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← 2014 ND 152 - State v. Smith

State v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

2014

Citation profile

28
cited by 28 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
6
states following
December 2018
most recently cited

25 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on South Dakota v. Neville · 133 S. Ct. 1552 - Missouri v. McNeely · McCoy v. North Dakota Department of Transportation · State v. Brooks · State v. Mitzel

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The applicable standard of review of a district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence is well established. When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the district court’s findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. We affirm the district court’s decision unless we conclude there is insufficient competent evidence to support the decision, or unless the decision goes against the manifest weight of the evidence. Whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal. The existence of consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Whether consent is voluntary is generally decided from the totality of the circumstances. Our standard of review for a claimed violation of a constitutional right is de novo.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “1. A person may not drive or be in_ actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if any of the following apply: [[Image here]] e. That individual refuses to submit to any of the following: [[Image here]] (2) A chemical test, or tests, of the individual’s blood, breath, or urine to determine the alcohol concentration or presence of other drugs, or combination thereof, in the individual’s blood, breath, or urine, at the direction of a law enforcement officer under section 39-20-01; ... [[Image here]] 2. An individual who operates a motor vehicle on a highway or on public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state who refuses to submit to a chemical test, or tests, required under section ... 39-20-01 ... is guilty of an offense under this section.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “As a threshold matter, Brooks’s argument is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's discussion of implied consent laws in McNeely. As the Supreme Court recognized in McNeely, implied consent laws, which 'require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to [blood alcohol concentration] testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense,' are ‘legal tools’ states continue to have to enforce their drunk driving laws. The Court noted that these laws typically require suspected drunk drivers to take a test for the presence of alcohol and mandate that a driver’s license will be revoked if they refuse a test. By using this 'legal tool’ and revoking a driver’s license for refusing a test, a state is doing the exact thing Brooks claims it cannot do — conditioning the privilege of driving on agreeing to a warrantless search.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.