2012 Pa. Super. 118 - Commonwealth v. McAdoo’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2016 Pa. Super. 97 - Com. v. Haslam, B., Jr. · Commonwealth v. Raglin

2. “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the development of three categories of interactions between citizens and the police. The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104-S.Ct. . 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 532 Pa. 62 , 614 A.2d 1378 (1992).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Raglin

3. “To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has been effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an objective test entailing a determination of whether, in view of all surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave. In evaluating the circumstances, the focus -is directed toward whether, by means of physical force or -show of: authority, the .citizen-subject’s .movement has in some way been restrained. In making this determination, courts must apply the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, with no single factor dictating the ultimate conclusion as to whether a seizure has occurred.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2016 Pa. Super. 22 - Commonwealth v. Roberts