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Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97718
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
TYLER P. LARSSON
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-556050
BEFORE: Sweeney, P.J., Rocco, J., and Keough, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 16, 2012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
William D. Mason, Esq.
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: T. Alan Regas, Esq.
Kristen L. Sobieski, Esq.
Assistant County Prosecutors
8th Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Robert L. Tobik, Esq.
Chief Public Defender
By: John T. Martin, Esq.
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J.:
{¶1} Appellant, the state of Ohio (“the State”), appeals the court’s sentencing
defendant-appellee Tyler P. Larsson (“defendant”) to time served in jail for his fifth degree
felony conviction. After reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent law, we reverse
and remand for resentencing.
{¶2} On December 6, 2011, defendant pled guilty to one count of vandalism in
violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(2), a fifth degree felony. The court sentenced defendant to
36 days in jail with credit for time served.
{¶3} The state appeals and raises one assignment of error for our review.
I. The trial court erred by imposing a sentence of 36 days in jail, and
crediting the appellee for 36 days served for the offense of vandalism, a fifth
degree felony, when Ohio law requires the imposition of either 1) a prison
sentence, 2) a potential $2,500 fine, or 3) up to three years of post release
control.
{¶4} Defendant was sentenced after H.B. 86 took effect in September 2011. As
part of H.B. 86, R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) states as follows:
Except as provided in division (B)(1)(b) of this section, if an offender is
convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony of the fourth or fifth degree that is
not an offense of violence, the court shall sentence the offender to a
community control sanction of at least one year’s duration if all of the
following apply:
(i) The offender previously has not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a
felony offense or to an offense of violence that is a misdemeanor and that the
offender committed within two years prior to the offense for which sentence
is being imposed.
(ii) The most serious charge against the offender at the time of sentencing
is a felony of the fourth or fifth degree.
(iii) If the court made a request of the department of rehabilitation and
correction pursuant to division (B)(1)(c) of this section, the department,
within the forty-five-day period specified in that division, provided the court
with the names of, contact information for, and program details of one or
more community control sanctions of at least one year’s duration that are
available for persons sentenced by the court.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶5} In State v. Cox, 8th Dist. No. 97924,
2012-Ohio-3158
, this court reversed the
trial court’s sentencing a defendant to a two-day jail term with credit for two days served
under the post-H.B. 86 statute. The Cox court held that the new statutory scheme
“specifies that a sanction of community control must be imposed for at least one year.”
Id. at ¶ 4. We follow the precedent set forth in Cox, because we find that case to be
directly on point with the case at hand. All of the factors listed in R.C.
2929.13(B)(1)(a)(i)-(iii) apply to defendant; therefore, the court was required to sentence
him to a minimum of one year of community control sanctions.
{¶6} Furthermore, we find this court’s en banc decision in State v. Nash, 8th Dist.
No. 96575,
2012-Ohio-3246
, which affirmed the trial court’s sentence of three days in jail
with credit for time served for a fifth degree felony, to be inapplicable to the instant case,
because Nash was sentenced prior to September 2011.
{¶7} Defendant’s sentence of 36 days in jail with credit for time served was
improper as a community control sanction under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a). The state’s sole
assignment of error is sustained.
{¶8} Judgment reversed and remanded for resentencing.
It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee its costs
herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
JAMES J. SWEENEY, PRESIDING JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
