[Cite as State v. Ledley,
2010-Ohio-1260.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 14-09-39
v.
TORRIE LEDLEY, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marysville Municipal Court
Trial Court No. TRD 0902991
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: March 29, 2010
APPEARANCES:
Alison Boggs for Appellant
Tim Aslaner for Appellee
Case No. 14-09-39
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Although originally placed on our accelerated calendar, we elect,
pursuant to Local Rule 12(5), to issue a full opinion in lieu of a judgment entry.
{¶2} Defendant-appellant, Torrie Ledley, appeals the October 2, 2009
judgment of the Marysville Municipal Court, finding her guilty of failure to stop
after an accident involving property of others in violation of R.C. 4549.03(A), a
misdemeanor of the first degree and, inter alia, suspending her driver’s license for
180 days.
{¶3} On the night of June 16, 2009, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Ledley
was driving along a wet roadway when she failed to stop at a stop sign at the
intersection of Kinney Pike and Graham Jones Road in Union County, Ohio, and
“clipped” a street sign, damaging it. Ledley failed to report her accident.
{¶4} Two days later, the Union County Sheriff’s Office (“UCSO”)
received a report from the County Engineer’s Office, informing the UCSO that the
sign had to be replaced and that a license plate had been found near the sign when
the road crew went to replace the sign. Deputy Louden of the UCSO investigated
the incident and found that the plate was registered to Ledley. Later that morning
he went to Ledley’s home, and she admitted that she had struck the sign, causing
the damage. Deputy Louden then cited Ledley with failure to stop after an
accident involving property of others in violation of R.C. 4549.03(A).
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{¶5} Initially, Ledley entered a not guilty plea to this charge. However,
on October 2, 2009, Ledley indicated that she wanted to change her plea. The
court discussed with Ledley what the prosecution’s sentencing recommendation
was going to be, which included a recommendation of thirty days in jail with all
thirty days suspended. The court then stated: “Unless there’s something unusual
about the case, Mr. Parsons [the prosecutor], I treat these as OVI’s that got away.
So I probably would not adopt the Prosecutor’s recommendation.” In response,
the prosecutor informed the court that there was no evidence that alcohol was
involved, that Ledley cooperated with the investigating officer, and that his review
of the relevant statutes did not indicate that a license suspension was authorized
for this charge.
{¶6} After hearing from the prosecutor, the court asked Deputy Louden if
he had any indication that alcohol was involved. Deputy Louden stated that he did
not detect that alcohol was involved but that he did not interact with Ledley the
night of the incident. The court then asked Ledley if she still wanted to change her
plea, she stated that she did, and the court proceeded to accept her plea after
finishing its plea colloquy with her. After this exchange, the prosecution asked the
court to follow its sentencing recommendation, and Ledley explained what
happened when she struck the sign. Ledley informed the court that no alcohol was
involved, that it was raining, her “tires were bald,” her “brakes were shot,” and
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that when she came upon the curve in the road and hit her brakes she hit the sign.
She then apologized and asked that the court not suspend her license.
{¶7} Prior to sentencing Ledley, the trial court stated: “Well, I notice it
took two days before it was reported. Based upon that, as I said, Ms. Ledley, my
attitude is that these are the drunk drivers that got away. So I’m going to sentence
you accordingly.” The court then sentenced her to thirty days in jail with twenty-
seven of those days suspended, a $600.00 fine with $300.00 suspended, ordered
that she pay restitution of $344.42 and court costs, and suspended her driver’s
license for 180 days with driving privileges ten hours a day, five days a week.
This appeal followed, and Ledley now asserts one assignment of error.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW, WHEN IT SUSPENDED
APPELLANT’S DRIVER’S LICENSE AFTER DEFENDANT
PLED GUILTY TO A VIOLATION OF O.R.C. 4549.03, WHEN
THAT STATUTE DOES NOT GIVE THE COURT THE
AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND A DRIVER’S LICENSE.
{¶8} This Court has previously held that “a misdemeanor sentence will
not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion.” State v.
Rexroad, 3rd Dist. No. 16-08-21, 2009-Ohio-1657, citing State v. Frazier,
158
Ohio App.3d 407,
815 N.E.2d 1155,
2004-Ohio-4506, ¶ 15. Abuse of discretion
“connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s
attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore
(1983),
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219,
450 N.E.2d 1140.
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{¶9} The Revised Code states that, when sentencing on a misdemeanor, a
trial court shall be guided by the purposes of misdemeanor sentencing: to protect
the public from future crime and to punish the offender. R.C. 2929.21(A).
Among the non-residential sanctions that a court may impose upon a
misdemeanant, R.C. 2929.27(A)(13) permits a court to suspend the offender’s
privilege to operate a motor vehicle. However, a court may only suspend this
privilege “[i]f authorized by law[.]” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.27(A)(13).
{¶10} Revised Code section 4549.03(B) states: “Whoever violates division
(A) of this section is guilty of failure to stop after an accident involving the
property of others, a misdemeanor of the first degree.” Nothing in R.C. 4549.03
authorizes a court to suspend the driver’s license of a person who violates this
section unlike various other offenses contained in Title 45 regarding violations of
the law involving motor vehicles. For instance, R.C. 4549.02, entitled Stopping
after accident; exchange of identity and vehicle registration, and R.C. 4549.021,
entitled Stopping after accident involving injury to persons or property,
specifically mandate that a trial court impose a class five suspension of the
offender’s driver’s license under certain circumstances. However, another
example, R.C. 4511.75, entitled Stopping for school bus; signals, provides that a
court may impose a class seven driver’s license suspension on an offender. R.C.
4511.75(F)(2). Yet, R.C. 4549.03 contains no similar provision.
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{¶11} Given the General Assembly’s decision to designate which offenses
it renders worthy of a license suspension and its specific language in R.C.
2929.27(A)(13) that a license suspension for misdemeanors is allowed if
authorized by law, we find that a license suspension for a violation of R.C.
4549.03(A) is not authorized. Therefore, the trial court did not have authority to
suspend Ledley’s license in the case sub judice.
{¶12} Additionally, we note that Ledley did not raise any issue on appeal
from any part of the sentence other than the license suspension. However, the
court’s statements, on the record, that it considers these types of offenses to be
“drunk drivers that got away,” absent any indication, other than damage to a street
sign, that alcohol was involved would seem to indicate a sentencing process that is
not based upon any facts in the record related to the offense for which Ledley was
being sentenced. Such a process is both arbitrary and unreasonable as a matter of
law. Accordingly, we find that not only was Ledley’s driver’s license suspension
unauthorized by law, it was also an abuse of the court’s discretion in sentencing.
{¶13} For these reasons, the assignment of error is sustained and the
judgment of the Marysville Municipal Court, suspending Ledley’s driver’s license
for 180 days, is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed and
Cause Remanded
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WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., and ROGERS, J., concur.
/jlr
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