Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

2010 UT App 294

Hampton v. PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES

Court of Appeals of Utah

Decided October 21, 2010

This page is marked noindex.

Court of Appeals of Utah · decided 2010-10-21

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently April 2018

1 district · 5 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“An adequately briefed argument contains the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority. A reviewing court is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research. Accordingly, we may refuse, sua sponte, to consider inadequately briefed issues.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Jesse H. Dansie Family Trust v. Public Service Commission, 2018 UT App 78 - Camco Constr. Inc. v. Utah Baseball Acad. Inc.

“A reviewing court 'is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Jesse H. Dansie Family Trust v. Public Service Commission, 2012 UT App 162 - Allen v. Ciokewicz

Relies on Allen v. Friel · State v. Bishop · State v. Thomas

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2010-10-21

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1MEMORANDUM DECISION

VOROS, Judge:

¶211 Tonda Lynn Hampton challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Professional Title Services and Clay G. Holbrook (collectively, Defendants). We affirm on the basis that Hampton's appeal is inadequately briefed. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a).

¶3T2 An adequately briefed argument "contain[s] the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented ... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Id. R. 24(a)(9). " 'Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶13, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). A reviewing court "'s not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 Ill.App.3d 1087, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). Accordingly, "we may refuse, sua sponte, to consider inadequately briefed issues." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶ 22, 128 P.3d 1179 (citing Utah R.App. P. 24(j)).

¶413 We acknowledge that Hampton here appears pro se. She is therefore entitled to "every consideration that may reasonably be indulged." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). "However, [als a general rule, a party who represents [herself] will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar....'" Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶11, 194 P.3d 903 (quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1213) (first alteration in original). "Further, 'reasonable' indulgence is not unlimited indulgence.... Reasonable considerations do not include ... attempt{ing] to redress the ongoing consequences of the party's decision to function in a capacity for which [she is not trained." Id. (quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1218). Our courts "will not engage in constructing arguments out of whole cloth," even in capital cases. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988).

¶5#4 Hampton's brief is not close to adequate. The argument portion of her brief is three pages; excluding summary and introduction, it consists only of a bare outline. And the arguments she does advance are difficult to decipher, e.g., "The court improperly created a standard requiring that Plaintiff should have raised fraud in a prior case prevented plaintiff to enter evidence, Therefore, causing Plaintiff to become incompetent,. ... The court in this role imper-missibly put itself in the position of an assumption."

¶6*798T5 We agree with the concurrence that Hampton's arguments are "earnestly stated," and her commitment to her position shines through. 'We also recognize the uncomfortable reality that our system of justice is expensive. While some pro se litigants may have made a "decision to function in a capacity for which [they are] not trained," see Allen, 2008 UT 56, T11, 194 P.8d 908, we understand that many simply cannot afford a lawyer. Nevertheless, our system is designed so that the "appellant must do the heavy lifting," State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ¶ 21, 147 P.3d 448. We cannot do it even for an earnest pro se litigant. "An appellate court that does the lifting for an appellant distorts [the] fundamental allocation of benefits and burdens." Id.

¶7T6 Even granting Hampton every consideration that may reasonably be indulged in light of her pro se status, we affirm on the ground that her brief on appeal is inadequate to enable us to consider the merits of her claims.

¶8171 CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.

/2010/utapp/294 · .json · Public domain