129 Nev., Advance Opinion al
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
BENJAMIN JAMES CLANCY, No. 59571
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. NOV 2 7 2013
TRACIE K. LINDEMAN
CLVX GY SU5',.,E V.• WO
BY_
4
DEPUTY -LERK
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a • ry
verdict, of leaving the scene of an accident. Eighth Judicial District Court,
Clark County; Doug Smith, Judge.
Affirmed.
The Weiner Law Group, LLC, and Jason G. Weiner and Nathan Sosa, Las
Vegas,
for Appellant.
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B.
Wolfson, District Attorney, and Jonathan E. VanBoskerck, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County,
for Respondent.
BEFORE HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
In Nevada, a driver who has been involved in an accident
must stop and remain at the scene until he has provided certain
CPrree+6,J 9e,r- ei,c/71 5 keis. CT- 13-3561-19
information and rendered reasonable assistance to any person injured in
the accident. NRS 484E.010-.030. If the accident resulted in bodily injury
or the death of a person, a driver's failure to stop and remain at the scene
is a felony. NRS 484E.010(3). In this appeal, we must determine whether
the State is required to prove that the driver had knowledge that he had
been involved in an accident. Holding that such knowledge is required
and that the knowledge may be actual or constructive, we conclude that
sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury's finding that
appellant knew or should have known that he was involved in an accident
before leaving the scene. Thus, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
FACTS
Appellant Benjamin Clancy was charged with a felony for
leaving the scene of an accident that resulted in bodily injury. The
accident involved a vehicle driven by Clancy and a motorcycle operated by
Barry Robinson. Robinson was traveling southbound on Interstate 15
through Las Vegas early in the morning with his girlfriend, Erica Norris,
as a passenger. A vehicle merged in front of him and struck the front tire
or fender of his motorcycle, causing him to lose control. Robinson and
Norris fell off the motorcycle, which hit the center divider and then
skidded across the freeway, stopping in the far right emergency lane.
A passenger in a minivan traveling ahead of Robinson's
motorcycle witnessed the accident. Diane Camacho saw a silver SUV
strike Robinson's motorcycle and then accelerate, overtaking the minivan
on the right side. Camacho saw the driver of the SUV, whom she later
identified as Clancy, looking in the rearview mirror and over his shoulder
at the crash behind him. The silver SHY exited the freeway at the next
off-ramp but did not pull over. Camacho dialed 911 and gave the
dispatcher the license plate number for the silver SUV.
2
Nevada Highway Patrol Trooper George Thaw arrived on
scene to conduct an investigation. After taking photographs of the
motorcycle, he interviewed Robinson and Norris in the hospital while
waiting for his dispatcher to run the plate numbers taken by Camacho.
Thaw learned that the silver SUV belonged to Clancy, and he drove to
Nellis Air Force Base, where Clancy was stationed, to question him.
While there, he inspected Clancy's car and saw damage to the vehicle's
right rear panel, which Thaw estimated was the same height as the front
fender of Robinson's motorcycle. Thaw arrested Clancy for leaving the
scene of an accident that resulted in bodily injury to a person. Clancy
denied having any knowledge of the accident.
At trial, Clancy called an accident reconstruction specialist as
an expert witness. Based on scrutiny of the two vehicles and the nature of
the markings on Clancy's SUV, the defense expert opined that there was
no evidence of a collision between Clancy's SUV and Robinson's
motorcycle. The State did not call an expert to rebut this testimony, but it
did cross-examine the defense expert as to whether there could have been
contact between the two vehicles that could have resulted in the
motorcycle's crash without causing significant damage to the SUV.
At the close of evidence, Clancy argued in favor of a jury
instruction stating: "You must find Defendant not guilty of Leaving the
Scene of an Accident unless you find that the Defendant had actual
knowledge of the accident at the time it occurred." (Emphasis added.) The
district attorney, however, sought the following instruction: "In order to
find the Defendant guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident, you must
find that the Defendant knew or should have known that he had been
involved in an accident prior to leaving the scene of that accident."
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(Emphasis added.) The court ultimately adopted the district attorney's
proposed instruction. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Clancy argues that the district court abused its
discretion by instructing the jury that it must find that a defendant knew
or should have known that he was involved in an accident in order to find
the defendant guilty of leaving the scene of an accident because actual
knowledge is required. We disagree and hold that NRS 484E.010 requires
the State to prove that the driver either knew or should have known that
he was involved in an accident. We further conclude that NRS 484E.010's
phrase "involved in an accident" is not unconstitutionally vague or
ambiguous and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
support the jury's guilty verdict.
NRS 484E.010 requires knowledge that an accident occurred
The district court has broad discretion in determining the
appropriate jury instructions. Cortinas V. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1019,
195
P.3d 315, 319 (2008). We have declined to disturb a district court's refusal
of a jury instruction absent an abuse of discretion or judicial error. Id.
The question presented is whether the defense instruction on knowledge
should have been given because it was a correct statement of the law. See
Nay v. State, 123 Nev. 326, 330,
167 P.3d 430, 433 (2007) ("[T]he
defendant 'is not entitled to an instruction which incorrectly states the law
or that is substantially covered by other instructions." (quoting Barnier v.
State, 119 Nev. 129, 133,
67 P.3d 320, 322 (2003))). We review de novo
whether an instruction is a correct statement of the law. Id.
To determine whether the defense instruction was a correct
statement of the law, we must look to the statute defining the offense.
NRS 484E.010 provides in pertinent part:
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1. The driver of any vehicle involved in an
accident on a highway or on premises to which the
public has access resulting in bodily injury to or
the death of a person shall immediately stop his or
her vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close
thereto as possible, and shall forthwith return to
and in every event shall remain at the scene of the
accident until the driver has fulfilled the
requirements of NRS 484E.030.
3. A person failing to comply with the
provisions of subsection 1 is guilty of a category B
felony . . . .
The statute does not contain any express language regarding
the driver's knowledge that he had been involved in an accident. Because
strict liability offenses generally are disfavored, the simple omission of
appropriate terminology does not end our inquiry. See Ford v. State, 127
Nev. 262 P.3d 1123, 1127 (2011) ("many 'cases interpret[]
criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter requirements,
even where the statute by its terms does not contain them' (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70
(1994))). Our primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain the
Legislature's intent in enacting it. Moore v. State,
117 Nev. 659, 661,
27
P.3d 447, 449 (2001). "Where the language of the statute cannot directly
resolve the issue standing alone, we consider the context and spirit of the
statute in question, together with the subject matter and policy involved."
Id. at 661-62,
27 P.3d at 449 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The purpose behind NRS 484E.010 is to require drivers
involved in an accident to stop and provide identifying information and
render reasonable assistance to injured persons for the benefit of any
person who may have been injured in the accident. See generally State v.
Feintuch, 375 A.2d 1223 (N.J. Suer. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (discussing
purpose of offense of leaving the scene of an accident). It imposes an
affirmative course of action on the driver. State v. Wall, 482 P.2d 41, 45
(Kan. 1971). "Implicit therein must be the element of recognition or
awareness on the part of that driver, of the fact of [an accident]." Id. The
statute's purpose is not served where the driver is unaware of the event
requiring him to stop and provide identifying information and render
assistance—the accident. In that situation, the statute does nothing to
encourage the driver to stop and provide information and render
assistance; the driver did not stop because he was not aware that there
was a reason to do so. As the Washington Supreme Court has observed in
addressing this issue, "It is inconceivable that the legislature intended
that punishment would be imposed for failure to follow the course of
conduct outlined [stop, exchange information, and render aid], if the
operator of the vehicle was ignorant of the happening of an accident."
State v. Martin, 440 P.2d 429, 436 (Wash. 1968). Rules of statutory
construction require us to avoid such an absurd result. Accordingly, we
construe NRS 484E.010(1) to require proof of knowledge of involvement in
an accident. 1
'We acknowledge that we have declined to impose a similar
knowledge requirement with respect to the bodily-injury-or-death element
of the statute. Dettloff v. State, 120 Nev. 588, 594,
97 P.3d 586, 590 (2004)
(holding that "actual or constructive knowledge of injury or death is not an
element of the felony offense of leaving the scene of an accident"). There is
good reason for this distinction. As explained in this opinion, omitting a
knowledge requirement as to the accident element would defeat the
purpose of the statute. In contrast, adding a knowledge requirement as to
the bodily-injury-or-death element would defeat the purpose of the statute
because doing so would encourage drivers involved in an accident to leave
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Having concluded that knowledge of involvement in an
accident is required for criminal liability under NRS 484E.010, we must
determine whether that knowledge must be actual knowledge. We agree
with the State that actual knowledge need not be proven to satisfy the
knowledge requirement. 2 Imposing an actual knowledge requirement
would encourage drivers not to stop so as to avoid gaining actual
knowledge of an accident or to avoid further criminal liability, which
defeats the purpose of the statute. Cf. Dettloff v. State, 120 Nev. 588, 594,
97 P.3d 586, 590 (2004) (declining to require knowledge of injury). In
contrast, focusing on whether the driver knew or should have known that
he was involved in an accident is more consistent with the duty to stop
and render aid imposed by NRS 484E.030. The Kansas Supreme Court,
for example, provides a sound rationale for adopting such a standard:
...continued
the scene in order to avoid gaining any knowledge of potential injury or
death or to avoid an arrest for other crimes, such as driving under the
influence. Id.
2 Clancy suggests that we approved of an actual knowledge
instruction in Dettloff. In that case, we merely observed that the district
court had instructed the jury that "to find Dettloff guilty of leaving the
scene of an accident, he must have known he was involved in an accident."
120 Nev. at 593,
97 P.3d at 589. Our opinion does not reproduce the exact
language of the instruction. Even assuming that the instruction required
actual knowledge that Dettloff was involved in an accident, our decision in
that case does not address whether that part of the instruction was a
correct statement of the law. We were asked to determine whether the
instruction was a correct statement of the law to the extent that it did not
require knowledge of injury, and we addressed the instruction only as to
that issue. Id. at 593-95,
97 P.3d at 589-90.
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Direct evidence of absolute, positive, subjective
knowledge may not always be obtainable. We
think it sufficient if the circumstances are such as
to induce in a reasonable person a belief that
collision has occurred; otherwise a callous person
might nullify the humanitarian purpose of the
statute by the simple act of immediate flight from
an accident scene without ascertaining exactly
what had occurred.
State v. Wall, 482 P.2d 41, 45 (Kan. 1971) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we conclude that the jury instruction given by the
district court correctly informed the jury to determine whether Clancy
knew or should have known that he was involved in an accident, and
therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion by giving that
instruction.
NRS 484E.010 is not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous
Clancy argues that the phrase "involved in an accident" in
NRS 484E.010(1) is unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous because it is
not clear whether the phrase requires actual contact with the vehicle, or
also includes a motorcycle swerving to avoid a vehicle without any
physical contact.
We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo,
presuming that a statute is constitutional. State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev.
, 245 P.3d 550, 552 (2010). The party challenging a statute's
constitutionality "has the burden of making a clear showing of invalidity."
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). A statute is
unconstitutionally vague "(1) if it 'fails to provide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited'; or (2) if it 'is so standardless
that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement."
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Id. at ,
245 P.3d at 553 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. „ 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010)).
Although the constitutionality of the phrase "involved in an
accident" as used in NRS 484E.010(1) has never been addressed in
Nevada, a number of other jurisdictions have determined that very similar
language is not vague or ambiguous. In State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d
137 (Iowa 1983), the Iowa Supreme Court held that such language was not
vague or ambiguous because such terms were easily defined by reference
to their common dictionary definitions. Id. at 139-40. The Texas Court of
Appeals has held the same. Sheldon v. State, 100 S.W.3d 497, 500-01
(Tex. Ct. App. 2003)).
The word "accident" is commonly defined as "[a]n unintended
and unforeseen injurious occurrence." Black's Law Dictionary 16 (9th ed.
CV. 2009). Webster's yCictionary defines "involve" as "to draw in as a
participant" or "to require as a necessary accompaniment." Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 1191 (3d ed. 2002). These definitions
do not require direct physical impact between two vehicles in order to be
"involved in an accident." Other jurisdictions have concluded that similar
language does not require actual contact between vehicles. See, e.g.,
People v. Kroncke, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493, 501 (Ct. App. 1999) (interpreting
"accident" as used in California's hit-and-run statute broadly to include a
passenger jumping out of a moving car); State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d
137, 140 (Iowa 1983) ("[Iowa's hit-and-run] statute does not require a
collision between the driver's vehicle and another vehicle or person" in
order to be deemed to have been "involved" in an "accident"); State v.
Hughes, 907 P.2d 336, 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) ("[W]e conclude the
Legislature did not intend that the duty to stop, identify and render aid in
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an injury accident be interpreted so narrowly as to attach only to the
driver of a vehicle which collided with another.").
Applying the dictionary definition of the words "involved" and
"accident," and following the construction of such language as used by
other jurisdictions in their hit-and-run statutes, we conclude that NRS
484E.010 gives fair notice of what is prohibited and does not encourage
discriminatory enforcement, thus is not unconstitutionally vague. See
Castaneda, 126 Nev. at ,245 P.3d at 553.
Evidence was sufficient to support the verdict
Next, we address Clancy's argument that the evidence at trial
was insufficient to establish that a collision actually occurred or that
Clancy knew that there had been an accident.
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, this court determines
whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816,
192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). "This court will not reweigh the evidence or
evaluate the credibility of witnesses because that is the responsibility of
the trier of fact." Id.
At trial, Camacho, the witness in the vehicle in front of Clancy
and Robinson, stated that she saw Clancy's silver SUV strike Robinson's
motorcycle. On cross-examination, Clancy attempted to show that from
the angle Camacho viewed the vehicles, she could not have seen the rear
corner of Clancy's SUV and only inferred that the SUV actually made
contact with the motorcycle. Another witness, Cary Pierce, was driving
behind Robinson at the time of the accident and saw a light-colored SUV
or van make contact with Robinson's motorcycle. Pierce, distracted by the
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motorcycle crash, was unable to positively identify the vehicle he saw
strike the motorcycle.
Clancy's expert testified that the marks on Clancy's car are
not consistent with such an accident. However, the State's cross-examination attempted to raise the possibility that the nature of the
particular accident could have resulted in minimal markings on Clancy's
SUV.
As we have concluded, actual physical contact between two
vehicles is not required for a person to be involved in an accident under
NRS 484E.010. Accordingly, Camacho's observation that Clancy merged
into Robinson's motorcycle immediately followed by the motorcycle
crashing, Pierce's observation from behind that a light-colored vehicle
actually struck the motorcycle, and Robinson's observation that a vehicle
actually struck his motorcycle provide sufficient evidence for a jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Clancy's SUV was involved in an accident
with Robinson's motorcycle, even if Clancy's expert raised doubts about
whether actual contact between the vehicles occurred. See Mitchell, 124
Nev. at 816,
192 P.3d at 727.
The State's evidence was also sufficient to support the jury
finding that Clancy either knew or should have known that an accident
occurred. Specifically, Camacho testified that immediately following
Robinson's crash, she saw Clancy looking over his shoulder and at his
rearview mirror before he accelerated away and exited the freeway at the
next off-ramp, despite having entered the freeway just over a mile earlier
and still being well short of Nellis Air Force Base, his destination. Thus,
we hold that sufficient evidence supported the jury's guilty verdict.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction entered by
the district court.
Parraguirre
We concur:
Hardesty
Ott ri
Cherry
V
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