2013 Pa. Super. 255 - Commonwealth v. Feese’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “... [W]e note that vagueness challenges may be of two types. First, a challenge of facial vagueness asserts that the statute in question is vague when measured against any conduct which the statute arguably embraces. Second, a claim that a statute is vague as applied contends the law is vague with regard to the particular conduct of the individual challenging the statute. For a court to entertain challenges of facial vagueness, the claims must involve First Amendment issues. When a case does not implicate First Amendment matters, vagueness challenges are to be evaluated in light of the facts at hand— that is, the statute is to be reviewed as applied to the defendant’s particular conduct. [Habay] contends the conflict of interest statute, discussed supra, is vague both facially and as applied to him. He claims the vagueness arises because the statute does not define the phrase “Use ... of the authority of his office or employment” or the phrase “for the private pecuniary benefit of himselfl.]” [Habay] does not develop an argument demonstrating that his claim is a First Amendment issue. As such, we need only determine whether the statute is vague as applied to him. For the reasons that follow, we find the statute is not vague under the facts of this case. In any event, as our discussion will also show, even if [Habay’s] claims did implicate the First Amendment, it is patently clear that the statute at hand is not vague on its face. The phrases challenged by [Habay] use commonly”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2014 Pa. Super. 44 - Commonwealth v. Orie · Commonwealth v. Veon

2. “A. WHERE THE TRIAL COURT MET WITH THE JURY OUTSIDE OF THE PRESENCE OF [APPELLANT] AND COUNSEL AND ANSWERED QUESTIONS WHICH PERTAINED TO THE COURT’S CHARGE AND ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE, WAS [APPELLANT] DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND TO A FAIR TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE [1], SECTION 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH, AS WELL AS PA.R.CRIM.P. 647(C)? B. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT [APPELLANT] WAS GUILTY OF ENGAGING IN A “CONFLICT OF INTEREST?” C. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT [APPELLANT] WAS GUILTY OF THEFT BY UNLAWFUL TAKING OR DISPOSITION? D. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT [APPELLANT] WAS GUILTY OF THEFT OF SERVICES? E. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT [APPELLANT] WAS GUILTY OF THEFT BY DECEPTION? F. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT [APPELLANT] WAS GUILTY OF THEFT BY FAILURE TO MAKE REQUIRED DISPOSITION OF FUNDS? G. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT [APPELLANT] WAS GUILTY OF CONSPIRACY? H. WHERE THE TRIAL COURT PERMITTED A CHART WHICH WAS NOT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE TO BE PROVIDED TO THE JURY IN THE DELIBERATION ROOM, WHETHER SUCH VIOLATED [APPELLANT’S] RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, AS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, AS WELL AS THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE? I. WHETHER THE DELIBERATE DESTRUC”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2014 Pa. Super. 112 - Commonwealth v. Stetler

3. “In Skilling, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the honest services statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 , was limited in application to bribe and kickback schemes, and that any additional interpretations, particularly those that included deprivations not only of money or property, but also of intangible rights, would run afoul of the vagueness doctrine. The statutory text of the honest services statute at issue in Skilling is not remotely similar to that of the instant case. Furthermore, the Commonwealth did not allege any sort of intangible right deprivation as the basis of charging [ajppellant with violations of [section 1103(a)]. Accordingly, Skilling does not undermine the holding in Habay , nor does it have any controlling or persuasive authority in the instant case.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2017 Pa. Super. 214 - Commonwealth v. Berry