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← 2012 Pa. Super. 56 - Commonwealth v. Hill

2012 Pa. Super. 56 - Commonwealth v. Hill’s Empirical Analysis

2012

Citation profile

4
cited by 4 later decisions
1
states following
November 2014
most recently cited

4 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Johnson v. Zerbst · United States v. Wade · Edwards v. Arizona · Colorado v. Connelly

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A defendant may waive his/her Sixth Amendment right to counsel so long .as the waiver is voluntary, knowing, .and intelligent. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 , 108 S.Ct. 2389 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988). Although a defendant’s Miranda rights have their source in the Fifth Amendment, a defendant who is admonished with the warnings set forth in Miranda has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his/her Sixth Amendment rights, and thus a waiver of his/her Miranda rights may constitute a waiver of both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. Id. at 296 , 108 S.Ct. 2389 ; see also Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 , 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2085 , 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009). The determination whether an accused has knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights depends on the facts of each particular case. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). These circumstances include the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), overruled in part on other grounds, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The government has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the waiver was “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and was “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision ”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “The Court of Appeals stated that there was no indication that Fields or his lawyer anticipated that Fields would be asked questions after the examination. But it would have been unreasonable for Fields and his attorneys to assume that Fields would not be informed of the polygraph readings and asked to explain any unfavorable result. Moreover, Fields had been informed that he could stop the questioning at any time, and could request at any time that his lawyer join him. Merely disconnecting the polygraph equipment could not remove this knowledge from Fields’ mind. [The Eighth Circuit’s rule certainly finds no support in Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ], which emphasizes that the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the suspect initiated the questioning, is controlling. Nor is the rule logical;] the questions put to Fields after the examination would not have caused him to forget the rights of which he had been advised and which he had understood moments before. The rule is simply an unjustifiable restriction on reasonable police questioning.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We likewise conclude that [trial counsel] had no reasonable basis for his actions, and that his failure to suppress [sic] [appellee]’s statement was highly prejudicial. In this regard, the PCRA court found [appelleej’s statements during the post-polygraph interrogation, when introduced by Lieutenant Kelly at trial, were incriminating. Trial Court Opinion, 1/2/07, at 4 (finding number 12). Echoing this position, at the conclusion of the PCRA evidentiary hearings, counsel for the Commonwealth conceded that the scope of [appellee]^ waiver of his constitutional right to counsel was the only genuine issue for the PCRA court’s resolution, since without [appellee]’s post-polygraph incriminating statement to Lieutenant Kelly “we are — we are basically out of court. [Appellee] would be entitled to a new trial which perhaps we couldn’t even give him.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.