Downing v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Counts v. State · Travis J. Kovach v. The State of Wyoming

2. “.... In order for there to be a violation of the right of confrontation, a defendant must show more than just a denial of the ability to ask specific questions of a particular witness. Rather, a defendant must show that he was prohibited "from engag ing in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness ... 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness" Hannon [v. Statel, ¶ 18, 84 P.3d [320] at 330 [ (Wyo.2004)] (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant an "opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defendant might wish." Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 , 106 S.Ct. at 1435 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 , 106 S.Ct. 292, 295 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam ) (emphasis in original)). A defendant's right to cross-examination of a witness is not unfettered, but is subject to the trial court's "discretion to reasonably limit cross-examination to prevent, among other things, questioning that is repetitive or of marginal relevance." Hannon, ¶ 22, 84 P.3d at 331-32 (quoting United States v. DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626, 629-30 (10th Cir.1991)); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 , 109 S.Ct. 480, 483 , 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Travis J. Kovach v. The State of Wyoming

3. “The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees defendants in criminal cases the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against" them. Its main purpose is to provide defendants with the opportunity for effective eross-exami-nation. One of the most important aspects of the right of eross-examination is attacking the witness' credibility and the truth of the testimony. Credibility may be tested by interrogation that attempts to reveal possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives. Defense counsel should ordinarily be given wide latitude when cross-examining a witness about credibility or bias. Counsel should be allowed to "expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and eredibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." The trial court, however, retains discretion to reasonably limit eross-examination to prevent, among other things, questioning that is repetitive or of marginal relevance.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Counts v. State