Egan v. SSA

Egan v. SSA                                CV-11-147-JL   1/31/12

                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE



Melissa Anne Egan
     v.                                 Civil N o . 11-cv-147-JL
                                        Opinion N o . 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner,
Social Security Administration


                             MEMORANDUM ORDER

      This is an appeal from the denial of a claimant’s

application for Social Security Disability Benefits. See 

(g).      The claimant, Melissa Anne Egan, contends that

the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) incorrectly found that

although Egan was severely impaired by degenerative disc disease,

fibromyalgia, and a depressive disorder, Admin. R. 9;1 see 

 (a),(c), she retained the residual functional

capacity2 (“RFC”) to perform light work “involving only

occasional contact with supervisors, coworkers [sic] and the

public.”      Admin. R. 1 1 ; see 

(b).   Egan also


      1
      The court will reference the administrative record (“Admin.
R.”) to the extent that it recites facts contained in or directly
quotes documents from the record. C f . Lalime v . Astrue, N o . 08-
cv-196-PB, 

, at *1 (D.N.H. Apr. 1 4 , 2009).
      2
      “Residual Functional Capacity” is defined as “an assessment
of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical
and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and
continuing basis. A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8 hours
a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” SSR
96-8p, 

, at *1 (July 2 , 1996).
alleges that it was error for the ALJ to conclude that she

remained capable of performing past employment, see 

(a)(4)(iv), o r , in the alternative, that given Egan’s

mental limitations, there remained a significant number of jobs

available to her in the national economy.3    Admin. R. 13-14; see

(a)(4)(v). Specifically, Egan contends that

the ALJ committed reversible error because h e :

     (1) did not grant controlling weight to the opinions of
     her treating medical providers when formulating Egan’s
     RFC, C l . B r . 3-10, see generally 

,
     404.1527(d); SSR 96-2p, 

 (July 2 , 1996),
     and

     (2) improperly determined at Step 4 that Egan was
     capable of performing her past relevant work as a
     secretary in light of her functional limitations, C l .
     Br. 10-11; see 

(a)(4)(iv), and

     (3) given her mental impairments, the ALJ improperly
     relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“the
     Grid”), see generally 

 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), p t .
     404, subpt. P, App. 2 ; 404.1560(g), to conclude in the
     alternative that she was capable of performing numerous
     other jobs in the national economy. C l . B r . 11-12.




     3
      The social security regulations set forth a five step
procedure to determine if a claimant is disabled. 

(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden in the first
four steps to show that: (1) she is not engaged in substantial
gainful activity; (2) she has a severe impairment; (3) the
impairment meets or equals a specific impairment listed in the
Social Security regulations; or (4) the impairment prevents or
prevented her from performing past relevant work. At Step 5 of
the analysis, it is the Commissioner’s burden to establish that
jobs exist in the national economy given the claimant’s
impairments, age, education, and work experience. See 

                                 2
The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence in the record, and moves for an order

affirming his decision. This court has subject-matter

jurisdiction under 

 (federal question) and 

(g) (Social Security).    After a review of the

administrative record, the court denies Egan’s motion and grants

the Commissioner’s motion.


I.   APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

     The court’s review under Section 405(g) is “limited to

determining whether the ALJ deployed the proper legal standards

and found facts upon the proper quantum of evidence.”     Nguyen v .

Chater, 

 1 , 35 (1st Cir. 1999); see Simmons v . Astrue,

 9 1 , 399 (D.N.H. 2010).   If the ALJ’s factual

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record,

they are conclusive, even if the Court does not agree with the

ALJ’s decision and other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.

See Tsarelka v . Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 

(1st Cir. 1988).   Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.”   Richardson v . Perales, 

 (1971)

(quotations omitted).   The ALJ is responsible for determining

issues of credibility, resolving conflicting evidence, and

drawing inferences from the evidence in the record.     See


                                  3
Rodriguez v . Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 

 1 8 , 222

(1st Cir. 1981); Pires v . Astrue, 

 5 , 21 (D.

Mass. 2008) (“resolution of conflicts in the evidence or

questions of credibility is outside the court’s purview, and thus

where the record supports more than one outcome, the ALJ’s view

prevails”).   The ALJ’s findings are not conclusive, however, if

they were “derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or

judging matters entrusted to experts.”     Nguyen, 172 F.3d at 3 5 .

If the ALJ made a legal or factual error, the decision may be

reversed and remanded to consider new, material evidence, or to

apply the correct legal standard.     Manso-Pizarro v . Sec’y of

Health & Human Servs., 

 5 , 1 6 , 19 (1st Cir. 1996); see 

(g).


II.   BACKGROUND

      Pursuant to this court’s local rules, the parties filed a

Joint Statement of Material Facts (document number 1 0 ) , which is

part of the record reviewed by the court. See LR 9.1(d).       This

court will briefly recount the key facts and otherwise

incorporates the parties’ joint statement by reference.

      Egan filed a request for Disability Insurance Benefits and

Supplemental Security Income in January 2009 alleging an onset of

disability in August 2008 due t o , inter alia, anxiety,




                                  4
depression, hip and back pain, and fibromyalgia.         See Admin. R.

111.       She was 31 years old at the date of filing.   

 at 9 6 .

       At the hearing, Egan testified that her mental impairments

limited her ability to interact with people and be a dependable

worker, while her physical limitations rendered her unable to

lift anything over 10 pounds on a regular basis, and made her

unable to reach and bend.        She also claimed that she could not

sit or stand for any appreciable amount of time. 

 at 2 6 , 32-

34.    Egan stated that she was incapable of performing her prior

work as a licensed nurse’s aid, because it is a physically

demanding position and she finds interacting with others unduly

stressful.4      

.   Egan also testified that she left a

job as a copy clerk for the Registry of Deeds because it required

too much lifting and she “did not get along with my coworkers

[sic].”5      

.   Finally, she testified that she left a

job as a legal secretary because she didn’t get along with others

and had difficulty handling criticism from her boss.        

 at 3 8 .

Egan stated that she would be unable to perform any secretarial


       4
      Egan stated that she had difficulty working as an aide in a
private home because the client’s family “stressed me out so bad
I basically told them where to stuff it.” 

 at 3 6 . Similarly,
in an institutional placement, she claimed to struggle to
interact appropriately with co-workers. 

 at 3 7 .
       5
      There is no evidence in the record that Egan was ever fired
from a position due to an inability to interact with other
people. 

.

                                      5
work because it involves “lifting . . . sitting for long periods

of time, dealing with customers or people coming into the

[office].”   

 at 3 9 .

     The ALJ concluded that Egan was severely impaired by

“degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, and depressive

disorder.”   Id. at 9.      The ALJ did not find these conditions to

be disabling, noting that an exam at the Dartmouth Hitchcock

Spine Center in August 2009 revealed “no true myelopathic

symptoms4 and it was questioned if the claimant actually had any

radicular5 symptoms,” and at that time “[i]t was determined the

claimant could perform full-time sedentary work.”      Admin. R. 1 2 .

The ALJ also stated that by April 2010, Egan’s primary care

physician “noted that the claimant’s conditions were stable

overall, and her pain was reasonably well controlled with

medication,”6 and that Egan’s primary care physician “recommended

     4
      “Myelopathy” refers to “any of various functional
disturbances or pathological changes in the spinal cord.”
Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 1239 (31st ed. 2007).
     5
      “Radicular” pertains to “any one of the smallest branches
of a vessel or nerve.” Id. at 1595. “Radiculitis” is the
“inflammation of the root of a spinal nerve,” while
“radiculalgia” is “pain due to disease of the spinal nerve
roots.” Id.
     6
      As discussed in detail, supra, ten months earlier, Egan’s
physician, D r . David B . Richardson, placed some limitations on
Egan’s ability to lift over 10 pounds, bend and twist, and engage
in repetitive walking, standing or sitting. Id. at 266. D r .
Richardson, however, noted that the restrictions were in effect
for only 30 days. Id. There is no evidence in the record that

                                     6
the claimant do approximately 40 minutes of cardiovascular

exercise per day” to help control her fibromyalgia.    Id. at 12-

13.

      The ALJ concluded that although “the record does document

chronic depression,” Egan’s hearing testimony that her mental

illness (in particular, her inability to function socially) was

disabling was inconsistent with the record.    The ALJ noted that

in her self-function report, Egan “reported a wide range of

activities of daily living and even described her schedule as

‘hectic.’”7   Id. at 1 3 , 137. The ALJ had earlier concluded,8

based on Egan’s self-function report and an exam by D r . William

Swinburne, Ph.D., that Egan exhibited only mild difficulties in

daily activities and concentration, persistence and pace and had

these restrictions were extended beyond thirty days, and, as the
ALJ noted, D r . Richardson believed by May of 2010 that Egan’s
pain was well controlled and that her fibromyalgia could be
treated with exercise. D r . Richardson’s partner, D r . Theodore A .
Ruel, similarly opined that because “[t]he findings on her MRI
are modest,” surgical intervention was “ill advised” and that he
had “nothing to offer her further in terms of diagnostics or
therapeutic interventions.” Id. at 520.
      7
      The ALJ observed that in this function report, Egan stated
“that [in] a typical day she gets the children off to school in
the morning, runs errands, takes her children to appointments,
does grocery shopping, performs upkeep of the house, makes
dinner, helps . . . with homework. . . .[Egan] noted that she
does [leisure] activities when her time allows as she has a
‘hectic’ schedule.” Id. at 1 0 .
      8
      These finding were made in the context of whether Egan
suffered from a “listed” impairment. See 

(a)(4)(iii).

                                  7
never had an episode of decompensation.    Admin. R. 10-11, 133-40,

411-15.   The ALJ also concluded, based on this same evidence,

that Egan had “moderate difficulties” in social functioning

because of her tendency to be irritable, withdraw from people,

and exhibit “mild road rage.”   

 at 1 0 . The ALJ found Egan’s

social functioning only moderately impaired based on D r .

Swinburne’s note that although Egan felt that “some people”

“cannot take her ‘directness’ and view her as a ‘witch’,” D r .

Swinburne believed “[i]n other interactions [Egan] can relate

reasonably well in public.”   

 at 1 0 , 414. Further, the ALJ

considered Egan’s own report that she lived with her boyfriend,

another friend and multiple children, and often visits her

parents, talks with friends on the phone, and takes her children

to appointments and to school. 

 at 1 0 .

     The ALJ gave minimal weight to the opinion of treating

psychologist, D r . Meghan Estey, Psy.D., that Egan’s mental issues

would interfere with her ability to work more than 10-19 hours

per week.   

 at 1 3 , 552. The ALJ instead decided to credit D r .

Swinburne’s conclusion that Egan retained the ability to complete

basic work related tasks, but “her emotions could be volatile and

as such, her ability to work out interpersonal difficulties may

be limited; at other times her relations with coworkers [sic]

would be superficially good.”   

 at 1 3 , 415.



                                  8
     The ALJ accordingly found that Egan has the residual

functional capacity to perform light work, see 

(b), “involving only occasional contact with

supervisors, coworkers [sic] and the public.”    Admin. R. 1 1 . The

ALJ thus concluded that Egan was capable of performing her past

work as a secretary, and, in the alternative, that there are a

significant number of jobs available to her in the national

economy, and she is not disabled.     Admin. R. 13-14; see 

(a)(4)(iv)-(v). This appeal followed.9


III. ANALYSIS

     A five-step process is used to evaluate an application for

social security benefits. 

(a)(4).     The

applicant bears the burden through the first four steps to show

that she is disabled.10   Freeman v . Barnhart, 

(1st Cir. 2001).   At the fifth step, the Commissioner bears the

burden of showing that a claimant has the residual functional


     9
      The Decision Review Board, see generally 

, did not complete its review of the ALJ’s denial in a
timely fashion, Admin. R. 1 , rendering the ALJ’s order a final
decision of the Commissioner appealable to this court. See 

.
     10
      The Social Security Act defines disability as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.” 

(d)(1)(A).

                                  9
capacity to perform other work that may exist in the national

economy.   Id.; see also 

(a)(4)(v); Heggarty

v . Sullivan, 

 9 0 , 995 (1st Cir. 1991).   The ALJ’s

conclusions at steps four and five are informed by his assessment

of a claimant’s RFC, which is a description of the kind of work

that the claimant is able to perform despite her impairments.       

(a)(4), 404.1545.


A . Medical opinion

     Egan first contends that the ALJ erred in failing to grant

controlling weight to the opinion of D r . Estey, Egan’s treating

psychiatrist.   D r . Estey’s succinct functional analysis of Egan’s

ability to work consisted of a notation that:

     [Egan’s] symptoms of depression and other mental
     illness affect her activities of daily living and her
     ability to interact appropriately with others, adapt to
     change, and work. . . . It is my opinion, that her
     mental illness will continue to significantly impact
     her ability to function at acceptable levels in the
     world for longer than 12 months and that these symptoms
     will interfere with her ability to work more than 10-19
     hours a week.

Admin. R. 552. Egan states that because D r . Estey treated her

over twenty times11 before rendering an opinion that Egan was


     11
      The court notes, however, that D r . Estey began treating
Egan in September 2009, one month after she was initially denied
benefits.     Admin. R. 4 2 , 443. C f . O’Dell v . Astrue, 

 7 8 , 387 (D.N.H. 2010) (less weight given where there is
“potential bias to advocate on claimant’s behalf”) (quotations,
brackets, and ellipses omitted).

                                  10
capable only of working 10-19 hours per week, the ALJ erroneously

concluded that Egan was capable of full-time work.    The court

disagrees.

     The decision that a claimant is disabled is reserved to the

Commissioner.   See 

(e)(1); SSR 96-5p, 

, at *2 (July 2 , 1996).   As such, “[a] statement by a

medical source that [a claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to

work’” does not compel a finding that the claimant is disabled.

(e)(1).   Still, an ALJ is prohibited from

disregarding relevant medical source opinions. See SSR 96-5p,

, at * 5 . An ALJ, as a lay person, cannot interpret

a claimant’s medical records to determine his RFC. Manso-

Pizarro, 

 7 . An ALJ must rely to some degree on RFC

evaluations from a physician or another expert. 

.

This does not mean, however, “that there must always be some

super-evaluator, a single physician who gives the factfinder an

overview of the entire case.”    Evangelista v . Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 

 (1st Cir. 1987).    That premise

“is unsupported by the statutory scheme, . . . case law, or by

common sense, for that matter.”    

   Rather, “an ALJ is entitled

to piece together the relevant medical facts from the findings of

multiple physicians.”   Mulkerron v . Astrue, N o . 09-10998-RGS,




                                  11


, at *9 (D. Mass. July 1 5 , 2010) (quotations

omitted).

     An ALJ is required to give controlling weight to the opinion

of a treating physician “if it is well-supported by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is

not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case

record.”    Lopes v . Barnhart, 

 (D.

Mass. 2005) (quotations and brackets omitted); see generally SSR

N o . 96-2p, 

, at * 1 . Where an ALJ’s functional

assessment is at odds with a medical source opinion, he must

adequately explain his reasons for disregarding that opinion.

See 

(d); SSR 96-8p, 

, at * 7 ;

Marshall v . Astrue, N o . 08-cv-147-JD, 

, at *3

(D.N.H. Dec. 2 2 , 2008); c f . Monroe v . Barnhart, 

 (D. Mass. 2007) (ALJ must give sufficient explanation

for adopting contrary view of disability).     Conflicts between

treating physicians and a non-treating non-examining doctor is

for the ALJ to resolve. Tremblay v . Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 

 1 , 12 (1st Cir. 1982).   The decision to resolve

that conflict against the claimant should be affirmed if “that

conclusion has substantial support in the record . . . .“      Id.;

see also DiVirgilio v . Apfel, 

 6 , 77 (D. Mass.

1998).



                                  12
     The ALJ properly limited the amount of weight given to D r .

Estey’s opinion because the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion

that her assessment is inconsistent with the entire record.      See

generally, SSR N o . 96-2p, 

, at * 1 ; Lopes, 

; 

. As the ALJ recognized,

Egan’s “emotions could be volatile” and her “ability to work out

interpersonal difficulties may be limited.”    Admin. R. 1 3 .

Substantial evidence in the record, however, did not indicate

that such limitations, in D r . Estey’s words “significantly impact

her ability to function at acceptable levels in the world.”      Id.

at 552. Egan described, in her function report, an active daily

life12 and indeed Egan stated that she had little time for

hobbies “due to [a] hectic schedule.”13   Admin. R. 137. Although

Egan herself terminated employment during an emotional




     12
      Egan’s depression and irritability did not prevent her from
completing a multitude of tasks involving social interactions
with friends, roommates, family and the general public. She
described an ability to get children ready for school, run
errands, go to family appointments, grocery shop, visit her
parents, and talk to friends on the phone. Id. at 133-34.
     13
      The court recognizes that this statement is inconsistent
with Egan’s testimony at the hearing. Such conflicts, however,
are for the ALJ, not the court to resolve. See Pires, 

 (resolution of conflicts outside the purview of
the court); c f . DiVirgilio, 

 7 .

                                 13
outburst,14 

 she was never fired from a job for that

behavior. 

.

     Dr. Estey’s opinion also conflicts with the two other

medical source statements in the record.      Both examining

psychologist D r . Swinburne, and consulting psychologist D r .

Michael Schneider, failed to find her outbursts disabling.        Dr.

Swinburne examined Egan and produced a lengthy evaluation of her

capabilities. Id. at 411-415. In his “Mental Status

Examination,” D r . Swinburne found that Egan was “attentive and

cooperative”, exhibited clear and logical thoughts, and had

intact short term and long term memory.      Id. at 413. He opined

that Egan had a sustained attention span, and “[i]n a work-like

situation   . . . could provide reasonably good attendance

understand and . . . remember short and simple instructions.”

Id. at 414. D r . Swinburne noted Egan’s irritability, but

properly observed that “[i]n other interactions she can relate

reasonably well in public.”   Id.     D r . Swinburne also noted that

although Egan may occasionally be tardy, work attendance would

not be a problem and despite her past conflicts at work, her

“relations with coworkers [sic] could be superficially good.”



     14
        Egan testified that at her last job as an in-home nursing
assistant “interacting with family and company, it just got to be
too much . . . I lost it and told them where to stuff it.” Id.
at 2 7 .

                                 14
Id. at 415. D r . Swinburne did recognize that Egan “may have

difficulty managing some of the stressors that accompany most

jobs,” but she could still “focus her attention on tasks for [a]

reasonable period of time.”   Id.     His assessment, while

recognizing certain functional challenges, contradicts D r .

Estey’s belief that Egan is very low functioning.15



     15
      Dr. Schneider also completed a mental functional capacity
assessment. Id. at 417-33. He did not examine Egan, but based
on her medical records, concluded that although Egan had a severe
impairment, “[i]n an environment where she is in a somewhat
socially isolated workstation and where the supervisory criticism
is not overly critical of her performance, she is able to
interact appropriately with peers and supervisors.” Id. at 433.

      Egan agrees that D r . Schneider’s assessment contradicted
that of D r . Estey. C l . B r . 6-7. She contends, however, that the
ALJ erred because he did not discuss D r . Schneider’s analysis in
the order. This argument fails because ALJ’s are not required to
discuss evidence that is cumulative or does not support the
claimant’s position. See, e.g., Lord v . Apfel, 

 , 13 (D.N.H. 2000).

     Finally, Egan alleges that the ALJ erred in failing to adopt
a consulting physical therapist’s opinion that Egan, based on
cardiovascular health, could only perform sedentary work. The
ALJ acknowledged this finding, but was not required to adopt it
as a physical therapist is not a “treating source” whose opinion
is given special weight, see 

(a),
404.1527(d), 404.1546. Moreover, the physical therapist’s
conclusion was inconsistent with her own observation that Egan
did not exhibit any myelopathic symptoms, and had questionable
radicular issues, a finding noted by the ALJ. Admin. R. 1 2 , 436.
Finally, it is well established that functional conclusions about
an ability to perform at a “sedentary” or “light” capacity are
reserved to the Commissioner, see 

(e)(2),
404.1545, who considers all the evidence, and whose RFC
determination will be upheld so long as there is ample record
support. Accordingly, the court concludes there was no error.

                                 15
     Further, D r . Estey’s functional analysis was rendered in

cursory fashion, and as such, the ALJ could properly give it less

weight.   See Coggon v . Barnhart, 

 0 , 53 (D. Mass.

2005); 

(d)(3).    D r . Estey’s opinion was

included in a letter to Egan’s counsel16 containing only two

substantive paragraphs. The first paragraph was three sentences

long and briefly outlined the history of treatment. The second

paragraph included only four conclusory sentences discussing her

opinion that Egan is unable to work.    As seen supra, D r . Estey’s

analysis contained no specific reference to either her treatment

notes17 or the medical record in general. Id. at 552. An ALJ is


     16
      An ALJ may give less weight to an “advocacy opinion.” See,
e.g., Coggon, 

 3 . In particular, where the
record supports the inference that a medical opinion was
“obtained specifically for the purpose of bolstering [a
claimant’s] case”, an ALJ can properly give it less weight.
O’Dell, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 387; c f . Evangelista, 

.
Dr. Estey’s note began: “I am writing this letter at the request
of Melissa Egan . . . in support of her receiving Social
Security.” Admin. R. 552. The ALJ was therefore entitled to
afford D r . Estey’s opinion “minimal weight.” 

 at 1 3 .
     17
      The court reviewed Egan’s treatment notes from D r . Estey
and Mountain Wellness Associates. Admin. R. 443-498, 521-549
(notes from September 2009 - July 2010). The notes contain
little discussion of Egan’s work conflicts, but dwell almost
exclusively with conflict with her ex-husband and his family and
her boyfriend’s family. Although Egan sometimes mentions
physical pain, id. at 527 (April 2 7 , 2010), treatment notes by
her primary care physician, D r . David. B . Richardson, during that
same period note that Egan’s “pain has been reasonably well-controlled,” and that “[o]verall, she is stable.” Id. at 516
(note from April 2 , 2010). Although Egan described a lot of
personal turmoil (mostly due to disappointment and conflict

                                 16
justified in discounting a medical opinion when that opinion

lacks analysis and reference to supporting medical records. C f .

Tremblay, 

 (treating physician opinion entitled to

no more weight than a consulting physician if the disability

assessment is conclusory).    The ALJ did not err, therefore, in

concluding that “Dr. Estey’s opinion is not consistent with the

record in its entirety,” and granting that opinion minimal

weight.   

 at 1 3 .

     Egan also contends that the ALJ erred in assigning a light

work RFC to Egan because her treating physician, D r . David B .

Richardson, limited her to sedentary work for 30 days in February

2009.   C l . B r . 9-10; Admin. R. 266. This argument lacks merit

because although the ALJ did not address this short term

limitation, the ALJ specifically referenced D r . Richardson’s

observation in April 2010 that Egan’s pain was well controlled in

determining her light work RFC. Admin. R. 1 2 , 516. Although an

ALJ is not entitled to disregard relevant medical facts,

determination of the RFC is the province of the ALJ based on all

the medical evidence in the file. See 

. D r .


regarding non-work relationships), in the last treatment note
from D r . Estey’s practice, Egan was assessed to be “more stable,
less anxious.” Id. at 550. At that appointment, Egan stated
that her “medicine seems to be working,” and her “anxiety is more
manageable.” Id. at 549. These notes appear to contradict D r .
Estey’s functional assessment less than two months later. Id. at
552.

                                  17
Richardson’s February 2009 note was limited “until further

evaluation and treatment is reviewed with the patient,” and

therefore clearly modified by D r . Richardson’s later analysis.

Admin. R. 266. D r . Richardson’s February evaluation was not

supported by his later observations, and indeed the limitation

was never extended by D r . Richardson.   Therefore, it was not

entitled to any significant weight by the ALJ.18    C f . 

(d).


B . Work Opportunities

     Egan next contends that the ALJ erred in concluding at Step

4 that she was able to perform her prior work, 

(a)(4)(iv),(f), and at Step 5 that there were ample

other work opportunities available to her in the national

economy.   

(a)(4)(v),(g). At the fourth step

of the evaluation process, the ALJ determines whether the

impairment prevents the claimant from performing the work she has

performed in the past. If the claimant is able to perform her

previous work, she is not disabled.   

(e).        If


     18
      Similarly, Egan faults the ALJ for failing to discuss the
conclusions of consulting psychiatrist D r . Michael Schneider and
how those conclusions were inconsistent with D r . Estey’s
findings. This argument lacks merit because D r . Schneider’s
findings supported the ALJ, who is not required to discuss
evidence in his order that is cumulative and does not support a
claimant’s disability claim. See, e.g., Lord, 

.

                                 18
the claimant is unable to perform prior work, then the fifth step

calls for an analysis of the claimant’s ability to perform other

work in light of her RFC, as well as age, education, and work

experience. If the claimant is unable to perform other work in

the national economy, then she is entitled to disability

benefits.   

(f); Vega-Valentin v . Astrue, 

 6 4 , 268 (D.P.R. 2010).   The claimant has the burden,

at Step 4 , of proving that she cannot return to her former

employment because of the alleged disability.     Santiago v . Sec'y

of Health & Human Servs., 

 , 5 (1st Cir.1991).    Once a

claimant has demonstrated an inability to return to her previous

employment, the Commissioner has the burden, at Step 5 , to prove

the existence of other jobs in the national economy the claimant

can perform.   Ortiz v . Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 

 (1st Cir.1989).

     Egan first contends that the ALJ erred in finding that given

her light capacity RFC, she was capable of performing her past

relevant work as a secretary.    Specifically, the ALJ concluded:

     The record shows that the claimant’s past job as a
     secretary was performed [within] the last 15 years, at
     the substantial gainful activity level, and for enough
     time to learn the skills of the job. (Exhibit 4 E , 7 E ,
     and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles). In
     comparing the claimant’s residual functional capacity
     with the physical and mental demands of this work, I
     find that the claimant is able to perform it as
     generally performed. (Exhibit 7 E , 4 E , Dictionary of
     Occupational Titles).


                                  19
Admin. R. 1 3 . Egan alleges because “[t]here is no particularized

finding that [Egan] can do the physical and mental demands of

[her] past work as a secretary,”       C l . B r . 1 0 , the ALJ committed

reversible error. The court disagrees because although the ALJ’s

discussion could have been better developed, it was not so

lacking as to warrant a remand.

     “The RFC to meet the physical and mental demands of jobs a

claimant has performed in the past (either the specific job a

claimant performed or the same kind of work as it is customarily

performed throughout the economy) is generally . . . sufficient

. . . for a finding of ‘not disabled.’”        SSR 82-62, 

, at * 3 ; see generally 

(e),(f),

404.1560(b).   The claimant is responsible for providing evidence

concerning the vocational demands of her past work.          SSR 82-62,

, at * 3 ; 

(b).       The ALJ then

makes a determination of the claimant’s ability to do prior work

based on a

     careful appraisal of (1) the individual’s statements as
     to which past work requirements can no longer be met
     and the reason(s) for his or her inability to meet
     those requirements; (2) medical evidence establishing
     how the impairment limits [the] ability to meet the
     physical and mental requirements of the work; and (3)
     . . . supplementary or corroborative information from
     other sources such as employers, the Dictionary of
     Occupational Titles, etc., on the requirements of the
     work as generally performed in the economy.




                                  20
SSR 82-62, 

, at * 3 ; see generally, 

(b)(2) (allowing an ALJ to use the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles “to obtain evidence we need to help us

determine whether you can do your past relevant work”).

Further, “for a claim involving a mental/emotional impairment,

care must be taken to obtain a precise description of the

particular job duties which are likely to produce tension and

anxiety, . . . in order to determine if the claimant’s mental

impairment is compatible with the performance of such work.”     SSR

82-62, 

, at * 3 .

       Here, the ALJ exercised due care. The record contained, and

indeed the ALJ referenced at both Step 3 and Step 4 , evidence

indicating that while Egan had only mild limitations in daily

activities, concentration, persistence, and pace, she was only

moderately challenged by her inability to function socially.     See

Admin. R. 10-13.   The ALJ recognized her treating physician’s

note that Egan’s physical pain was ‘well-controlled,” id. at 516,

and indeed an examination at the Dartmouth Hitchcock Spine Center

revealed that Egan “has no true myelopathic symptoms and I am

questioning whether she [exhibits] radicular symptoms.”   Id. at

436.   The ALJ specifically took those factors into account in

fashioning restrictions on her light RFC, id., as well as her

ability to perform prior work as a secretary as defined by the



                                 21
Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Id.; c f . Gillis v . Astrue,

N o . 08-cv-225-SM, 

, at *8-*9 (D.N.H. Apr. 6, 2009)

(noting that ALJ considered claimant’s mental abilities to

perform past work and incorporated them into the Step 4 finding).

The court recognizes that the ALJ’s Step 3 discussion and Step 4

RFC analysis was quite detailed, while his determination that she

could perform her prior work merely referenced exhibits in the

record and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.19   His

notations make clear, however, that the ALJ considered his prior

discussion of Egan’s mental and physical capabilities, record

evidence, and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles when

determining that Egan could undertake secretarial work as it is

generally performed in the economy.

     Finally, Egan’s argument that the ALJ erred in relying on

the Grid for his alternative Step 5 finding is meritless.    At

Step 5 of the disability analysis, “the burden shifts to the

Secretary to show the existence of other jobs in the national

economy” that the claimant can perform despite his or her

impairments.   Guyton v . Apfel, 

 (D. Mass.

1998) (quotations omitted).   Where the claimant’s limitations are



     19
      The regulations specifically allow the ALJ to use the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles “to obtain evidence we need to
help us determine whether you can do your past relevant work.”

(b)(2).

                                22
exclusively exertional, the Commissioner can satisfy his burden

through the use of the “Grid,” a regulatory “matrix of the

applicant’s exertional capacity, age, education, and work

experience. If the facts of the applicant’s situation fit within

the Grid’s categories, the Grid directs a conclusion as to

whether the individual is or is not disabled.”      Seavey v .

Barnhart, 

 , 5 (1st Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted); see

generally, 20 C.F.R. p t . 4 0 4 , subpt. P, App. 2 , § 200; see, e.g.,

Ortiz, 

.

     In cases where a claimant suffers from both exertional and

non-exertional limitations,

     [i]t is permissible for the Administrative Law Judge to
     rely on the Grid where [he] concludes that these
     nonexertional impairments or limitations impose no
     significant restriction on the range of work a claimant
     is exertionally able to perform. Moreover, if a nonstrength impairment, even though considered
     significant, has the effect only of reducing that
     occupational base marginally, the Grid remains highly
     relevant and can be relied on exclusively to yield a
     finding as to disability. Yet the more that
     occupational base is reduced by a nonexertional
     impairment, the less applicable are the factual
     predicates underlying the Grid rules, and the greater
     is the need for vocational evidence.

Guyton, 

 (quotations and citations omitted).

So long as the record “amply support[s]” the conclusion that the

claimant’s nonexertional limitations do not interfere with a full

range of work, reliance on the Grid is appropriate. Ortiz, 

.


                                  23
       The ALJ concluded that although Egan suffered from a severe

mental impairment, “the additional [non-exertional] limitations

have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled

light work.”    Admin. R. 1 4 . Although the First Circuit Court of

Appeals has cautioned against use of the Grid, and in fact

encouraged use of vocational experts, where there are non-

exertional limitations, see Ortiz, 

, use of the

Grid “cannot be defeated by low-level personality and emotional

disorders that undoubtedly afflict - at least from time to time -

vast numbers of the populace.”     

 at 5 2 4 , n.3 (quotations

omitted).    Here, record evidence supports the ALJ’s determination

that Egan’s non-exertional impairments “were not sufficiently

severe to necessitate the taking of vocational testimony.”          

. As discussed supra, Egan wrote that her “hectic”

lifestyle kept her from her hobbies. Her consulting psychologist

determined that although she had some moderate social

difficulties because of her tendency to be “direct” and

irritable, she was still able to “relate reasonably well in

public.”    Admin. R. 1 0 , 414. D r . Schneider likewise opined that

she could function in a “somewhat” isolated workstation.       Id. at

433.   Although it may well have been advisable for the ALJ to

take vocational testimony, the court finds no error.




                                  24
 IV. CONCLUSION

      Pursuant to sentence four of 

(g), Egan’s

motion to reverse and remand the Commissioner’s decision20 is

denied.       The Commissioner’s motion to affirm the decision21 is

granted.       The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in

accordance with this order and close the case.



      SO ORDERED.




                                   Joseph N . Laplante
                                   United States District Judge

Dated: January 3 1 , 2012

cc:   Bennett B . Mortell, Esq.
      Gretchen Leah Witt, Esq.




      20
           Document n o . 8.
      21
           Document n o . 9.

                                    25