr.,
Superintendent, Hillsborough
County Department of Corrections;
Charles Ward, MD; and
Christopher Braga, M D ,
Defendants
O R D E R
Pro se plaintiff Wayne Bell claims that he was denied
constitutionally adequate medical care while incarcerated in the
Hillsborough County House of Corrections. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Before the court is Defendant James O’Mara’s motion for summary
judgement, in which defendants Ward and Braga join.1 While Bell
was reminded by the court of the need to respond to O’Mara’s
motion, the motion remains unopposed. For the reasons given,
defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.
Summary Judgment Standard
A summary judgment motion should be granted when the record
reveals “no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the
1
Dr. Braga filed a notice of joinder, while Dr. Ward filed
a motion for joinder. To the extent that anything more than a
notice of joinder is necessary, Dr. Ward’s motion is granted.
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F E D .
R . C I V . P . 56(c). “The object of summary judgment is to ‘pierce
the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties’ proof in
order to determine whether trial is actually required.’ ” Dávila
v . Corporación de P . R . para la Diffusión Pública, 498 F.3d 9, 12
(1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Acosta v . Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc.,
386
F.3d 5 , 7 (1st Cir. 2004)). When ruling on a party’s motion for
summary judgment, a trial court “constru[es] the record in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolv[es] all
reasonable inferences in [that] party’s favor.” Meuser v . Fed.
Express Corp.,
564 F.3d 507, 515 (1st Cir. 2009) citing Rochester
Ford Sales, Inc. v . Ford Motor Co.,
287 F.3d 3 2 , 38 (1st Cir.
2002)).
Background
Wayne Bell was incarcerated in the Hillsborough County House
of Corrections (“HOC”) from May of 2008 through September of
2009. Defendant O’Mara is the Superintendent of the Hillsborough
County Department of Corrections. From May through November of
2008, Dr. Charles Ward was the HOC’s Medical Director. He was
succeeded in that position by Dr. Christopher Braga.
Bell filed five petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the
New Hampshire Superior Court between June 8 , 2008, and June 1 8 ,
2
2009, all of which were denied. In his first petition he asked
the court to make the following orders:
1 . To order Valley S t . Jail/A.K.A. H.C. D.O.C. to give
me medication I have been prescribed by a physician for
years.
2 . Make an order to audit the operations of the medical
staff so the court can make an assessment as to what
needs to be revamped so this type of deliberate
indifference doesn’t continue to happen.
(Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., O’Mara Aff., Ex. A , at 1.) He also listed
the following reasons why the court should issue the orders he
requested:
1 . It is a violation of due process to neglect
detainees purposely, for their medical needs.
2 . Dr. Ward has proven in his past, deliberate
indifference and must not be allowed to continue his
ineptitude.
3 . It is cruel and unusual to make a man suffer without
his medication. Sleep deprived, anxiety attacks . . .
(Id.) The Superior Court construed Bell’s habeas petition as
raising a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, based on Bell’s
allegations of deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
(Id. at 5.) The court denied relief, on substantive grounds, in
orders dated June 18 and September 1 9 , 2008. (Id. at 2-6.) In
his second state habeas petition, which was denied in a margin
order that referred to the two orders on his previous petition,
Bell also complained of a lack of medications, which he
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characterized as an Eighth Amendment violation. (See id., Ex. B ,
at 2.) In his third state habeas petition, Bell claimed:
C.) Petitioner states Hillsborough County Correctional
Facility refuses to admit petitioner to hospital
to have proper xrays done on sever[ely] damaged
cervical disks and a hernia, that is causing
extreme pain.
D.) Petitioner also states it is cruel and unusual to
make a man suffer from c[h]ronic pain, sleep
deprivation, anxiety, and sever[e] headaches.
E.) Eighth amendment states [that it] is a violation
of due process to neglect [detainees] for, their
medical needs.
F.) Petitioner states this is a clear case of
deliberate indifference.
(Id., Ex. C , at 1 (citations omitted).) In response to Bell’s
third petition, the trial court wrote:
Motion denied. The petitioner has set forth no
basis for relief on the grounds of a violation of any
liberty interest. To the extent he seeks medical care,
he has failed to set forth any basis for the relief
requested. The House of [C]orrections is able to
provide necessary medical care to its inmates.
(Id., Ex. C , at 3.)
In his fourth petition, Bell claimed: “HCHC refuses to admit
petitioner to hospital to have x-rays on cervical disks from
degenerative disk disease that is causing extreme pain, [muscle]
spasms and ringing in ears. Also a painful hernia possibly
caused by struggling to get out of bed.” (Id., Ex. D., at 2.)
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Bell’s fifth state habeas petition also complained, in
constitutional terms, about a lack of proper medication and
defendant’s failure to have him admitted to the hospital for x-
rays. (See id., Ex. E , at 6.) As noted, all five of Bell’s
state habeas petitions were denied, and none is under appellate
review. Thus, each petition has been fully adjudicated.
Bell also filed a petition for habeas relief in this court,
which was construed by the magistrate judge as a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. He makes the following claims:
C.) Petitioner states Hillsborough County Correctional
Facility [refuses] to administer, [p]rescription
medication from family physicians. Violation of
eighth amendment.
D.) Petitioner states Honorable Judge James O’Neil III
made orders that James O’Mara have, the medical
staff immediately administer all medications that
[are] active and refillable. Docket # 08-E-0202.
E.) Petitioner states the Hillsborough County
[C]orrectional Facility did not follow the,
Superior Judge James O’Neil’s orders, [t]hree
months later still no medications, [a] new,
hearing was conducted and Judge James O’Neil
vacates the said orders September 1 5 , 2008.
F.) Petitioner states violation of eighth amendment it
is cruel and unusual punishment t o , make a man
suffer from chronic pain, sleeping deprivation,
anxiety, irregular blood pressure, muscle [spasms]
and severe headaches.
G.) Petitioner states Hillsborough County Correctional
Facility refuses to admit petitioner, to the
emergency room (Elliot [H]ospital). Petitioner
states severe pain in cervical disks, ringing in
ears and a hernia that is causing additional pain.
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H.) Petitioner states violation of eighth amendment of
due process to neglect [detainees], purposely for
their medical needs.
(Compl.).
Discussion
O’Mara moves for summary judgment on grounds of res judicata
and collateral estoppel. He argues that all of Bell’s claims are
barred, because they have been fully litigated in the New
Hampshire state courts. O’Mara is correct.
“Under federal law, a federal court must give to a state-
court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that
judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was
entered.” Sutliffe v . Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 326 (1st
Cir. 2009) (quoting Torromeo v . Town of Fremont,
438 F.3d 113,
115-16 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
New Hampshire, collateral estoppel “bars a party to a prior
action . . . from relitigating any issue or fact actually
litigated and determined in the prior action.” In re Zachary G.,
159 N.H. 146, 151 (2009) (quoting Cook v . Sullivan,
149 N.H. 774,
778 (2003)). For collateral estoppel to arise, three basic
conditions must be satisfied: “the issue subject to estoppel must
be identical in each action, the first action must have resolved
the issue finally on the merits, and the party to be estopped
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must have appeared as a party in the first action . . . .” Id.
(quotation omitted). Those three “conditions must be understood,
in turn, as particular elements of the more general requirement,
that a party against whom estoppel is pleaded must have had a
full and fair prior opportunity to litigate the issue or fact in
question.” Cook,
149 N.H. at 778 (quoting Gephart v . Daigneault,
137 N.H. 166, 172 (1993)). Here, Bell’s claims are barred by
collateral estoppel, and because that is enough to entitle
defendants to summary judgment, it is unnecessary to determine
whether res judicata would also apply.2
The three elements of collateral estoppel have all been met.
Bell’s five state habeas petitions and his complaint in this case
raised the same legal issue: whether Bell was subjected to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the form of
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Moreover, all
of Bell’s state habeas petitions alleged a denial of necessary
medication, and several of them alleged that he was denied access
to hospital x-ray facilities, which comprise the same factual
bases for his claims in this case. Turning to the second
2
Given plaintiff’s request for money damages in this case
(see Mot. to Amend (document n o . 2 7 ) ) , res judicata might well
not apply. See Reed v . McKune, 298 F.3d 946, 951 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding that inmate’s prior habeas corpus proceeding had
preclusive effect, under collateral estoppel but not res
judicata, on subsequent claims for money damages in section 1983
action).
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element, Bell’s issues have been resolved finally and on the
merits in several of his state habeas proceedings. (See O’Mara
Aff., Ex. A , at 2-3; Ex. C , at 3.) And, plainly, Bell appeared
as a party in those previous actions. In short, Bell has had a
full and fair prior opportunity to litigate both the legal claims
and factual matters raised in this case. Accordingly, he is
estopped from litigating those issues yet again in this court.
See Zachary G., 159 N.H. at 151.
Conclusion
For the reasons given, defendant’s motion for summary
judgment (document n o . 59) is granted, as is defendant Ward’s
motion for joinder (document n o . 6 1 ) . The clerk of the court
shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the
case.
SO ORDERED.
January 1 1 , 2010
cc: Wayne F. Bell, pro se
Carolyn M. Kirby, Esq.
John A . Curran, Esq.
Elizabeth L. Hurley, Esq.
Jonathan A . Lax, Esq.
Todd J. Hathaway, Esq.
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