[Cite as State v. Davis,
2012-Ohio-3570.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97636
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
STEVEN C. DAVIS
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-549173
BEFORE: Keough, J., Stewart, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 9, 2012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert L. Tobik
Chief Public Defender
BY: Cullen Sweeney
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue
Suite 200
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: James M. Rice
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Steven C. Davis (“Davis”), appeals his sentence. For
the reasons that follow, we reverse his sentence and remand for resentencing.
{¶2} In 2004, Davis pled guilty to sexual battery and gross sexual imposition and
was sentenced to five years probation. Pursuant to Ohio’s sex offender registration
system then in effect, former Chapter 2950 (Ohio’s Megan’s Law), Davis was classified
as a sexually oriented offender, the least restrictive classification under Megan’s Law.
As a sexually oriented offender, he was required to comply with the registration
framework provided in Megan’s Law, including annual registration for ten years.
Additionally, he was subject to the penalties under Megan’s Law for noncompliance.
{¶3} In 2007, the Ohio General Assembly enacted Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act
(“AWA”), repealing Megan’s Law and providing increased obligations and registration
requirements to be applied retroactively to previously-registered sex offenders like Davis.
Pursuant to the AWA, the Attorney General reclassified Davis as a Tier III sex offender.
The AWA provisions increasing Davis’s registration duties and penalties for
noncompliance went into effect on January 1, 2008. As a Tier III sex offender, Davis
was required to verify his address every 90 days for life instead of once a year for ten
years as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law.
{¶4} In 2011, Davis was charged with failing to provide notice of change of
address under R.C. 2950.05(F)(1). The indictment also provided a furthermore
specification that Davis was previously convicted of a violation of his reporting and
registration duties.
{¶5} Davis filed a motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the Ohio Supreme
Court’s holdings in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
2010-Ohio-2424,
933 N.E.2d
753, and State v. Williams,
129 Ohio St.3d 344,
2011-Ohio-3374,
952 N.E.2d 1108,
which held that the AWA was unconstitutional as applied to individuals like Davis who
were previously classified under Megan’s Law. The motion also requested alternate
relief pursuant to this court’s holding in State v. Page, 8th Dist. No. 94369,
2011-Ohio-83, that the AWA penalties do not apply to individuals such as Davis because
Megan’s Law offenders can only be subject to Megan’s Law penalties.
{¶6} After a hearing on Davis’s motion, the trial court denied his motion to
dismiss the indictment and denied the request for alternate relief, relying on the First
District’s decision in State v. Freeman, 1st Dist. No. C-100389, 2011-Ohio-4357, rather
than this court’s decision in Page.
{¶7} Thereafter, Davis pled no contest to the indictment. The trial court found
him guilty of failure to provide notice of change of address, in violation of R.C.
2950.05(F)(1), and the furthermore specification. The trial court sentenced him to a
mandatory three-year prison term pursuant to the current version of R.C. 2950.99. Davis
was granted an appellate bond during the pendency of this appeal.
{¶8} Davis appeals, raising as his sole assignment of error that the trial court
erred when it sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence of three years under the
AWA. He contends that he is not subject to the enhanced penalties of the AWA because
he was originally classified under Megan’s Law. The State maintains that Davis is
subject to the current version of R.C. 2950.99, the law in effect at the time he committed
the non-reporting offense, and thus he is subject to the enhanced penalties provisions.
{¶9} This court recently addressed this issue in State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Nos.
96582, 96622, 96623, 2012- Ohio-261, and held that the enhanced penalties under R.C.
2950.99 and the AWA do not apply to individuals who were originally sentenced under
Megan’s Law. Id. at ¶ 31-38.1
{¶10} Until the Ohio Supreme Court issues a definitive ruling on this issue or until
it remedies the conflict among the districts, we are bound by the precedent of this court.2
Accordingly, we sustain Davis’s assignment of error, reverse his sentence, and remand
the matter to the trial court to impose a sentence consistent with Megan’s Law.
{¶11} Judgment reversed and remanded.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
This court certified that its decision in Smith is in conflict with the decisions of the First and
1
Fifth Appellate Districts. See State v. Freeman, 1st Dist. No. C-100389, 2011-Ohio- 4357, State v.
Bowling, 1st Dist. No. C-100323, 2011-Ohio-4946, and State v. Dunwoody, 5th Dist. No. CT11-0029,
2011-Ohio-6360. On May 23, 2012, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that a conflict exists and
has held the case for the decision in State v. Grunden, Supreme Court Case No. 2011-1553.
The issue has been accepted for review by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Howard,
2
Supreme Court Case No. 2011-2126.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY WITH SEPARATE
OPINION
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY:
{¶12} I concur in the decision reached in this case because it follows this court’s
precedent. However, I remain convinced that the analysis set forth in State v. Freeman,
1st Dist. No. C-100389, 2011-Ohio-4357, and in my dissenting opinion in State v. Page,
8th Dist. No. 94369,
2011-Ohio-83, is correct — at least until the Ohio Supreme Court
says otherwise.
