[Cite as State v. Thompson,
2014-Ohio-3706.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 27232
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
CLEOPHUS THOMPSON, JR. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 13 04 1102
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 27, 2014
BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Cleophus Thompson appeals from the decision of the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Thompson was arrested on April 20, 2013, and was later indicted on two
counts of felonious assault with two accompanying firearm specifications. After the trial date
was rescheduled twice, on December 5, 2013, Mr. Thompson filed a motion to dismiss based on
an alleged violation of his statutory speedy trial rights. While the trial court never ruled on the
motion, on December 18, 2013, Mr. Thompson pleaded no contest to one count of felonious
assault and the accompanying firearm specification. The remaining count and specification were
dismissed. The trial court sentenced Mr. Thompson to four years for felonious assault and a
mandatory term of three years for the firearm specification for a total of seven years. Mr.
Thompson has timely appealed, raising two assignments of error for our review.
2
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO DISMISS THOMPSON’S CASE, AS REQUIRED BY LAW,
AFTER THE STATE VIOLATED THOMPSON’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHTS TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN [IT] DID NOT
DISMISS THE CASE AFTER THE STATE VIOLATED THOMPSON’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY KEEPING HIM
INCARCERATED FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME DURING THE
PENDENCY OF HIS CASE.
{¶3} In Mr. Thompson’s two assignments of error he asserts that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss as his right to a speedy trial was violated. Because this Court does
not possess the complete record of the proceedings, we overrule his assignments of error.
{¶4} Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. State
v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 219 (1980). “There is also a statutory right to a speedy trial in
Ohio.” State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010012,
2012-Ohio-3524, ¶ 8. Speedy trial
statutes constitute a rational effort to enforce the constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an
accused charged with the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor. Pachay at syllabus.
Accordingly, the prosecution and the trial courts have a mandatory duty to try an accused within
the time frame provided by the statute and strict compliance with the statute is required. State v.
Ramey,
132 Ohio St.3d 309,
2012-Ohio-2904, ¶ 14.
{¶5} “R.C. 2945.71 dictates the time limits within which a defendant must be brought
to trial. Under R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), a person charged with a felony ‘[s]hall be brought to trial
within two hundred seventy days after the person’s arrest.’ This time period may be extended
3
for a number of reasons enumerated under R.C. 2945.72.” State v. McCormick, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 24516, 2009-Ohio-3169, ¶ 6. Therefore, to determine if the trial court erred in denying Mr.
Thompson’s motion to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds, this Court must review the entire
record and “‘determine the exact number of days that should have been tallied against the
state[.]’”
Id., quoting State v. Broughton,
62 Ohio St.3d 253, 257 (1991).
{¶6} Unfortunately, the only transcript in the record on appeal is the transcript of Mr.
Thompson’s sentencing hearing. There are no transcripts of any pretrial hearings or status
conferences. Additionally, we note that there is no entry in the record denying Mr. Thompson’s
motion to dismiss. Thus, we do not even have the benefit of knowing why the trial court denied
Mr. Thompson’s motion to dismiss. It appears that such may have happened on the record as
part of Mr. Thompson’s plea hearing. However, that transcript is not in our record either.
Without the transcripts or the appropriate substitutes pursuant to the appellate rules, this Court
cannot know whether there are additional tolling events that would be attributable to Mr.
Thompson or whether he may have waived his right to a speedy trial in open court on the record.
See Ramey at ¶ 18 (“To be effective, an accused’s waiver of his or her constitutional and
statutory rights to a speedy trial must be expressed in writing or made in open court on the
record.”) (Internal quotations and citation omitted.). Further this Court is unable to determine
whether Mr. Thompson asserted below that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was also
violated, as his motion to dismiss only discusses his statutory right.
{¶7} As noted above, particularly in speedy trial cases, this Court is required to review
the entire record to determine if the trial court erred. See McCormick at ¶ 6; see also State v.
Ramey, 132 Ohio St.3d 309,
2012-Ohio-2904, at ¶ 33 (“[A]n appellate court may affirm a
conviction challenged on speedy-trial grounds even if the trial court did not expressly enumerate
4
any reasons justifying the delay when the reasonableness of the continuance is otherwise
affirmatively demonstrated by the record.”).
An appellant has the responsibility of providing the reviewing court with a record
of the facts, testimony, and evidentiary matters that are necessary to support the
appellant’s assignments of error. In the absence of such a record or a substitute
statement of the evidence as permitted by App.R. 9(C) and (D), an appellate court
must presume regularity in the trial court’s proceedings and accept the validity of
its judgment.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Akron v. Kulasa, 9th Dist. Summit No. 19815, 2000
WL 353987, *4 (Apr. 5, 2000). Given the importance of the right to a speedy trial, this Court
would obviously prefer to have a complete record so that it could review the issue on the merits
and evaluate whether Mr. Thompson’s rights have been violated. However, in light of the
current state of the record, we are required to affirm the trial court’s judgment.1 See id. at *5.
Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Thompson’s assignments of error.
III.
{¶8} In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
1
We note that nothing in this opinion should be read to foreclose Mr. Thompson’s ability
to file a motion to reopen pursuant to App.R. 26(B).
5
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
CONCURS.
CARR, J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
APPEARANCES:
KANI HARVEY HIGHTOWER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
