[Cite as In re Collins,
2012-Ohio-5234.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
ALLEN COUNTY
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF: CASE NO. 1-11-63
WILLIAM L. COLLINS, SR.
[LEE TOLBERT, ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF EASTER I. OPINION
SMITH – APPELLANT]
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
Probate Division
Trial Court No. 2001 ES 213(A)
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 13, 2012
__________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
David K. Goodin for Appellant.
Jonathan Hollingsworth for Appellees.
Mark A. Van Dyne, Admr. of Estate.
Case No. 1-11-63
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Lee Tolbert (“Tolbert”) brings this appeal from
the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County, Probate Division
finding William L. Collins, Sr. to be the father of Eddis Jackson fka Eddis Collins,
William Collins, Jr., and Jonathon Collins. For the reasons set forth below, the
judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} On February 26, 2001, William L. Collins, Sr. (“Collins”) died
intestate. He was legally married to Easter I. Collins (“Easter”) at that time. On
April 10, 2001, Easter filed an Application to Relieve the Estate from
Administration along with a form identifying herself as the sole known survivor
who would inherit under the statutes of descent and distribution. This listing was
made despite the fact that Collins’ obituary listed Eddis Jackson (“Eddis”),
William Collins, Jr. (“William”), and Jonathon Collins (“Jonathon”) as his
children. The application listed total assets of $254.00 and were distributed to
Easter as the surviving spouse.
{¶3} On July 5, 2001, Easter filed a motion to reopen the estate and to
convert it to a full administration. This was done to give Easter authority to
negotiate a settlement of an asbestos claim. The Standard Probate Form 1.0 again
listed Easter as the sole beneficiary of the estate. Easter was appointed
administrator of the estate on July 13, 2001.
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{¶4} On February 11, 2004, Easter, acting as administrator of Collins’
estate, filed an application to approve the settlement and to distribute the wrongful
death and survival claim on behalf of Collins. No notice was given to any other
persons. However, Easter now identified Charles Conley (“Charles”) and Fred
Conley (“Conley”) as nephews of Collins who might have an interest. She
claimed that she had no knowledge of the nephews’ whereabouts. Eddis, William,
and Jonathon were still not identified to the court. The first settlement was
approved on April 1, 2004, and the net amount of $13,311.19 was distributed to
Easter as the surviving spouse. On April 1, 2005, a second settlement application
was filed. The amount of $33,400.96 was distributed to Easter as surviving spouse
on April 12, 2005. Both settlement orders were to distribute payments for a
wrongful death claim. On June 5, 2008, the trial court, at Easter’s request,
changed those orders to be allocated as benefits from a survivor claim.
{¶5} In June of 2008, a third application to approve a settlement and
distribute the funds was filed. Notice by publication was given to the nephews via
The Lima News. The trial court approved the distribution of $4,430.24 as a
survival claim to Easter. Easter then filed on August 13, 2008, a motion to
dispense with further notice to Charles and Fred concerning future settlements.
The motion was granted on August 14, 2008.
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{¶6} On September 17, 2008, Easter filed her first partial account of the
estate with the trial court. The account claimed that the sole amount of $5,530.24
was distributed to her, but not the remaining $46,712.15, even though it had
passed through the estate.
{¶7} On January 13, 2009, Easter died. Her obituary identified Eddis,
William, and Jonathon as her step-children. On August 14, 2009, Easter’s
daughter, Gloria Shurelds (“Shurelds”) applied to be appointed as the successor
administrator of Collins’ estate. Letters of authority were issued on August 20,
2009. On November 17, 2009, Eddis filed a motion to remove Shurelds as the
successor administrator. Eddis then filed her own motion to be named
administrator of Collins’ estate on December 23, 2009. By agreement of the
parties, Mark Van Dyne (“Van Dyne”), a local attorney, was appointed by the
court to serve as a special administrator pending litigation concerning the
administration of Collins’ estate.
{¶8} Tolbert is the administrator of Easter’s estate and the fiancé of
Easter’s daughter. On behalf of Easter’s estate, Tolbert filed a complaint to
determine heirship under R.C. 2123.06 on March 19, 2010. An amended
complaint was filed on August 10, 2010. The matter proceeded to trial on August
18 and 19, 2011. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court determined that
Collins’ heirs at law pursuant to R.C. 2105.06 were Easter, Eddis, William, and
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Jonathon. Tolbert appeals from this judgment and raises the following
assignments of error.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred as a matter of law, by not properly
applying the entirety of [R.C. 3111] and misapplying [R.C.
3705.23(A)(3)], when determining the parent-child relationship
between the Decedent and the Defendants.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court lacked sufficient evidence to find that a common
law marriage existed.
Third Assignment of Error
The trial court erred as a matter of law, by finding that a
common law marriage existed after the statute of limitations for
proving a civil contract had expired.
Fourth Assignment of Error
Since the Defendants were neither parties to the marriage
contract, nor intended third (sic) beneficiaries to the marriage
contract, the Defendants are precluded from bringing an action
on said contract.
Fifth Assignment of Error
The Defendant’s attempt to prove a common law marriage is
barred by the equitable defense of laches.
Sixth Assignment of Error
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied
[Tolbert’s] motion for summary judgment.
In the interests of clarity, the assignments of error will be addressed out of order.
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{¶9} In the sixth assignment of error, Tolbert claims that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for summary judgment. When reviewing a motion for
summary judgment, courts must proceed cautiously and award summary judgment
only when appropriate. Franks v. The Lima News (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 408,
672 N.E.2d 245. “Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be
granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issues as to any material fact
remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but
one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving
party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.” State ex rel. Howard v.
Ferreri (1994),
70 Ohio St.3d 587, 589,
639 N.E.2d 1189. When reviewing the
judgment of the trial court, an appellate court reviews the case de novo.
Franks,
supra.
{¶10} The short version of the above is that in order for Tolbert to be
granted summary judgment, there can be no questions of fact. Tolbert filed his
motion for summary judgment on July 29, 2011, less than one month prior to trial.
The underlying question in this case is whether Eddis, William, and Jonathon are
the children of Collins. Tolbert argued that as a matter of law, Eddis, William,
and Jonathon, could not prove that they were the children of Collins for various
reasons. However, in their response, Eddis, William, and Jonathon alleged that
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they had already been established as the children of Collins and that the arguments
presented by Tolbert were affirmative defenses that he had to prove at trial. Eddis,
William, and Jonathon, also allege that since Tolbert filed the complaint to
determine who is a legal heir, he has waived the right to preclude anyone from
presenting evidence that they are heirs. Eddis, William, and Jonathon presented
numerous questions of fact to be resolved by the trial court. Therefore, the trial
court did not err as a matter of law by denying the motion for summary judgment.
The sixth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶11} In the third and fourth assignments of error, Tolbert alleges that
Eddis, William, and Jonathon cannot use the common law marriage between
Collins and their mother, Mary Collins (“Mary”). Tolbert claims in the third
assignment of error that they cannot use the marriage because it has been more
than 20 years since the marriage “contract” ended. The fourth assignment of error
is based upon a claim that since Eddis, William, and Jonathon were not parties to
the civil contract of marriage, they cannot enforce the provisions of it. These
arguments might be relevant if Eddis, William, and Jonathon were attempting to
enforce the provisions of the marriage contract. They are not. Instead, they are
merely using the fact that the common law marriage existed to help prove
paternity. The trial court was not asked to enforce any provision of the contract,
but merely to recognize the existence of it. This would be no different than asking
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the court to recognize a traditional marriage as existing. A marriage contract is
not a traditional contract where terms are set forth in writing prior to the parties
entering the “contract.” Instead, it is a legal relationship requiring a legal
proceeding to be terminated. Tolbert has presented no legal basis for excluding
the existence of the common law marriage. Thus, the third and fourth assignments
of error are overruled.
{¶12} Tolbert alleges in the first assignment of error that the trial court did
not correctly apply R.C. 3111 and R.C. 3705.23(A)(3). “The parent and child
relationship extends equally to all children and all parents, regardless of the
marital status of the parents.” R.C. 3111.01. In cases where paternity is in
question, the proponent may present all relevant evidence on the issue. R.C.
3111.10. In addition to the methods presented by R.C. 3111 for establishing
parentage, there are other methods. Brookbank v. Gray, 74 Ohio St.3d 279, 282
(1996), quoting White v. Randolph,
59 Ohio St.2d 6 (1979). A natural father may
legitimize a formerly illegitimate child by subsequently marrying the mother and
acknowledging the child as his.
Id.
{¶13} Tolbert argues that the alleged children are prohibited from
establishing paternity because more than five years have passed since they
respectively turned 18 years of age. R.C. 3111.05. However, the trial court
determined that the determination of parentage occurred prior to the expiration of
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the statute of limitations. In support of its claim, the trial court points to the facts.
First, all three of the birth certificates in question list Collins as the father. “A
certified copy of a vital record … issued in accordance with this section, shall
be considered for all purposes the same as the original and shall be prima-facie
evidence of the facts stated in it in all courts and places.” R.C. 3705.23. Contrary
to the argument presented by Tolbert, the statute does not limit which facts the
certificate of birth represents as factual to the fact of birth. The only portion that is
limited is that the portion for health and medical use shall not be used in the
certified copies. R.C. 3705.23(A)(4)(a). All other information, including the
identification of the parents, is included in a certified copy making it part of the
prima facie evidence. R.C. 3705.23(A)(3). Additionally, there was testimony that
Collins and the mother of Eddis, William, and Jonathon held themselves out as
married for several years, that Collins claimed the children as his, and that after
the death of their mother, the children were raised by Collins as his children
without any formal establishment of guardianship.1 At no time did Collins
question whether the children were his biological children or object to the
accuracy of the birth certificate. Until this proceeding, no one questioned whether
Eddis, William, or Jonathon were the biological children of Collins. The
statement that Collins is the father on the three birth certificates is not disputed in
1
No guardianship would be necessary for the children to reside with their biological father after the death
of their mother.
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any way.2 Thus, there is prima facie evidence that paternity was established by
agreement of the parties well before the statute of limitation expired.
{¶14} There is also evidence that Mary and William Collins Sr. considered
themselves to be in a common-law marriage. In addition to the testimony of the
children and Collins prior wife that Collins introduced Mary as his wife and the
children as his children, there is also the fact that Mary signed Eddis’ birth
certificate as “Mary Collins.” Mary’s death certificate was completed with
information provided by Collins and listed Mary’s name as Mary Collins. Mary's
obituary, presumably completed by Collins, listed Collins as her husband. If Mary
and Collins were married via common law, then there is evidence that Collins
acknowledged the children after the marriage as his and thus legitimized them.
Given all the evidence before it, the trial court correctly applied the law. The first
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶15} The second assignment of error alleges that the trial court’s ruling
was not supported by sufficient evidence. Sufficient evidence has been described
by the Ohio Supreme Court as “a test of adequacy.” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio
St.3d 328,
2012-Ohio-2179, ¶11 (quoting State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380,
386 (1997)). The question to be asked by the Appellate Court is that viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, is there some competent, credible
2
Tolbert does not argue that Eddis, William, and Jonathon are the children of anyone but Mary and
William Collins Sr. Instead, he argues that they have not established paternity in a timely manner.
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evidence to support the verdict. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
the appellate court does not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the
witnesses. Id. To do so would be to review the manifest weight of the evidence.
Id.
{¶16} A review of the evidence in this case indicates that there is more
than sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. The evidence
established that Jonathon, Eddis, and William were all born to Mary and Collins as
set forth in their birth certificates. No question of paternity was ever raised by
anyone and no one, including Collins, objected to the designation of Collins as
their father. Mary and Collins cohabitated for many years. At some point in time,
Mary started going by the name Mary Collins. She signed Eddis’ birth certificate
using the last name Collins. The reputation of the couple in the community was
that they were husband and wife and that they introduced each other in that
manner. Upon Mary’s death in 1977 from a car accident, Collins provided
information for the death certificate indicating that Mary’s last name was Collins.
Mary’s obituary listed her last name as Collins and listed William as her husband.
After her death, Collins continued to raise the children as his own and signed all
school papers as the parent of the children.
{¶17} William’s second wife, Delores Collins (“Delores”) indicated that
she had always believed that Collins and Mary were married. She testified that
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she had been a guest in their home and they were recognized as husband and wife
in the community. Delores also testified that Collins acknowledged Eddis,
William, and Jonathon as his children and introduced them as such.
{¶18} Upon the death of Collins in 2001, Easter helped draft the obituary.
Collins’ obituary listed Eddis, William, and Jonathon as his children. Upon
Easter’s death in 2009, her funeral arrangements and obituary were completed by
her children and Eddis. The obituary listed Eddis, William, and Jonathon as step-
children. In addition, Collins’ death certificate, which had Easter as the informant,
listed his name as “William Leon Collins, Sr.”. This same name was used to
identify Collins in both his obituary and in Easter’s obituary. Although Collins’
birth certificate was not part of the record, the trial court could reasonably presume
that the designation of Sr. as part of Collins’ name was not part of his birth name
and instead designated that he had a son with the same name. The obituary in fact
identifies a “William L. Collins, Jr.” as one of his children. Most notably, Tolbert
presented no evidence that Collins was not the father of Eddis, William, or
Jonathon, or that anyone ever questioned their parentage.
{¶19} The trial court reviewed all of this evidence and made the following
conclusions.
In summary, William Collins, Sr. was identified on their birth
records at the time of their births (over 44 years ago) as the
father of Eddis, Jonathon, and William, Jr. That designation
was never challenged or questioned from the time of their birth
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and through the death of both their mother and father. William
Collins, Sr. during his lifetime never challenged the fact that he
was their father. Mary Alice Collins, the mother and ultimately
his wife, during her lifetime never challenged the fact that
William, Sr. was their father. If any of those persons had reason
to challenge the paternity of William, Sr., they could have done
so. The conclusion is that they did not challenge it because none
of the principals involved ever questioned it. The birth records
of each reflected that William, Sr. was their father, a common
law marriage existed between the mother and father, the
community recognized and acknowledged him as their father
and there was no need or purpose to be served by initiating any
action to either challenge or confirm the accuracy of the birth
records. It was not challenged until someone outside their
immediate family circle (the Administrator of the estate of
William’s third wife, whom he had married thirteen years after
Mary Alice’ death) questioned it another nine years after the
death of William, Sr. with the filing of the instant Complaint to
Determine Heirship. That challenge has not been supported by
any evidence to suggest that William, Sr. is not, in fact, their
father.
The situation was exacerbated in 2001 when William’s surviving
spouse chose to omit Eddis, Jonathon and William Jr. from
Standard Probate Form 1.0 when filed on April 10 and July 5, of
that year. She also did not file a Complaint to Determine
Heirship to resolve any issues regarding inheritance at that time,
leaving Eddis, Jonathon and William, Jr. with no notice that the
estate was being administered or their heirship questioned.
Easter Collins’ omission left them with no knowledge that the
estate was even being administered, and no opportunity to assert
their claims to a right to participate in the distribution of estate
assets. When the Applications to Approve settlement and
Distribution of the wrongful death or survivor claims were filed
(in 2004 and 2005) they were not identified as possible next of
kin or heirs and were therefore not provided notice and an
opportunity to assert any claim of a right to participate in the
settlement proceeds, even though they had been long recognized
to be the children of William, Sr., and even identified as such in
his obituary. With the Amended Application to Approve the
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Second Wrongful Death Settlement (filed on April 5, 2005)
Easter Collins as fiduciary chose to attempt to provide notice to
two persons she identified as being nephews of William, Sr., but
not the three persons who had been identified (with her input
and assistance) in his obituary as his surviving children. …
…
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that on the date of his death, the heirs at law of William Collins,
Jr. (sic) under Ohio Revised Code Section 2105.06 were as
follows:
A) his surviving spouse, Easter Irene Collins
B) his daughter, Eddis Jackson
C) his son, William Collins, Jr.
D) his son, Jonathon Collins.
October 25, 2011, Judgment Entry, 9-11. The trial court’s findings are supported
by competent, credible evidence. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support
the judgment and the second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶20} In the fifth assignment of error, Tolbert claims that the doctrine of
laches prevents Eddis, Jonathon and William from being named heirs. This court
notes that laches is an affirmative defense that must be proven by the party raising
it. Civ.R. 8(C). In order to prevail upon a claim of laches, the proponent must
prove 1) that the opposing party was unreasonably delayed in pursuing the claim
and 2) that the proponent was materially prejudiced by the delay. Wiley v. Wiley,
3d Dist. No. 9-06-34, 2007-Ohio-6423, ¶14. To invoke the doctrine of laches, the
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proponent must have clean hands. Id. at ¶15. A delay, in and of itself, does not
constitute laches. Id. at ¶19.
{¶21} A review of the record in this case shows that the doctrine of laches
does not apply. First, the initial petition to relieve the estate from administration
was filed in 2001. It listed Collins probate assets as $254. The Standard Probate
Form 1.0 only listed Easter as a surviving heir, not the children. Thus, they were
given no notice of the administration of the estate. Even if they had been given
notice, the entire estate would have been appropriately distributed to Easter under
the laws of descent and distribution. However, in 2004 a motion to reopen the
estate was filed and a full administration was ordered due to a wrongful death
settlement. Standard Probate Form 1.0 was again filed with only Easter’s name on
it. Thus, again, Eddis, Jonathon and William were given no notice that the estate
was once again open and that there were assets to be distributed. The same thing
occurred in 2005, except this time, Easter listed Collins’ nephews as potential
heirs. The children, who were known to Easter at that time, were not listed. The
repeated actions of Easter and by her subsequent administrator to deny notice to
the children or to request a determination of heirship earlier meant that the
children were not given notice of the estate. In fact, the children testified that they
learned about their father’s estate from a third party after the death of Easter in
2009. That was the first notice of the estate they received. Until that time, they
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did not know there was a claim to protect because they believed the matter to be
resolved in 2001 soon after Collins’ death. The real cause of the delay was not the
actions of Eddis, Jonathon, and William, but the actions of Easter and her
subsequent administrators, including Tolbert. Since Tolbert does not come to the
court with clean hands, he cannot receive the equitable remedy of laches.
Therefore, the fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶22} Having found no error prejudicial to Appellant, the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Allen County, Probate Division, is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed.
SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
/jlr
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