[Cite as State v. Chambers,
2011-Ohio-1055.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JACKSON COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 10CA12
vs. :
CHRISTOPHER CHAMBERS, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellee. :
________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Jonathan D. Blanton, Jackson County Prosecuting
Attorney, 295 Broadway Street, Suite 100, Jackson, Ohio
45640
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jeremy J. Masters, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400,
Columbus, Ohio 43215
_________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED: 3-3-11
ABELE, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Jackson County Common Pleas Court judgment that
dismissed the indictment against Christopher Chambers, defendant below and appellee herein.
The court determined that the State of Ohio, plaintiff below and appellant herein, failed to try
appellee within the statutory speedy trial time limit.
{¶ 2} Appellant raises the following assignment of error for review:
JACKSON, 10CA12 2
“DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
HAD BEEN VIOLATED?”
{¶ 3} In March 2007, appellee was charged in the Jackson County Municipal Court with
one count of breaking and entering and one count of assault. He was arrested on March 16,
2007 and remained in jail until August 29, 2007.1
{¶ 4} On May 10, 2007, the Jackson County Grand Jury returned an indictment that
charged appellee with assault and breaking and entering. After appellee's arraignment, the trial
court set the matter for a July 30, 2008 status conference. Appellee did not appear for the status
conference.
{¶ 5} On February 5, 2010, appellee filed a pro se motion to dismiss due to an alleged
speedy trial violation. On February 17, 2010, appellee entered a guilty plea to the breaking and
entering charge, and the court dismissed the assault charge. On April 29, 2010, the court
permitted appellee to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶ 6} On June 11, 2010, appellee filed a motion to dismiss due to an alleged speedy trial
violation. On June 14, 2010, the trial court held a hearing to consider appellee’s motion.
Following the hearing, the trial court found that appellee had been in jail between March 17,
2007 and August 29, 2007 on the pending charge. The court then employed the triple-count
provision and determined that by August 29, 2007, four hundred ninety-eight days elapsed for
speedy trial purposes. The court thus concluded that the state failed to bring appellee to trial on
1
We could not locate anything in the record submitted to this court to verify these dates. We observe, however,
that the trial court used these dates to calculate the speedy trial time and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the trial court’s factual findings are correct.
JACKSON, 10CA12 3
the pending charges within two hundred seventy days and dismissed the charges. The state now
appeals.
{¶ 7} In its sole assignment of error, the appellant argues that the trial court erroneously
determined that the state failed to bring appellee to trial within the statutory speedy trial time
limits. In particular, the appellant asserts that appellee’s failure to appear at the July 30, 2008
status conference forfeited his right to assert a violation of the speedy trial statute for those days
preceding his failure to appear. Under the facts present in the instant case, however, we do not
agree with the appellant.
{¶ 8} Initially, we note that a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to dismiss based
upon a violation of the speedy trial provisions presents a mixed question of law and fact for our
review. See, e.g., State v. Toler, Ross App. No. 09CA3103, 2009-Ohio-6669, at ¶15; State v.
Alexander, Scioto App. No. 08CA3221,
2009-Ohio-1401, at ¶15. We accord due deference to
the trial court’s findings of fact if competent, credible evidence supports them. We will,
however, independently review whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts of the
case. See, e.g., State v. Skinner, Ross App. No. 06CA2931,
2007-Ohio-6320, at ¶8; State v.
Thomas, Adams App. No. 06CA825,
2007-Ohio-5340 at ¶8.
{¶ 9} Ohio's speedy trial provisions, R.C. 2945.71 to 2945.73, seek to enforce an
accused’s constitutional right to a speedy and public trial. State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d
218,
416 N.E.2d 589, syllabus. In Brecksville v. Cook (1996),
75 Ohio St.3d 53, 55,
661 N.E.2d
706, 707, the court discussed an accused’s right to a speedy trial:
“Ohio’s speedy trial statute was implemented to incorporate the
constitutional protection of the right to a speedy trial provided for in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Section 10, Article I, of the
JACKSON, 10CA12 4
Ohio Constitution. State v. Broughton (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 256,
581
N.E.2d 541, 544; see Columbus v. Bonner (1981),
2 Ohio App.3d 34, 36, 2 Ohio
B.Rep. 37, 39, 2 Ohio App.3d 34,
440 N.E.2d 606, 608. The constitutional
guarantee of a speedy trial was originally considered necessary to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration, to minimize the anxiety of the accused, and to
limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. State ex rel. Jones v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 130, 131,
9 Ohio
App.3d 108, 109,
378 N.E.2d 471, 472.
Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees to the party
accused in any court ‘a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.’ ‘‘Throughout the
long history of litigation involving application of the speedy trial statutes, this
court has repeatedly announced that the trial courts are to strictly enforce the
legislative mandates evident in these statutes. This court’s announced position of
strict enforcement has been grounded in the conclusion that the speedy trial
statutes implement the constitutional guarantee of a public speedy trial.’ (Citations
omitted.) State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 221,
416 N.E.2d 589, 591.
We are acutely conscious of the magnitude of the rights we interpret today. We
have also previously explained, however, that ‘the prescribed times for trial set
forth in R.C. 2945.71 are not absolute in all circumstances, but a certain measure
of flexibility was intended by the General Assembly by the enactment of R.C.
2945.72, wherein discretionary authority is granted to extend the trial date beyond
the R.C. 2945.71 time prescriptions.”
{¶ 10} In seeking to enforce an accused’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, R.C.
2945.71(C)(2) requires the state to try a person charged with a felony within two hundred seventy
days after his arrest. For purposes of computing the two hundred seventy day period, R.C.
2945.71(E) provides that each day an accused spends in jail awaiting trial on the pending charge
counts as three days. The date of arrest is not counted in calculating the number of speedy trial
days that have elapsed. State v. Lautenslager (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 108, 109-110,
677 N.E.2d
1263; State v. McCornell (1993),
91 Ohio App.3d 141, 145,
631 N.E.2d 1110, 1112; State v.
Steiner (1991),
71 Ohio App.3d 249, 250-251,
593 N.E.2d 368, 369.
{¶ 11} Once an accused demonstrates that more than two hundred seventy days have
elapsed between his initial arrest and the date of his trial, the accused establishes a prima facie
JACKSON, 10CA12 5
case for dismissal. State v. Butcher (1986), 27 Ohio St.3d 28, 30-31,
500 N.E.2d 1368,
1369-1370; State v. Baker (1993),
92 Ohio App.3d 516, 525,
636 N.E.2d 363, 369; State v.
Howard (1992),
79 Ohio App.3d 705, 707,
607 N.E.2d 1121; State v. Geraldo (1983),
13 Ohio
App.3d 27, 28,
468 N.E.2d 328. The burden then shifts to the state to produce evidence
demonstrating that the accused was not entitled to be brought to trial within the two hundred
seventy day period. Baker,
92 Ohio App.3d at 526,
636 N.E.2d at 369;
Howard, supra; State v.
Bowman (1987),
41 Ohio App.3d 318, 319,
535 N.E.2d 730.
{¶ 12} R.C. 2945.72 sets forth the circumstances under which the two hundred seventy
day period may be extended. R.C. 2945.72 provides:
The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the case
of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only by the following:
(A) Any period during which the accused is unavailable for hearing or
trial, by reason of other criminal proceedings against him, within or outside the
state, by reason of his confinement in another state, or by reason of the pendency
of extradition proceedings, provided that the prosecution exercises reasonable
diligence to secure his availability;
(B) Any period during which the accused is mentally incompetent to stand
trial or during which his mental competence to stand trial is being determined, or
any period during which the accused is physically incapable of standing trial;
(C) Any period of delay necessitated by the accused’s lack of counsel,
provided that such delay is not occasioned by any lack of diligence in providing
counsel to an indigent accused upon his request as required by law;
(D) Any period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the
accused;
(E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or
abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused;
(F) Any period of delay necessitated by a removal or change of venue
pursuant to law;
(G) Any period during which trial is stayed pursuant to an express
statutory requirement, or pursuant to an order of another court competent to issue
such order;
(H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused's own motion
and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the
accused’s own motion;
JACKSON, 10CA12 6
(I) Any period during which an appeal filed pursuant to section 2945.67 of
the Revised Code is pending.
{¶ 13} If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limits set forth in the speedy
trial statutes, and if the R.C. 2945.72 exceptions do not apply, R.C. 2945.73 requires the court,
upon motion prior to trial, to discharge the accused.
{¶ 14} After our review of the record in the case sub judice, we agree with the trial
court’s conclusion that the state failed to bring appellee to trial within the statutory speedy trial
time limit. As the trial court found, appellee was in jail on the pending charge for one hundred
sixty-six days. Because appellee was in jail, each of the one hundred sixty-six days counts as
three days for speedy trial purposes. Under this triple-count mechanism, four hundred
ninety-eight speedy trial days elapsed between March 17, 2007, and August 29, 2007. During
this time period, a trial date was not set. Also during this time period, appellee did not fail to
appear for any scheduled court appearances. The appellant has not offered any explanation as to
why it did not seek to try appellee before the speedy trial clock expired in 2007. Rather, the
appellant argues that because appellee failed to appear at a status conference over one year after
the speedy trial time limit had already expired, he waived his right to assert a speedy trial
violation.
{¶ 15} To support its argument, the appellant cites State v. Bauer (1980) 61 Ohio St.2d
83,
399 N.E.2d 555. In Bauer, the court held: “[A] defendant who fails to appear at a scheduled
trial, and whose trial must therefore be rescheduled for a later date, waives his right to assert the
provisions of R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 for that period of time which elapses from his initial
arrest to the date he is subsequently rearrested.”
Id. at 85. In Bauer, the court initially set a trial
JACKSON, 10CA12 7
date within the speedy trial time limit, but the defendant failed to appear for that timely-set court
date. The Bauer court refused to allow a defendant to assert the speedy trial protections when
the defendant’s own actions resulted in the expiration of the time limit.
{¶ 16} By contrast, in the case sub judice it was not the accused’s actions that resulted in
the expiration of the speedy trial time limit. Rather, the speedy trial time had expired prior to
the time appellee failed to appear at the July 30, 2008 status conference. Under these
circumstances, we do not believe that the rule set forth in Bauer applies so as to bar appellee
from asserting a speedy trial violation. Our holding is limited, however, to those situations
when the speedy trial time limit expires before the defendant’s failure to appear at a court
hearing.
{¶ 17} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons we hereby overrule the appellant’s
sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that appellee recover of appellant the costs
herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Jackson County
Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Harsha, P.J. & McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
JACKSON, 10CA12 8
For the Court
BY:
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the
time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
