[Cite as Lassiter v. Lassiter,
2014-Ohio-2367.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
CHRISTO LASSITER, : APPEAL NOS. C-130486
C-130487
Plaintiff-Appellant, : C-130488
C-130489
vs. : TRIAL NOS. EX-0300269
EX-0100234
SHARLENE LASSITER, n.k.a. : EX-0200139
SHARLENE BOLTZ, EX-0300270
Defendant-Appellee. : O P I N I O N.
Civil Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part in C-130486;
Appeals Dismissed in C-130487, C-130488, and
C-130489.
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 4, 2014
The Law Office of Douglas Haman, Esq., LLC, and Douglas Haman, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
The Law Office of Karen Oakley-Everson and Karen Oakley-Everson, for
Defendant-Appellee.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
D E W INE , Judge.
{¶1} This case involves two ex-spouses, who have been burdening the court
system with their disputes for the past 18 years. The latest chapter arises from the ex-
husband’s attempt to revive a dormant judgment. The trial court granted the motion to
revive the judgment, but plainly fed up with the whole mess, also awarded the ex-wife
attorney fees in an amount equal to the revived judgment. It also denied the ex-
husband’s request for attorney fees that he contended he was owed from a decade ago.
On appeal the ex-husband challenges the trial court’s treatment of the fee issues.1 We
uphold the denial of fees to the husband. But while we share the trial court’s frustration,
there is no basis in law for awarding fees to the ex-wife in this situation. Thus, we are
constrained to vacate that part of the court’s judgment.
One Marriage Spawns Two Decades of Litigation
{¶2} Way back in 1996, plaintiff-appellant Christo Lassiter filed to divorce his
then-wife Sharlene Lassiter n.k.a. Boltz. Litigation and more litigation followed. We
won’t summarize all the gory details here, but some of the highlights may be found in
two of our previous decisions on the issue, Lassiter v. Lassiter, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
010309, 2002-Ohio-3136, and Lassiter v. Lassiter, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-020494,
C-020370 and C-020128,
2003-Ohio-2333. We summed it up this way:
This court has not seen many domestic relations cases more contentious
and acrimonious or more consumption of judicial resources than this
case. The parties, who are both law professors and who ought to know
better, engaged in thoroughly inappropriate behavior that was
1 Mr. Lassiter filed notices of appeals in four cases, but it is clear from the record that the judgment
with which he takes issue was entered only in the case numbered EX-0300269 and appealed in the
case numbered C-130486. Therefore, we dismiss the other three appeals—C-130487, C-130488, and
C-130489.
2
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
detrimental to the resolution of their case and to the welfare of their
children …. This court takes a dim view of such tactics.
Lassiter, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-010309, 2002-Ohio-3136, at ¶ 1.
{¶3} We pick up the story in 2003. By then, the divorce had long been final,
but the parties were still fighting about who owed what to whom. After a good deal of
procedural wrangling, the parties agreed to a court order that set off various judgments
owed between the parties with the end result that Ms. Boltz owed Mr. Lassiter
$4,214.56. In the September 2003 order, the court reserved judgment on the issue of
attorney fees, which had been requested by Mr. Lassiter and disputed by Ms. Boltz. The
parties were ordered to “submit affidavits asserting the factual basis of their arguments
[about the attorney fees] within 15 days from the entry of this Order.” The court further
provided that “[i]f the parties are unable to reach an agreement as to whether said sums
are due, Mr. Lassiter may move this Court for a determination of the issue based on the
filed affidavits.”
{¶4} No affidavits were filed. Rather, on September 18, 2003, Ms. Boltz filed
a notice of bankruptcy, which stayed the proceedings. The bankruptcy petition was
dismissed on July 21, 2004. Mr. Lassiter subsequently filed a “Notice of Bankruptcy
Dismissal” on October 25, 2005, which stated, “Ms. [Boltz’s] bankruptcy petition having
been dismissed, it is now appropriate for the Court to proceed to hear this matter [the
execution of judgment].”
{¶5} More than seven years later, in December 2012, Mr. Lassiter filed the
motion to revive the judgment against Ms. Boltz that is the subject of this appeal.
Within his motion, Mr. Lassiter also requested the attorney fees that had been
referenced in the September 2003 court order. Ms. Boltz filed a motion in opposition to
revivor, claiming that she had not received proper notice of the motion. She also
3
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
challenged the amount of the underlying judgment. The trial court ordered the parties to
submit written closing arguments on the motion to revive and attorney fees.
{¶6} After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the court concluded that Mr.
Lassiter was entitled to a revived judgment in the amount of $4,214.56. But it found
that Mr. Lassiter was not entitled to attorney fees, and that instead it would award Ms.
Boltz fees in an amount equal to the judgment, $4,214.56. It explained that it was
awarding fees because it believed the revivor action “to be revenge motivated rather than
the mere collection of a debt,” and that Mr. Lassiter had been “twisting the knife” with
the proceedings. The court concluded,
Based upon the familiarity of the Court of Common Pleas with the history
between the two parties, and because the consequences of their frivolous,
vexatious and endless litigation have fallen more heavily on the taxpayers
and the courts of Hamilton County than they have either of them, an
award of attorney fees is hereby assessed against Christo Lassiter.
Additionally, the court informed the parties that it would retain jurisdiction over any
future proceedings between them.
We Have to Reverse the Fee Award to Ms. Boltz
{¶7} Because they are related, we consider the first three assignments of error
together. In the first and second, Mr. Lassiter asserts that the trial court erred when it
awarded attorney fees to Ms. Boltz pursuant to Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51, respectively.
In the third, he contends that the trial court erred when it awarded attorney fees without
a showing of misconduct on the part of Mr. Lassiter.
{¶8} An award of attorney fees is, of course, the exception rather than the
norm in the American litigation system. A court may only award fees in certain
narrowly circumscribed situations. Here, the court located its authority to award fees in
4
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Civ.R. 11, R.C. 2323.51, and the court’s inherent power. We examine each source of
authority to determine if the award may be upheld.
{¶9} Under Civ.R. 11, an attorney is required to sign every pleading, motion
or other document to certify that he “has read the document; that to the best of the
attorney’s or party’s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay.” The rule, by its very terms, addresses one who
signs a court document. Because Mr. Lassiter did not sign any of the pleadings, he could
not be sanctioned under Civ.R. 11.
{¶10} R.C. 2323.51 does allow for a trial court to award attorney fees to
sanction a party’s frivolous conduct. But if the court seeks to award the fees upon its
own initiative, it must conduct a hearing to determine whether the conduct was frivolous
and what attorney fees are reasonable. R.C. 2323.51(B)(2). The trial court held no such
hearing and thus could not award attorney fees under R.C. 2323.51.
{¶11} That leaves us with the court’s inherent authority. See Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,
111 S.Ct. 2123,
115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). A court possesses
inherent power to assess attorney fees “as an appropriate sanction for conduct which
abuses the judicial process.”
Id. at 45. “Because of their very potency, inherent powers
must be exercised with restraint and discretion.”
Id. at 44. Thus, we review the court’s
award of attorney fees under its inherent power for an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 55.
{¶12} In a nutshell, the court’s bases for awarding attorney fees to Ms. Boltz
were its belief that Mr. Lassiter was “twist[ing] the knife” by trying to collect the old debt
and the parties’ prior history of bad behavior over the two decades of litigation. We
understand the court’s motivation, agree with its objectives, and sympathize with its
frustration. But we still cannot uphold the fee award.
5
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶13} The only matter before the trial court was the revivor action which Mr.
Lassiter inarguably filed within the limitations period. R.C. 2325.18(A). He may have
been “twisting the knife” by pursuing the action, but it was a knife he had a legal right to
twist. We cannot say that it is sanctionable conduct to attempt to collect a valid
judgment in a legally permissible manner, no matter what our guess may be as to the
debt collector’s subjective motivation. Further, the amount of attorney fees awarded by
the court does not appear to be tied in any way to the actual fees incurred by Ms. Boltz.
Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that the court abused its discretion in
ordering that Mr. Lassiter pay Ms. Boltz’s attorney fees. The first three assignments of
error are sustained.
We Sustain the Denial of Fees to Mr. Lassiter
{¶14} Mr. Lassiter’s fourth assignment of error is that the trial court erred
when it refused to order Ms. Boltz to pay attorney fees. Again, we review the trial court’s
decision for an abuse of discretion. We find no abuse of discretion here. As pointed out
by the court, Mr. Lassiter never followed the procedures set forth in the September 2003
order to determine whether attorney fees were appropriate. We don’t buy his contention
that he was excused from doing so because Ms. Boltz filed for bankruptcy shortly after
the September 2003 order. The record reveals that the bankruptcy petition was
dismissed on July 21, 2004, and that Mr. Lassiter filed the notice of the termination of
bankruptcy on October 25, 2005. He has no explanation why he waited another eight
years to do anything about the fees he claims he was owed. The fourth assignment of
error is overruled.
The Last Assignment of Error Isn’t Ripe
{¶15} Mr. Lassiter’s fifth assignment of error—that the court erred in
announcing that it would retain jurisdiction over all future proceedings between the
6
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
parties—is not ripe for our review. True, by rule, the assignment of any future cases
between the parties must be done by lot. Sup.R. 36(B)(1); Loc.R. 7 of the County Court
of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, General Division. But here there is no
indication that the court attempted to exercise further jurisdiction over the parties in
contravention of the rules. The fifth assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶16} We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment to the extent that it
ordered Mr. Lassiter to pay attorney fees to Ms. Lassiter. In all other respects we affirm
the judgment of the trial court in the case numbered C-130486. The appeals in the cases
numbered C-130487, C-130488 and C-130489 are hereby dismissed.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part; appeals dismissed.
H ENDON , P.J., and D INKELACKER , J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
7
