[Cite as State v. Hackworth,
2013-Ohio-3566.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WAYNE )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 12CA0043
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
DIXIE HACKWORTH WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. TRC-12-01-00725
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 19, 2013
BELFANCE, Judge.
{¶1} The State appeals the decision of the Wayne County Municipal Court granting
Dixie Hackworth’s motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.
I.
{¶2} On January 28, 2012, Sergeant Robert Gable of the State Highway Patrol stopped
the vehicle being driven by Ms. Hackworth. Based on his observations, Ms. Hackworth was
charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Ms. Hackworth filed a motion to suppress,
arguing that Sergeant Gable lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the stop.1 A
hearing was held before a magistrate, who issued a decision denying Ms. Hackworth’s
suppression motion. Ms. Hackworth objected to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that Sergeant
Gable lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop her. The trial court sustained her objection
1
Ms. Hackworth made many arguments in her motion. However, they are not pertinent
to this appeal because the trial court did not reach them, determining that its conclusion that
Sergeant Gable lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop her was dispositive.
2
and granted her motion to suppress. The State has appealed, raising a single assignment of error
for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING HACKWORTH’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS ON THE BASIS THAT THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS ILLEGAL
AND THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY.
{¶3} The State argues that the trial court erred in granting Ms. Hackworth’s motion to
suppress because Sergeant Gable had reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the stop.
{¶4} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that
[a]ppellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and
fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of
trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and
evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must
accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent,
credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then
independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.
(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003–Ohio–5372, ¶ 8. A
traffic stop is constitutionally valid if probable cause exists. Dayton v. Erickson,
76 Ohio St.3d 3
(1996), syllabus. In addition, traffic stops can be constitutionally valid if “an officer has a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a crime.” State v. Mays,
119 Ohio St.3d 406,
2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 7. Whether reasonable,
articulable suspicion exists is determined by the totality of the circumstances.
Id. See also
United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
{¶5} The dashcam video in this case shows a two-lane country road with a center line
that would become a hashed line to allow for passing. Sergeant Gable testified that Ms.
3
Hackworth had crossed the yellow line marking the edge of her lane and onto the yellow line
marking the lane for the oncoming traffic. However, the trial court found that this testimony was
inconsistent with Sergeant Gable’s spontaneous statements on the dashcam, which it determined
indicated that Ms. Hackworth had merely driven on the line marking the edge of her lane and not
onto the line marking the edge of the lane for oncoming traffic. The court also found that Ms.
Hackworth properly used her turn signals on three separate occasions during the video and that
the video shows gradual drifting consistent with normal driving patterns. It ultimately
determined that, “given the inconsistencies between the Trooper’s testimony and the dash cam
video and audio, there is no finding of a minor traffic violation sufficient to justify the stop.”
{¶6} In other words, the trial court appears to have found that no probable cause
existed to justify the stop. The trial court also observed that “[r]easonable suspicion for the stop
did not exist given the inconsistencies between the Trooper’s testimony and the recording of the
stop on the dash cam video.” However, it appears from its judgment entry that it came to this
conclusion based upon consideration of whether any specific traffic violation actually occurred
rather than examination of the totality of the circumstances, which is the correct standard for
assessing the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-
Ohio-4539, at ¶ 7. Thus, even though it may have determined that probable cause for the stop
did not exist, it is unclear whether the trial court properly considered the totality of the
circumstances with respect to assessing whether reasonable, articulable suspicion that would
justify the stop existed. Therefore, it is appropriate for this Court to reverse the trial court’s
judgment, and remand the matter so that the trial court, in the first instance, may consider the
4
totality of the circumstances in determining the presence or absence of reasonable, articulable
suspicion.2
III.
{¶7} The judgment of the Wayne County Municipal Court is reversed, and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wayne County
Municipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A
certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
2
The State argues that the officer had probable cause to stop Ms. Hackworth because she
violated R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) by failing to drive within her lane. However, this question is not
ripe for review at this time.
5
MOORE, P. J.
HENSAL. J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
DAVID C. KNOWLTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
DANIEL R. LUTZ, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATHAN R. SHAKER, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellant.