¶1specially concurring.
¶2[¶ 29] I concur with the result and the reasoning in the majority opinion. I write separately only because, in my -view of the law, there is no such thing as a tort action for “fraud” as asserted by Podrygula. For the reasons I articulated in Erickson v. Brown, 2008 ND 57, ¶¶ 59-93, 747 N.W.2d 34 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), deceit is a tort claim and fraud is a claim for avoidance of a contract.
¶3[¶ 30] Both fraud and deceit claims are provided for by statute. Fraud is part of the chapter on consent to contractual obligations. See N.D.C.C. ch. 9-03. Deceit is part of the chapter on obligations imposed by law. See N.D.C.C. ch. 9-10. My persistent writings on the distinction between fraud and deceit are more than academic discussions because the claims have similar but different proof requirements and result in different remedies. Erickson, 2008 ND 57, ¶¶ 59-93, 747 N.W.2d 34 (Crothers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
¶4[¶ 31] Daniel J. Crothers