[Cite as State v. Cottrell,
2013-Ohio-2912.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99142
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
STEVE COTTRELL
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-409361
BEFORE: Stewart, A.J., S. Gallagher, J., and Keough, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 3, 2013
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Paul Mancino, Jr.
75 Public Square, Suite 1016
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Matthew E. Meyer
Adam Chaloupka
Assistant County Prosecutors
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44113
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J.:
{¶1} In 2002, a jury found defendant-appellant Steve Cottrell guilty of various
counts of aggravated murder and attempted murder, with firearm and gang specifications.
We affirmed those convictions on direct appeal, see State v. Cottrell, 8th Dist. No.
81356, 2003-Ohio-5806, but in 2012 found that the trial court erred at the time of
sentencing by not imposing a mandatory term of postrelease control. See State v.
Cottrell, 8th Dist. No. 97629,
2012-Ohio-2634, ¶ 9. We thus ordered a resentencing
“limited to the proper imposition of postrelease control.” Id. at ¶ 10. At resentencing,
Cottrell argued that despite our remand order limiting resentencing only to the issue of
postrelease control, he was entitled to a de novo resentencing on all counts and that the
provisions of R.C. 2929.191 setting forth the procedure to be followed to correct a
judgment of conviction concerning postrelease control were adopted after his original
sentencing and could not be applied retroactively to him. The court denied Cottrell’s
request for a de novo resentencing because it believed it was bound by the express terms
of the remand.
{¶2} The court properly refused to conduct a de novo resentencing on all counts
for two reasons. First, our opinion contained a mandate that Cottrell be resentenced
solely for the purpose of imposing postrelease control. That mandate was required by the
second paragraph of the syllabus to State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92,
2010-Ohio-6238,
942 N.E.2d 332, which states: “The new sentencing hearing to which an offender is
entitled under State v. Bezak is limited to proper imposition of postrelease control. (State
v. Bezak,
114 Ohio St.3d 94,
2007-Ohio-3250,
868 N.E.2d 961, syllabus, modified.)”
The court had no discretion to violate our mandate absent some intervening change in the
law. See R.C. 2949.05; State v. Carlisle, 8th Dist. No. 93266,
2010-Ohio-3407, ¶ 16-21,
aff’d on other grounds,
131 Ohio St.3d 127,
2011-Ohio-6553,
961 N.E.2d 671. In fact,
the court acknowledged the limited nature of the remand and in doing so properly limited
the proceedings to imposing postrelease control.
{¶3} Second, Cottrell’s argument that the statutory procedures for imposing
postrelease control under R.C. 2929.191, adopted after he had been sentenced in 2002,
cannot be applied retroactively to him ignores the Supreme Court’s holding in Fischer.
It is true that case decisions issued prior to Fischer — notably State v. Singleton, 124
Ohio St.3d 173,
2009-Ohio-6434,
920 N.E.2d 958 — held that R.C. 2929.191 could not
be applied retroactively to offenders who were originally sentenced prior to July 11, 2006
(the effective date of R.C. 2929.191). Fischer, however, overruled Singleton, sub
silentio, and expressly authorized the type of limited resentencing ordered by this court
and carried into execution by the trial court. See State v. Sanders, 11th Dist.
No. 2011-P-0088,
2012-Ohio-5025, ¶ 15 (collecting cases). We thus find no error in the
manner in which the court imposed postrelease control.1
Cottrell also cites State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200,
2009-Ohio-2462,
909 N.E.2d 1254,
1
for the proposition that a court, on resentencing, cannot just impose postrelease control but must
conduct a de novo resentencing. The state correctly notes that Bloomer does not stand for that
{¶4} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified
copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
proposition, and the legal proposition that Cottrell cites is from Singleton. We therefore find that
Bloomer has no application to this appeal.
