[Cite as State v. Seagle,
2012-Ohio-132.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 14-11-16
v.
DARREN A. SEAGLE, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 14-11-17
v.
DARREN A. SEAGLE, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeals from Marysville Municipal Court
Trial Court Nos. CRB 1100326 and CRB110327
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: January 17, 2012
Case No. 14-11-16, 14-11-17
APPEARANCES:
Darrell L. Heckman for Appellant
Tim Aslaner for Appellee
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Darren A. Seagle (hereinafter “Seagle”), appeals
the Marysville Municipal Court’s decision denying his motion to suppress
evidence and the judgment entries of conviction that followed thereafter. We
affirm.
{¶2} Around 4:00 a.m. on May 10, 2011, Seagle reported a domestic
violence incident that occurred between him and his live-in girlfriend, Amber
Lawson (hereinafter “Lawson”), to the Marysville Police Department. (Aug. 2,
2011 Tr. at 5-11, 25). Seagle invited law enforcement officers into his home to
investigate the matter. (Id. at 9-10). When officers entered Lawson’s bedroom to
question her about the incident, they discovered marijuana, rolling papers, and a
marijuana roach lying on top of the bedroom dresser. (Id. at 11-13). When the
officers asked Lawson about the items, Lawson stated that they belonged to
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Seagle, and that she would take a drug test to prove they did not belong to her. (Id.
at 13).
{¶3} On May 10, 2011, Seagle was separately charged with possession of
drug paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 2925.14(C)(1), a fourth degree
misdemeanor and possession of marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(3)(a), a
minor misdemeanor. (Doc. Nos. 2, 2). The former charge was assigned case no.
CRB 1100326; the latter charge was assigned case no. CRB 1100327.
{¶4} On May 16, 2011, Seagle filed a written plea of not guilty in both
cases. (Doc. No. 6). On May 19, 2011, Seagle filed a motion to suppress evidence
seized during the May 10th incident. (Doc. No. 7).
{¶5} On August 2, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the motion and
overruled the motion at the conclusion of the hearing. (Doc. Nos. 7, 16).
Immediately thereafter, Seagle entered no contest pleas to both charges, and the
trial court found Seagle guilty on both charges. (Id.). On the possession of drug
paraphernalia (case no. CRB 1100326), the trial court sentenced Seagle to 30 days
in jail but suspended the 30 days of jail upon the condition that Seagle successfully
complete one year of community control. (Doc. No. 15); (Aug. 2, 2011 Tr. at 36-
37). The trial court also imposed a $250 fine, ordered that Seagle pay $110 in
court costs, and imposed a 180-day license suspension. (Id.); (Id.). On the
possession of marijuana (case no. CRB 1100327), the trial court ordered Seagle to
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pay a $150 fine and $28 in court costs, and the trial court also imposed a 180-day
license suspension. (Doc. No. 7); (Aug. 2, 2011 Tr. at 36-37). Upon Seagle’s
request, the sentences in both cases were stayed pending appeal. (Doc. Nos. 8, 17);
(Aug. 2, 2011 Tr. at 37).
{¶6} On August 15 and 19, 2011, Seagle filed notices of appeal. (Doc. Nos.
10, 18). The appeal in case no. CRB 1100326 was assigned appellate case no. 14-
11-16; the appeal in case no. CRB 1100327 was assigned appellate case no. 14-11-
17. On October 13, 2011, this Court consolidated the cases for purposes of
appeal.1
{¶7} Seagle now appeals, raising one assignment of error for both cases.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Seagle argues that the trial court erred
by denying his motion to suppress evidence because law enforcement entered
Lawson’s room without her permission; and therefore, exceeded the scope of the
consent search authorized by Seagle. The City, on the other hand, argues that the
drugs and drug paraphernalia was not obtained as a result of a search of
1
Upon review of the record, it is apparent that the two charges were filed by the clerk of the trial court on
the same date and at the same time. Pursuant to the Rules of Superintendence, the charges should have
been assigned a single case number, 2011 CRB ___, with suffixes A and B to designate the separate
charges. Had the case number been properly assigned, the appellant would have only been required to file
one notice of appeal, pay one court cost deposit, and only one case on appeal would have resulted.
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Case No. 14-11-16, 14-11-17
defendant’s home; but rather, were found in plain view upon the officer’s
investigation of the alleged domestic violence incident.
{¶9} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed
questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,
2003-Ohio-5372,
797 N.E.2d 71, ¶8, citing State v. Mills,
62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366,
582 N.E.2d 972
(1992). At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact
and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of
witnesses.
Id. When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, deference is
given to the trial court’s findings of fact so long as they are supported by
competent, credible evidence.
Id. With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of
law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must decide whether the
facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. McNamara,
124 Ohio App.3d
706, 710,
707 N.E.2d 539 (1997).
{¶10} John Murray, a patrolman with the City of Marysville Police
Department, testified that he was dispatched to 1251 Collingwood Court around
4:00 a.m. on May 10, 2011 to investigate a domestic violence report. (Aug. 2,
2011 Tr. at 5, 7). Murray testified that, when he and his partner, Officer Collier,
arrived, they spoke with Seagle, and Seagle indicated that his girlfriend and he had
an argument and she tried to pry his bedroom door open. (Id. at 8-9). According
to Murray, Seagle took Officer Collier and him into the house and showed them
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the marks on his bedroom door. (Id. at 9). Murray testified that, after Seagle
showed them the marks on his bedroom door, Officer Collier and he “spoke to
[Seagle’s] girlfriend who [was] laying on the bed in the room adjacent to his
door.” (Id.).2 Murray testified that the door to the bedroom of Seagle’s girlfriend,
Amber Lawson, “was open and [Lawson] was laying on the bed there.” (Id. at 11).
Murray further testified that there were lights on in the house and a light on in
Lawson’s bedroom when he walked into Lawson’s bedroom and began talking to
her about the alleged incident of domestic violence. (Id.). According to Murray,
there was a dresser “just as you walk in the door” of Lawson’s bedroom, and
“[t]here were drugs and paraphernalia laying directly on top of that dresser as soon
as you walked in the door.” (Id. at 11-12). Murray identified State’s exhibit A as
photographs of the dresser and the drugs and drug paraphernalia located on top of
the dresser. (Id. at 12-13). Murray testified that he went into Lawson’s bedroom
“[t]o speak to her with reference to argument [sic] as to the second party involved
in the domestic[], and the drugs were in plain view.” (Id. at 12-13). He further
testified that, after he saw the drugs, he asked Lawson about them, and Lawson
denied that they belonged to her, and she volunteered to take a drug test to prove
they did not belong to her. (Id. at 13).
2
During his testimony, Murray drew a diagram of Seagle’s house on what sounds like a white dry erase
board, which was used to aid his testimony before the trier of fact. (Aug. 2, 2011 Tr. at 10).
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{¶11} On cross-examination, Murray testified that, at the time he was
dispatched, he did not know whether Seagle or Lawson reported the domestic
violence; but instead, that determination is reached after talking to the parties
involved. (Id. at 15). Murray acknowledged that they had no search warrant and
that the home was owned by Seagle, but Murray testified that Seagle asked law
enforcement to enter the home to show them the pry marks on his bedroom door.
(Id. at 15-16). When asked if Lawson invited Officer Collier and him into her
room to talk, Murray testified, “I don’t recall. The door was opened. We just
talked to her. … No. I don’t believe she did.” (Id. at 17). Murray testified that
Lawson never asked Officer Collier and him to wait a minute for her to come out
of the bedroom. (Id.). Murray could not recall what Lawson was wearing when
they entered the bedroom. (Id. at 16-17). Murray denied ever seeing or collecting
a container or box from the bedroom; he further denied that the marijuana was
located inside a box. (Id. at 19).
{¶12} Thereafter, the State rested, and Seagle called his girlfriend, Amber
Lawson to the stand. (Id.). Lawson testified that, as of May 10, 2011, she was
living at 1252 Collingwood Court, Marysville, Ohio. (Id. at 20). Lawson testified
that, when the officers came to the house, it was dark outside, and she was inside
her bedroom, which was separate from Seagle’s bedroom. (Id. at 20-21).
According to Lawson, law enforcement “asked me, can I come back? And I said,
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wait a minute.” (Id. at 21). Lawson testified that she told the officers to wait a
minute because she was in her pajamas and wanted to change her clothes. (Id.).
Lawson testified that the officers did not wait, but instead, just came into her
bedroom. (Id. at 22). Lawson testified that she did not invite the officers into her
bedroom, and they did not have her permission. (Id.). Lawson testified that, from
where the officers were standing by Seagle’s bedroom door, they could not have
seen what was in her bedroom. (Id.). Lawson testified that there was no marijuana
on the dresser when law enforcement entered her bedroom, but there was a
cigarette roller and rolling paper on the dresser. (Id. at 23). Lawson further
testified that the marijuana was inside a container, which she identified as
defendant’s exhibit A. (Id.). Upon cross-examination, Lawson testified that she
was clothed and she had a night stand light on in the bedroom when law
enforcement entered her bedroom. (Id. at 24). Lawson also testified that, when
they entered the bedroom, the officers began asking her about an argument she
allegedly had with Seagle. (Id.).
{¶13} Seagle testified that, on May 10, 2011, he reported to the Marysville
Police Department that Lawson and he were having an argument. (Id. at 25-26).
Seagle testified that the situation had stabilized between the two of them by the
time law enforcement arrived. (Id. at 26). According to Seagle, he did not have
any cuts, scrapes, or bruises, and he was not fearful of Lawson when the police
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arrived. (Id.). Seagle testified that he showed the police the pry marks on his
bedroom door, and that his bedroom is across the hall from Lawson’s bedroom.
(Id.). Seagle also testified that, if he was standing where the officers were
standing, he would not have been able to see into Lawson’s bedroom, including
the night stand. (Id. at 26-27). Seagle testified that he did not hear the police
officers say anything to Lawson before they entered her bedroom. (Id.). He
further testified that Lawson had a night light on in the bedroom when the officers
entered the bedroom. (Id. at 27).
{¶14} “Under [the plain-view] doctrine, an officer may seize an item
without a warrant if the initial intrusion leading to the item’s discovery was lawful
and it was ‘immediately apparent’ that the item was incriminating.” State v.
Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 442,
588 N.E.2d 819 (1992), superseded by
constitutional amendment as stated in State v. Smith,
80 Ohio St.3d 89,
684 N.E.2d
668 (1997), citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 465- 466,
91 S.Ct.
2022,
29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) and Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 136,
110
S.Ct. 2301,
110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). Seagle argues that the officer’s initial
intrusion leading to the marijuana and drug paraphernalia’s discovery was
unlawful since Lawson did not consent to the officers entering her bedroom. This
argument lacks merit. Law enforcement did not enter the home (or Lawson’s
bedroom) to conduct a search but to investigate the reported domestic violence,
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and the officers had Seagle’s express consent to enter the home for this purpose.3
See State v. Pamer, 70 Ohio App.3d 540,
591 N.E.2d 801 (1990), citing Davis v.
United States,
327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964). In fact, Seagle reported the domestic
violence in the first place, though law enforcement officers were unaware of that
fact when they initially reported to the scene. When law enforcement officers
entered Lawson’s bedroom, the door was wide open and the bedroom was
illuminated by a bed-side lamp. After reviewing the record, it is clear that the
officers entered Lawson’s bedroom to determine her part in the alleged incident of
domestic violence—not to search the bedroom for contraband. This is not a
consent search case, and therefore, this case is distinguishable from those Seagle
cites. Since law enforcement’s initial intrusion was lawful, the trial court did not
err in concluding that the items discovered were admissible in evidence under the
plain-view doctrine and denying the motion to suppress. State v. Schroeder, 6th
Dist. No. WD-00-076,
2001 WL 1308002, *3 (Oct. 26, 2001) (trial court did not
err in denying motion to suppress where officers entered the apartment to question
a party to a suspected domestic violence and drug paraphernalia was in immediate
plain view).
{¶15} Seagle’s assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
3
The parties agreed that Seagle was the owner of the home.
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{¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Judgments Affirmed
ROGERS, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
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