[Cite as State v. Crawley,
2014-Ohio-1949.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100145
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
HERBERT Q. CRAWLEY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-13-570726
BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., S. Gallagher, P.J., and E.A. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 8, 2014
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Christopher M. Kelley
75 Public Square, Suite 700
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Aleksandra Chojnacki
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Herbert Q. Crawley (“Crawley”), appeals his domestic
violence and abduction convictions. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm.
{¶2} Crawley was charged with one count of felonious assault, one count of
domestic violence, and one count of abduction. The domestic violence charge included a
furthermore specification alleging that Crawley knew the victim was pregnant at the time
of the offense. Crawley waived his right to a jury trial and the case proceeded to a bench
trial.
{¶3} The victim, Kimberly Torres (“Torres”), testified that she and Crawley lived
together from approximately October 2012 until January 2013. In December 2012,
Torres learned she was pregnant. Crawley had purchased a home pregnancy test for
Torres because she was experiencing pregnancy-like symptoms, and the test results were
positive.
{¶4} On January 12, 2013, after playing slot machines for a couple hours at the
Horseshoe Casino, Torres and Crawley began arguing and decided to return home.
Crawley, who was angry, drove the truck at excessive speeds. Torres continually asked
him to slow down and stop, but he refused.
{¶5} Eventually Crawley stopped at a red light, and Torres exited the truck.
Crawley drove the truck onto the curb where Torres was standing and knocked her over.
He picked her up, put her back in the truck then backhanded her in the mouth and
continued to argue as he drove home. Although the truck “bumped” Torres, she did not
believe Crawley intended to hit her with the vehicle. The argument continued inside the
house as Crawley placed his hands on her neck and choked her to the point of near
unconsciousness. Meanwhile, Torres’s daughter, who was in the house, called the
police.
{¶6} Officer Jonathan B. Hejny (“Hejny”) testified that he responded to Torres’s
house and found her in an upstairs bedroom with a split and swollen lip. According to
Hejny, Torres was “scared,” and “crying.” He explained: “[S]he was very intimidated
and scared of the suspect, Mr. Crawley. That was my impression, she was just
intimidated.” Another officer took a photograph of Torres’s face that depicts the injury
and is included in the record.
{¶7} Torres made a statement to police regarding the incident the following
morning. She testified that when she awoke that morning, her neck was bruised and
sore. However, the detective who interviewed her in her home did not take any
photographs of her neck. Torres refused medical treatment on the night of the incident
because she did not want to go to the hospital. She also declined to seek medical
treatment when she suffered a miscarriage seven days after the incident.
{¶8} The trial court granted Crawley’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal in part and
dismissed the felonious assault charge. However, the court found Crawley guilty of
abduction and domestic violence, with the pregnancy specification. The court sentenced
Crawley to nine months on the abduction charge and six months on the domestic violence
charge to be served concurrently. Crawley now appeals and raises three assignments of
error.
Pregnancy Specification
{¶9} In the first assignment of error, Crawley argues there was insufficient
evidence to establish the pregnancy specification.
{¶10} The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the prosecution
met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266,
2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks,
61
Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶11} Crawley was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A), which states that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause
physical harm to a family or household member.” R.C. 2919.25(D)(5) provides the
furthermore specification of which Crawley was found guilty and states, in relevant part,
that “if the offender knew that the victim of the violation was pregnant at the time of the
violation, a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section is a felony of the fifth degree,
and the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender.”
{¶12} Crawley contends his conviction on the furthermore specification was not
supported by sufficient evidence because there were no medical records to corroborate
Torres’s testimony that she was pregnant. He also argues Torres’s testimony was not
credible because she did not seek prenatal care during the early weeks of her pregnancy.
However, in a sufficiency analysis we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
state, without regard to credibility. Jenks, at paragraph two of the syllabus. Torres
testified that not only was she pregnant, but Crawley knew she was pregnant because he
purchased the pregnancy test and was aware of the results.
{¶13} Furthermore, medical records were not required to prove that Crawley
violated the pregnancy specification. As in many cases, credible witness testimony is
sufficient to establish all the elements of a crime. For example, criminal liability in rape
cases are often established solely on the victim’s testimony. In re C.T., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 97278, 2013-Ohio-2458; State v. McComas, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No.
2013 AP 03 0013,
2013-Ohio-3180 (stating that “[a]s with most, if not all, cases of rape,
it is generally a ‘he said, she said’ situation.”) Therefore, all the elements of the
specification were established through credible witness testimony, and this evidence, by
itself, is sufficient to sustain the pregnancy specification.
{¶14} The first assignment of error is overruled.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶15} In the second assignment of error, he contends his domestic violence
conviction with the pregnancy specification was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶16} A challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence attacks the verdict in
light of the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). When reviewing a claim that the
judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence, we review the entire record,
weigh both the evidence and all the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Patterson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
100086,
2014-Ohio-1621, ¶ 48, citing Thompkins at 387.
{¶17} It is difficult to overcome the manifest weight standard because the
resolution of factual issues resides with the trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d
230,
227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. The trier of fact has the
authority to “‘believe or disbelieve any witness or accept part of what a witness says and
reject the rest.’” State v. Flachbart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99248,
2013-Ohio-3807, ¶
13, quoting State v. Antill,
176 Ohio St. 61, 67,
197 N.E.2d 548 (1964). Therefore, an
appellate court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence only
in extraordinary circumstances to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice, and only when
the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal.
Id.
{¶18} In this case, there is substantial evidence upon which the court could
reasonably conclude that the furthermore specification was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Torres testified she suspected she was pregnant because she experienced the
same common pregnancy symptoms that she experienced in both her prior pregnancies.
Crawley purchased a pregnancy test for her to determine whether her symptoms were in
fact caused by a pregnancy. Although she admitted she did not seek prenatal care, she
explained “[b]ecause I did not plan on keeping it.”
{¶19} Torres also testified that she called “the nurse on call” at MetroHealth
Medical Center on January 19, 2013, because she was bleeding heavily and believed she
was having a miscarriage. Torres did not seek any medical treatment for the miscarriage
because she did not want to go to the hospital. She had previously testified that she also
declined medical treatment after the domestic violence incident because she did not want
to go to the hospital. Torres’s testimony contained many details and provides a
reasonable explanation for her decision not to seek medical treatment. Under these
circumstances, we cannot say that Crawley’s conviction on the pregnancy specification
was a manifest miscarriage of justice or that the evidence adduced at trial weighs heavily
in favor of acquittal.
{¶20} Therefore, the second assignment of error is overruled.
Abduction
{¶21} In the third assignment of error, Crawley argues his abduction conviction
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. He contends Torres’s version of the
facts are impossible and therefore incredible.
{¶22} Crawley was convicted of abduction in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2)
which states that “[n]o person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly … [b]y force
or threat, remove another from the place where the other person is found.” Torres
testified that Crawley refused to stop and let her out of the truck when he was driving at
excessive speeds. She further testified that he drove approximately 10 or 15 minutes
from the Horseshoe Casino before finally coming to a stop near the West Side Market.
Crawley argues there is no way it would take 10 or 15 minutes to drive from the
Horseshoe Casino to the West Side Market, especially if the driver is speeding.
Therefore, he argues, Torres’s testimony is not credible.
{¶23} However, the witness’s estimation of time must be weighed with all the
other evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be made based on the evidence.
Thompkins at 387. Torres testified:
Q: While you were in the vehicle with Mr. Crawley coming back home
from the Horseshoe Casino, did you feel that you were able to leave the
vehicle when you wanted ?
A: No.
Q: And why not?
A: I mean, he was — he was speeding. And I told him, you know, let me
out of this car.
Q: And did he let you out when you asked him to?
A: No.
Q: How long … was he driving, if you can approximate, before you did
come to that red light?
A: I said about 10, 15 minutes.
Q: From the time you —
A: Left the casino.
Q; From the time that you asked him to stop, how long had passed?
A: I mean, I was continually asking him to stop from when we left the
casino because he was speeding.
{¶24} There was no evidence in the record establishing the distance from the
casino to the West Side Market upon which the trier of fact could determine whether
Torres’s testimony was unreasonable. There was also no evidence of a different
estimation of time to contradict Torres’s testimony. Further, Torres’s testimony
regarding how much time elapsed was merely an estimation or opinion.
{¶25} The trial court was in the best position to view the witness, assess her
credibility, and decide what weight to attribute to her approximation. Even if her
estimate is a little longer than one might expect, a difference of a few minutes is not
outside the realm of reason. We, therefore, cannot say that the trial court lost its way in
finding Torres’s testimony credible.
{¶26} The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶27} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
