Slip opinions decided 2013 — Tax Court Memorandum

R determined a tax deficiency, an addition to tax under I.R.C. sec. 6651(a)(1), and an accuracy-related penalty under I.R.C. sec. 6662(a). The deficiency stems from R's disallowance of certain deductions taken by Ps' jointly owned entities treated as partnerships for Federal income tax purposes. The parties stipulated the agreed amount of the disputed income and expense items and the period of late filing of the 2007 tax return for purposes of the I.R.C. sec. 6651(a)(1) addition to tax, leaving only the I.R.C. sec. 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty in dispute. Held: Ps are liable for the I.R.C. sec. 6662(a) penalty.

Both P and R have moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether D (1) made gifts to his nieces (intervenors herein), in 2001 and 2002, of all the units of an LLC… Held: R's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the date-of-gift issue will be granted on the basis of collateral estoppel and, alternatively, because the 2001 and 2002 gifts were, in fact, gifts for Federal gift tax purposes. P's motion with respect to that issue will be denied. 2.

R determined that a corporation's compensation packages for its owner-employees were unreasonable and disallowed deductions for compensation paid for the 2003 through 2005 tax years. Held: The compensation packages paid to the corporation's owner-employees were reasonable and deductible under I.R.C. sec. 162, for the 2003, 2004, and 2005 tax years to the extent determined herein. The compensation paid to the owner-employees' daughter, Grace-Ann Strick, was unreasonable.

Ps filed petitions for review of a notice of Federal tax lien filing pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6320 in response to R's determinations that the collection actions were appropriate. Held: We exercise our discretion and remand these cases to IRS Appeals to clarify and supplement the record as the parties deem appropriate to consider P-H's medical condition.

R determined a deficiency in E's Federal estate tax. In a separate notice of deficiency, R determined a Federal gift tax deficiency for D's 2000 tax year. Held: The values of the High Meadows parcels of real property were higher, on the applicable gift tax and estate tax valuation dates, than those reported on the respective filed gift and estate tax returns. The values were at the same time lower than those determined in the notices of deficiency.

R determined deficiencies in P's 2007 and 2008 Federal income tax. P and R dispute whether P is entitled to deduct expenses in excess of the gross income from her horse activity, whether the death of P's stallion was a casualty loss, and whether P is entitled to deduct legal and professional expenses. Held: P is not entitled to deductions for the expenses incurred in her horse activity for the 2007 and 2008 tax years. Held further, the death of P's stallion was not a casualty loss in the 2008 tax year. Held further, P is not entitled to deduct the disputed legal and professional expenses for the 2007 and 2008 tax years. Held further, P is not liable for the I.R.C. sec. 6662(a) accuracy-related penalties for the 2007 and 2008 tax years.

P filed a petition for judicial review pursuant toI.R.C. sec. 6330(d)(1), in response to R's determination that levy action was appropriate. Held: R's determination is sustained in the absence of abuse of discretion by R's settlement officer.

R determined an income tax deficiency and an accuracy-related penalty under I.R.C. sec. 6662(a). R alleges P received but did not report income from the settlement of a lawsuit. R further asserts an increased deficiency for the portion of the settlement P's attorney retained as a fee. Held: The settlement proceeds P received are taxable income. Held, further, the portion of the settlement proceeds P's attorney retained constitutes taxable income to P. Held, further, P is liable for the I.R.C. sec. 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty.

R disallowed certain business expense deductions P claimed on his 2006 and 2007 tax return and determined deficiencies in income tax, additions to tax pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6651(a)(1) for failing to timely file the 2006 and 2007 tax returns, and accuracy-related penalties under I.R.C. sec. 6662(a) for P's 2006 and 2007 tax years. Held: P did not substantiate expense deductions for travel, meals, entertainment, and car expenses. Held, further, P is entitled to a portion of his claimed deductions for promotion and materials costs in connection with his real estate business for 2006 and 2007. Held, further, P is liable for additions to tax pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6651(a)(1) for failing to timely file his 2006 and 2007 tax returns. Held, further, P is liable for accuracy-related penalties pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6662(a) for 2006 and 2007.

R moves for summary judgment that he may proceed with collection of assessed tax and interest following a collection due process hearing and a determination by R's Appeals Office (Appeals) that a notice of Federal tax lien may stand. P objects on the basis that there is a genuine dispute as to the material fact of whether Appeals properly refused to settle his liability on the same terms allegedly offered to other similarly situated taxpayers. He had raised the same issue during a previous hearing following his receipt of a notice of intent to levy. 1. Held: Appeals did not abuse its discretion in concluding that P was making the same claim both during the levy hearing and in response to the lien notice. 2. Held, further, whether in making his claim in response to the lien notice P intended to raise a challenge to his underlying liability (for tax and interest) or whether he intended to request a settlement of that liability, he was precluded from raising the issue, under the first alternative pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) and under the second alternative pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6330(c)(4). 3. Held, further, it was harmless error for the settlement officer to rely on the former section rather than the latter.

R determined that the compensation P paid to E, its employee and owner, was unreasonable and disallowed its deduction for the tax year ending Aug. 31, 2004. Held: E's compensation was reasonable and deductible under I.R.C. sec. 162 to the extent determined herein. Held, further, P is liable for a portion of the I.R.C. sec. 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty as redetermined in this opinion.

In response to R's notice of a proposed levy, P's request for a collection due process ("CDP") hearing under I.R.C. sec. 6330(d) for his 2005 income tax requested abatement of penalty and stated that he wanted a collection alternative—an offer-in-compromise ("OIC") or an installment agreement ("IA"). At the CDP hearing before R's Office of Appeals ("Appeals"), P submitted a financial statement (on Form 433-A, "Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals") and an OIC concerning his 2005-2008 income tax liabilities. P did not raise the abatement of penalty issue during the CDP hearing or submit a proposed plan for an IA. To evaluate P's OIC, Appeals requested documentation concerning P's assets and income. P was given several extensions of deadlines to provide this additional documentation, but he never fully complied with Appeals' request. Nonetheless, on the basis of the financial information provided, Appeals determined P could fully pay his 2005-2008 liabilities. Appeals determined to reject P's OIC and proceed with the proposed levy to collect P's unpaid 2005 liability. P filed a petition in this Court, and R moved for summary judgment. Held: Appeals did not abuse its discretion in rejecting P's OIC and determining to proceed with the proposed levy, because P failed to produce all the requested documentation about his assets and income. Held, further, Appeals did not abuse its discretion in rejecting P's OIC when Appeals determined that P could fully pay his 2005-2008 liabilities. Held, further, Appeals did not abuse its discretion in not considering the abatement of penalty issue when P did not raise it at the CDP hearing. Held, further, Appeals did not abuse its discretion in not considering an IA when P proposed none.

P failed to file a Federal income tax return for tax year 2008. R prepared a substitute for return ("SFR") pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6020 and issued to P a notice of deficiency that included the tax shown on the SFR as well as additions to tax under I.R.C. secs. 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654. P did not file a petition with this Court for redetermination of the deficiency, and R assessed the tax and the additions. R later issued to P a final notice of intent to levy to collect the unpaid tax liability. In response P requested a collection due process hearing before R's Office of Appeals ("Appeals") pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6330, claiming that the SFR failed to take into account deductions to which P was entitled. After requesting a hearing, P filed an untimely return for 2008 in which he claimed deductions and showed a lesser amount of tax due than had been calculated in the SFR. R accepted the return and abated a portion of the tax, so that the remaining tax assessed equaled P's self-reported liability. R also abated portions of the additions to tax to reflect the reduced tax. At the CDP hearing P raised only a concern that the total amount R claimed was due was greater than the amount shown on the return P had filed. The Appeals officer informed P that the difference between the amount due and the amount shown on the return constituted additions to and interest on the tax shown on P's return. P raised no other issues at the hearing and Appeals issued a notice of determination sustaining the levy notice. P filed with this Court a timely petition for review of that determination, claiming for the first time that he had reasonable cause with respect to his failure to file a return and his failure to pay tax and that the additions to tax should be abated. R moved for summary judgment on the ground that P cannot challenge his underlying liability, because he received a prior notice of deficiency, and that IRS Appeals did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the levy notice. Held: P is barred from asserting "reasonable cause" and challenging his underlying liability for the additions to tax pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6330(c)(2)(B) because he received a notice of deficiency determining those additions to tax. Held, further, Appeals did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the levy notice, and R's motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Finkl intended to terminate its defined benefit plan and added Amendment 1 to effect that intention, providing, inter alia, for distributions as part of the termination process. Held: and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that Amendment 2 did not constitute an impermissible cutback and that Ps were not entitled to the benefits they claimed. The period within which Ps could file a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court expired.

R determined a deficiency and a penalty for P's 2008 tax year. Held: P does not qualify under any of the exceptions pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 72(t) and is liable for the 10% additional tax for early distributions from the retirement plans for 2008. Held, further, P is liable for the accuracy-related penalty pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6662(a) for 2008.

P-W was facing foreclosure on two pieces of real property. Held: The sale of the New Jersey property was a sale for Federal income tax purposes. Held, further, P-W realized both capital gain income and discharge of indebtedness ordinary income on the sale of the New Jersey property, in the amounts indicated.

Ps filed a motion for recovery of reasonable administrative and litigation costs pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 7430. Held: R's position was substantially justified. Held: R's position was substantially justified. P is not entitled to recovery of reasonable administrative and litigation costs.

R prepared a substitute for return for P's 2003 year, showing income tax due. In response to P's FOIA request, R gave him a transcript that showed no tax had been assessed. R later issued a notice of intent to levy, and P timely requested a hearing under I.R.C. sec. 6330. During the hearing P contended that no assessment had been made and raised various frivolous arguments. The IRS Office of Appeals obtained an up-to-date transcript of P's account to verify, pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6330(c)(1), that the tax had been duly assessed and issued to P a final notice of determination that it would proceed with a levy. P appealed that determination to this Court, asserting that "no legal assessment is on record". R moved for summary judgment, for a penalty under I.R.C. sec. 6673, and for the levy to proceed under I.R.C. sec. 6330(e)(2). P opposed, contending that his 2003 liability had been settled in full by a "Demand for Set-off of Claim". Held: The Office of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in consulting only a transcript of P's account to verify the assessment, notwithstanding P's reliance on a prior transcript to dispute the fact of the assessment. P's contention about a "Demand for Set-off of Claim" lacks any basis in fact or in law. R's motion for summary judgment will be granted. Held, further, P's use of frivolous arguments throughout the collection review proceedings is manifestly an attempt to delay collection without justification. R's motion to permit levy will be granted. Held, further, R's motion for a penalty under I.R.C. sec. 6673 will be denied, and P will not be required to pay a penalty.

R determined a deficiency in Ps' 2007 Federal income tax. Held: P-H failed to prove that he spent more time performing services for a real estate trade or business than he spent performing services for other trades or businesses. Therefore P-H is not a real estate professional.

Ps operated a consulting business, maintained a residence in Illinois, and did much of their consulting work at various other warmer locations while living in their motor home. Held: With a few exceptions, Ps failed to substantiate their entitlement to business expense deductions beyond those R already allowed. Held, further, Ps are entitled to deduct the interest they paid on the loan secured by their motor home as deductible home mortgage interest under I.R.C. sec. 163(h).

P is a gymnastics booster club. In June 1988 the IRS granted P's request to be recognized as exempt from Federal income tax under I.R.C. sec. 501(c)(3) as an organization fostering amateur sports competition. In its fiscal year ending June 30, 2003, P's members were parents of young athletes from approximately 240 families. The athletes were all on teams from one local private gym, to which each family individually paid tuition and other fees. These teams competed in meets, which required substantial additional funds that P collected and administered. Membership in P was mandatory for the parents of athletes who wanted to participate on the teams that were operated out of that private gym, and each family paid to P an annual assessment to cover the athlete's entry fees to compete in the meets and to offset the estimated expenditures for the coaches' travel. The assessment ranged from $600 to $1,400 per athlete for FY 2003, depending on the athlete's competitive level. A family could satisfy its athlete's assessment either by paying cash or by participating in P's fundraising program. The amount that an athlete's family raised was credited against his assessment. About 46% of the families engaged in fundraising in FY 2003. This fundraising generated a net profit of $35,326. P used 93% of that profit to reduce the assessment on average by 50 to 70% for the families that fundraised. P did not credit any of this profit against the assessments of the athletes whose families did not fundraise. R examined P's operations for FY 2003 and determined that it was not operated exclusively for tax-exempt purposes under I.R.C. sec. 501(c)(3). P petitioned for a declaratory judgment under I.R.C. sec. 7428(a). Held: R's final adverse determination is sustained because P was not operated exclusively for exempt purposes within the meaning of I.R.C. sec. 501(c)(3). P's net earnings inured to the benefit of its fundraising parent members, and it conferred substantial private benefit on children of those fundraising families.

J and OC (LLCs) each purchased a 7.93% working interest in an oil and gas leasehold. Each deducted expenses on its returns for the audit years (2004-06 for J, 2004 and 2005 for OC) that were allegedly associated with its working interest. R issued notices of final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAAs) to the LLCs denying the deductions, treating reported losses as passive activity losses under I.R.C. sec. 469, and asserting accuracy-related penalties under I.R.C. sec. 6662. After a trial addressing the issues raised in the FPAAs (substantive issues), we issued an order directing the parties to address our concern that the so-called income programs purchased by the LLCs constituted partnerships for Federal income tax purposes so that we were without jurisdiction to consider the merits of what would then be the LLCs' pass-through deductions from a source partnership (i.e., computational adjustments) at the LLCs' (partner) level, before the propriety of those deductions had been decided at the source partnership level, citing Sente Inv. Club P'ship of Utah v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 243, 248 (1990); Maxwell v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 783, 788 (1986); and Alhouse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-652, aff'd sub nom. Bergford v. Commissioner, 12 F.3d 166 (9th Cir. 1993). Both parties moved to reopen the record, which we did, and we conducted a second trial to address the jurisdictional issue. R argues that the income programs did not constitute partnerships for Federal tax purposes and that, therefore, we have jurisdiction to decide the substantive issues. P argues that the LLCs were members of "de facto" partnerships so that we lack jurisdiction to decide the substantive issues. 1. Held: Each LLC, together with the other working interest owners in the leasehold, joined together to conduct an unincorporated business, which, for Federal income tax purposes, must be classified as a partnership. 2. Held, further, the FPAAs issued to the LLCs, to the extent that they make adjustments only with respect to the substantive issues (partnership items), are invalid because there have been no source partnership-level proceedings. 3. Held, further, we will, therefore, on our own motion dismiss these consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction insofar as the individual FPAAs pertain to computational items.

Held: Evidence that insurance company A's loss reserves (1) were actuarially computed in accordance with the rules of the National… Held: Evidence that insurance company A's loss reserves (1) were actuarially computed in accordance with the rules of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the Actuarial Standards of Practice (ASOPs) and (2) fell within a range of reasonable reserve estimates as determined by A's appointed actuary in accordance…

Ps organized PCSC, an S corporation, in which P-M and P-D had ownership interests. Held: P-M and P-D are not entitled to deduct PCSC's losses because (1) Ps did not substantiate those losses, (2) P-M and P-D did not have sufficient basis in PCSC's stock to support deductions, since P-M's and P-D's alleged basis in PCSC's stock resulted from a series of paper transactions that largely canceled out one another and did not…

Ps failed to report pass-through items from two S corporations on their original returns; instead they attached statements prepared by their tax return preparer promising to file amended… Held: No substantial authority supports Ps' treatment of the corporate income, nor did they adequately disclose that treatment. Held, further, Ps have failed to show that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith in failing to estimate and report income from the corporations.

R issued a mathematical or clerical error notice to Ps for the 2008 tax year, which gave rise to an overpayment of $7,714. Held: This Court lacks jurisdiction to review R's application of the overpaid amount determined in the mathematical or clerical notice with respect to tax liabilities other than for 2008, the year for which the notice of deficiency was issued.

P, a fugitive from justice, underpaid his 2006 and 2007 Federal income tax. R determined for each year an I.R.C. sec. 6663(a) fraud penalty. P's business partner, not P, signed the 2007 return prepared for P. R received the 2007 return and processed it as P's. Held: Because the business partner was not properly authorized to sign the 2007 return, it is not a valid return for purposes of I.R.C. sec. 6663(a). SeeI.R.C. sec. 6664(b). Held, further, the Form 870, Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in Tax and Acceptance of Overassessment, signed by P's agent, is not a return. Held, further, because R has failed to prove that P deliberately filed his 2007 return after the due date, we will not sustain a delinquency addition to tax under I.R.C. sec. 6651(f) for fraudulent failure to file a return. Held, further, P is liable for an I.R.C. sec. 6663(a) fraud penalty for 2006.

On or about Oct. 15, 2001, the extended due date for Ps' 2000 Federal income tax return, Ps submitted to R's Andover, Massachusetts, Service Center a joint Federal income tax return for 2000, signed under penalties of perjury by P-H, but not by P-W. Upon receipt, the service center date-stamped the return, made handwritten markings indicating a missing signature, and mailed the return back to Ps with a form requesting that P-W sign it and that Ps return it to the service center within 20 days. Ps did not mail back the 2000 return with P-W's signature to the service center as requested. On July 29, 2002, respondent issued a "Taxpayer Delinquency Notice" to Ps. In response, Ps submitted a second joint Federal income tax return for 2000. The second 2000 return was identical to the first except that it was signed by both Ps opposite a date of Aug. 25, 2002, and bore neither the Oct. 15, 2001, date stamp nor the service center's markings on the original return. It was received by the service center on Sept. 2, 2002. Beginning on July 1, 2005, R obtained from Ps a series of consents extending the period of limitations on assessment and collection for 2000 until June 30, 2010, a date after the May 17, 2010, issuance of the notice of deficiency covering Ps' 2000 tax year. Ps allege that those consents are invalid because the I.R.C. sec. 6501(a) period of limitations on assessment and collection with respect to Ps' 2000 Federal income tax expired on Oct. 15, 2004, three years after they filed the initial 2000 return. Held: Ps are estopped from raising the affirmative defense of the period of limitations with regard to any 2000 deficiencies; 2000 remains open for assessment and collection of Federal income tax.

In 2001 P was convicted of tax crimes, including I.R.C. sec. 7201 tax evasion with respect to his 1991 tax year. R assessed an I.R.C. sec. 6663(a) civil fraud penalty of $23,104 for the 1991 tax year in August 2008. R issued notice and demand for payment of the $23,104 penalty plus interest of $53,385. P offered to compromise this liability, but R rejected the offer and filed a notice of Federal tax lien (NFTL). P then timely requested a collection due process hearing to review the rejection of his offer-in-compromise and the filing of the NFTL. Appeals rejected the offer-in-compromise and sustained the filing of the NFTL. Held: The administrative record is insufficient to determine whether Appeals appropriately considered P's health. Remand to clarify and supplement the record is appropriate.

P claimed a deduction for research expenses on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, of his 2007 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for a film series he was producing. After R issued a notice of deficiency, P requested that the costs be allowed as deductible qualified film production cost expenses pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 181. P did not timely make the required I.R.C. sec. 181(a) election to treat production costs as deductible for the 2007 tax year. Held: P is unable to currently deduct the 2007 film series research expenses pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 181 because he did not make a valid timely I.R.C. sec. 181 election; and even if this Court were to apply the doctrine of substantial compliance to accept P's 2007 Form 1040, Schedule C as a valid I.R.C. sec. 181 election, P would still not be entitled to the benefit of the I.R.C. sec. 181 deduction because he has not met the requirement of starting principal photography.

This is an estate tax valuation case in which R has increased the value of an interest in an LLC included in the value of the gross estate. The parties have stipulated copies of the pleadings. In the petition, P avers that he has obtained a new appraisal, "a copy of which" is attached to the petition. R admits only that a new appraisal is attached to the petition. P argues that the appraisal was admitted in evidence by stipulation and must be considered by us as expert testimony notwithstanding P's failure to qualify the author of the appraisal as an expert pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 or to satisfy Rule 143(g), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, addressing expert witness reports, and the provisions of our standing pretrial order addressing expert testimony. Held: We exclude the appraisal from evidence for failure of P to satisfy the preconditions to our receiving expert testimony. Held, further, the value of the interest in the LLC is determined.

Ps seek reasonable administrative costs pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 7430(f)(2), which were incurred in connection with tax years previously before this Court. Stipulated decisions were entered in all of those prior cases but were silent as to an agreement on reasonable administrative and litigation costs. Ps did not file motions for an award of reasonable administrative and litigation costs before the decisions in those cases became final. Held: The doctrine of res judicata applies, and Ps are not entitled to an award of reasonable administrative costs under I.R.C. sec. 7430(f)(2).

Participant, T, acting on behalf of Peking Investment Fund, LLC (PIF), as PIF's tax matters partner (TMP), executed a series of consents extending the I.R.C. sec. 6229(a) periods of limitations for making assessments (periods of limitations) with respect to PIF's 2001-04 taxable years (years in issue) until Dec. 31, 2008. T executed those consents pursuant to his appointment as PIF's TMP by H, acting on behalf of CMI, PIF's member-manager and its then TMP. R's agent auditing PIF's returns for the years in issue was notified of that appointment, and he solicited and accepted the consents in the belief that they were properly executed by T as PIF's new TMP. T and his wife (Ts) also executed consents extending to that same date the periods of limitations for making assessments against them for their 2001-03 taxable years, including assessments attributable to items of a partnership. T moves for summary judgment that the consents he executed on behalf of PIF are invalid and that the FPAA, issued on Dec. 30, 2008, is, therefore, untimely, on the ground that, as a nonmanaging member of PIF, he was not qualified to be PIF's TMP and not otherwise authorized to sign the consents. SeeI.R.C. sec. 6229(b)(1)(B). For 2001, T argues in the alternative that the initial consent, properly executed by H, on behalf of PIF's then TMP, CMI, was executed after the period of limitations for 2001 had expired. As an alternative basis for his motion, T argues that, because R had opposed T's motion to elect to participate in this case on the ground that T was never PIF's TMP, R is both judicially and equitably estopped from alleging that any of the foregoing consents are valid extensions of the periods of limitations. R argues that (1) PIF's appointment of T as PIF's TMP effectively authorized him to execute the consents on behalf of PIF, (2) in the alternative, CMI's resignation and appointment of T as PIF's TMP was ineffective so that CMI remained PIF's TMP, and T, as CMI's vice president, was authorized to execute the consents on CMI's behalf, (3) for 2001, the initial consent was timely executed by H, and (4) the doctrines of judicial and equitable estoppel are inapplicable to invalidate the foregoing consents. R moves for summary judgment that the consents executed by the Ts for 2001-03, and by T for 2004, are valid with respect to them individually so that the FPAA is timely with respect to T's distributive share of PIF's partnership items for the years in issue. 1. Held: T's motion for summary judgment that the initial consent for PIF's 2001 taxable year was untimely will be denied because there remains a genuine dispute as to material facts. 2. Held, further, R is not barred by the doctrines of judicial and/or equitable estoppel from relying on the foregoing consents. 3. Held, further, the consents that T executed on behalf of PIF extended the periods of limitations beyond the issuance of the FPAA on the ground that (1) T's appointment as PIF's TMP effectively authorized him to execute the consents pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6229(b)(1)(B) and, alternatively, (2) T is estopped from denying his authority, as PIF's ostensible TMP, to execute consents on PIF's behalf for the years in issue. 4. Held, further, R is not estopped by any misconduct from relying upon the consents that the Ts executed for 2001 to extend the period of limitations for that year beyond the issuance of the FPAA.