[Cite as State v. Windham,
2011-Ohio-3326.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
: Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
-vs- :
:
JA'BRELL WINDHAM : Case No. 10CA137
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas,
Case No. 10CR488
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 29, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JILL M. COCHRAN JOHN A. BOYD
38 South Park Street 3 North Main Street
Mansfield, OH 44902 Suite 505
Mansfield, OH 44902
Richland County, Case No. 10CA137 2
Farmer, J.
{¶1} On August 6, 2010, the Richland County Grand Jury indicted appellant,
Ja'Brell Windham, on two counts of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25, one
count of interference with custody in violation of R.C. 2919.23, one count of menacing
by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211, and one count of aggravated burglary in
violation of R.C. 2911.11. Said charges arose from incidents involving appellant and
Jennifer Lacy, the mother of his child.
{¶2} On September 23, 2010, appellant pled guilty to one count of domestic
violence and an amended count of burglary. The remaining charges were dismissed.
By sentencing entry filed November 2, 2010, the trial court sentenced appellant to the
maximum on each count, eighteen months, to be served consecutively for a total
sentence of three years in prison.
{¶3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
I
{¶4} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO
IMPOSE THE MINIMUM AUTHORIZED SENTENCE AND IMPOSED THE MAXIMUM,
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE UPON JA'BRELL WINDHAM FOR THE COMMISSION
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, F-4, AND BURGLARY, F-4, BECAUSE OHIO REVISED
CODE (R.C.) 2929.14(B) MANDATES THE IMPOSITION OF THE SHORTEST
PRISON TERM AUTHORIZED FOR THE OFFENSES, BECAUSE R.C. 2929.14(C)
PROHIBITS THE IMPOSITION OF A MAXIMUM PRISON TERM FOR THE
Richland County, Case No. 10CA137 3
OFFENSES, AND BECAUSE R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) PROHIBITS THE IMPOSITION OF
CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE."
I
{¶5} Appellant claims the trial court erred in sentencing him. Specifically,
appellant claims the trial court erred in sentencing him to maximum sentences and
ordering them to be served consecutively. We disagree.
{¶6} In reviewing a sentence, appellate courts must apply a two-step approach:
{¶7} "First, they must examine the sentencing court's compliance with all
applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the
sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. If this first prong is satisfied, the
trial court's decision shall be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v.
Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008–Ohio–4912, ¶4.
{¶8} Pursuant to State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1,
2006-Ohio-856, ¶100, "trial
courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and
are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum,
consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences." Appellant pled guilty to two felony
counts in the fourth degree. Felonies of the fourth degree are punishable by "six,
seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, or
eighteen months." R.C. 2929.14(A)(4). Appellant was sentenced to eighteen months
on each count, within the permissible statutory range and therefore not contrary to law.
{¶9} During sentencing, trial courts are to consider the factors set forth in R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12 which state the following in pertinent part:
Richland County, Case No. 10CA137 4
{¶10} "[R.C. 2929.11] (A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be
guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of
felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others
and to punish the offender. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall
consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from
future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the
offense, the public, or both.
{¶11} "[R.C. 2929.12] (A) Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or
2929.14 of the Revised Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon
an offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply
with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the
Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider the factors set forth
in divisions (B) and (C) of this section relating to the seriousness of the conduct and the
factors provided in divisions (D) and (E) of this section relating to the likelihood of the
offender's recidivism and, in addition, may consider any other factors that are relevant to
achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.
{¶12} "(B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply
regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors, as
indicating that the offender's conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting
the offense:
{¶13} "(2) The victim of the offense suffered serious physical, psychological, or
economic harm as a result of the offense.
{¶14} "(6) The offender's relationship with the victim facilitated the offense.
Richland County, Case No. 10CA137 5
{¶15} "(9) If the offense is a violation of section 2919.25 or a violation of section
2903.11, 2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code involving a person who was a family
or household member at the time of the violation, the offender committed the offense in
the vicinity of one or more children who are not victims of the offense, and the offender
or the victim of the offense is a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of
one or more of those children.
{¶16} "(D) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply
regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors indicating that the
offender is likely to commit future crimes:
{¶17} "(1) At the time of committing the offense, the offender was under release
from confinement before trial or sentencing, under a sanction imposed pursuant to
section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or under post-release
control pursuant to section 2967.28 or any other provision of the Revised Code for an
earlier offense or had been unfavorably terminated from post-release control for a prior
offense pursuant to division (B) of section 2967.16 or section 2929.141 of the Revised
Code.
{¶18} "(2) The offender previously was adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant
to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter
2152. of the Revised Code, or the offender has a history of criminal convictions.
{¶19} "(3) The offender has not been rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree after
previously being adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant to Chapter 2151. of the
Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter 2152. of the Revised
Richland County, Case No. 10CA137 6
Code, or the offender has not responded favorably to sanctions previously imposed for
criminal convictions."
{¶20} The trial court held a sentencing hearing on November 1, 2010 wherein it
clearly considered the statutory factors. T. at 6-10. See also, Sentencing Entry filed
November 2, 2010. In determining appellant's sentence, the trial court found the
following:
{¶21} "THE COURT: In this particular case, Mr. Windham, on June the 23rd,
again on June the 25th, again on June the 28th, again on July the 12th you assaulted or
harassed the mother of your child, choking her, threatening her, and on June 23rd
ripping the child from her. You apparently have a child together, although you had no
rights to visitation with the child. The police ultimately had to recover the child through
your mother. You have the idea that you own her, you have the right to regulate who
she sees, and that she has no right to associate with anybody other than you.
{¶22} "You have a terrible prior record. It starts at age fifteen, carrying a
concealed weapon on school premises, two convictions for gross sexual imposition. If
you had been an adult all these would have been felonies. Criminal trespass, receiving
stolen property two times, weapons in school, failure to comply with the order or signal
of a police officer, running from police officer in a high speed chase, two of those
convictions, assault, vehicular trespass, four probation violations showing that you have
a very great difficulty abiding by probation conditions.
{¶23} "As an adult, five disorderly conduct convictions, petit theft, menacing with
the same victim in 2009, obstructing official business.
Richland County, Case No. 10CA137 7
{¶24} "You're on municipal probation for some of those things at the present
time, and let me read what your probation officer says in municipal court about you.
{¶25} " ' The offender is on municipal probation with Officer Jerry Snay. This
officer spoke with Officer Snay on September 28th. Snay reported that the offender
does not report, continues to be charged with new offenses, does not comply with
curfew. Officer Snay reported that the offender may be released soon from Richland
County Jail. Snay is afraid what the offender may do to the victim upon his release.'
That's what your probation officer says about you.
{¶26} "In addition, you've had repeated efforts to contact the victim despite my
instructions of no contact. I can't control what she does, but I can certainly control what
you do, and you are not willing to abide by my instructions or control.
{¶27} "…
{¶28} "All this information about you, and what you have done, Mr. Windham,
speaks far louder than that little paper that you read to me. You are not trustworthy to
be on probation.
{¶29} "…
{¶30} "Mr. Windham, your record of criminal offenses without change shows that
you are not - - you continue to have a felony record, a juvenile record, you are not
affected by what you have done. You are willing to do serious, physical and emotional
harm to your victim." T. at 6-10.
{¶31} Based upon the trial court's findings, appellant has a long history of
criminal conduct including violence, being uncooperative with police, failing to abide by
the conditions of his probation, and disregarding court orders, including repeated
Richland County, Case No. 10CA137 8
violations of the trial court's no contact order with the victim. Clearly appellant is a high
risk for recidivism and there is a need to protect the public as well as the victim from
further crimes.
{¶32} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in sentencing appellant to
the maximum sentences and ordering them to be served consecutively.
{¶33} The sole assignment of error is denied.
{¶34} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is
hereby affirmed.
By Farmer, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Edwards, J. concur.
_s/ Sheila G. Farmer_________________
_s/ William B. Hoffman________________
_s/ Julie A. Edwards__________________
JUDGES
SGF/sg 609
Richland County, Case No. 10CA137 9
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
JA'BRELL WINDHAM :
:
Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 10CA137
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to
appellant.
_s/ Sheila G. Farmer_________________
_s/ William B. Hoffman________________
_s/ Julie A. Edwards__________________
JUDGES
