[Cite as State v. Haddon,
2014-Ohio-818.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99686
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
DWAYNE HADDON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-525980
BEFORE: Boyle, A.J., Jones, J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 6, 2014
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Erin R. Flanagan
1370 Ontario Street
2000 Standard Building
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Brian R. Radigan
Mary H. McGrath
Amy Venesile
Assistant County Prosecutors
Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
MARY J. BOYLE, A.J.:
{¶1} After this court granted a motion for delayed appeal to defendant-appellant,
Dwayne Haddon, he appeals from a trial court judgment sentencing him on April 14,
2010, to six years in prison for violating the terms of his community control sanctions.
He raises one assignment of error for our review:
I. The trial court erred when it imposed sentence at the April 14, 2010
probation violation hearing without consideration of the Ohio Revised
Code’s Section 2929 factors in derogation of statutory law and the
appellant’s due process rights.
{¶2} Finding no merit to his appeal, we affirm.
Procedural History
{¶3} Haddon was indicted on two counts of kidnapping and one count of
felonious assault in July 2009. In September of that same year, he pleaded guilty to
felonious assault, a felony of the second degree. The kidnapping charges were nolled by
the trial court.
{¶4} The trial court sentenced Haddon in October 2009 to five years of
community control sanctions. As part of Haddon’s community control sanctions, the
trial court ordered that Haddon complete an inpatient drug treatment program. The trial
court also told Haddon to stay away from the victim. At his sentencing hearing, the trial
court warned Haddon that if he violated the terms of his community control sanctions,
that it would sentence him to eight years in prison.
{¶5} On April 14, 2010, the trial court held a probation violation hearing.
Haddon’s probation officer explained to the court that Haddon tested positive for cocaine
on March 2, 2010. The probation officer also reminded the court that he and Haddon
were before the court “on February 3, 2010 on a violation hearing after [Haddon] had
complications with his inpatient treatment, and at that time, [the trial court] continued
him.” The probation officer further explained that at that time, the victim had alleged
that Haddon was harassing her at her place of employment when he obtained weekend
passes from the inpatient treatment program. As a result of the harassment, Haddon was
kicked out of his inpatient treatment program.
{¶6} At his April 14, 2010 probation violation hearing, Haddon requested the
trial court to continue his probation a second time. Haddon explained that he had found
new employment where he would not have to see the victim (it appears that they had
worked together, although the record is not entirely clear) and said that he had been
talking to his pastor to deal with his depression and addictions.
{¶7} The trial court stated:
We’ve gone through this. I attempted to obtain treatment for you. That
didn’t work out. You’ve been on probation in the past in other courts
repeatedly. You violated repeatedly. You’ve been to prison. And
irrespective of your record, based upon your need for treatment, I made it
available to you, and to no avail.
{¶8} The trial court found that Haddon violated the conditions of his community
control supervision, and sentenced him to six years in prison. It is from this judgment
that Haddon appeals.
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
{¶9} Haddon argues that the trial court failed to consider the statutory purposes
and principles of sentencing and the recidivism and seriousness factors set forth in R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12.
{¶10} We do not review felony sentences under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Rather, we may
increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence … or may vacate the
sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing if
we determine that the record clearly and convincingly … does not
support the sentencing court’s findings under [various provisions]; [or]
[t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
Id.
{¶11} The court’s only guide in this case was the purposes and principles of felony
sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the serious and recidivism factors set forth in
R.C. 2929.12. R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that
[t]he overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from
future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender using the
minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes
without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government
resources.
{¶12} Under R.C. 2929.12(A), trial courts must consider a nonexhaustive list of
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B), (C), (D), and (E), including the seriousness of the
defendant’s conduct, the likelihood of recidivism, and “any other factors that are
relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.”
{¶13} Haddon argues that the record is “absolutely devoid of any consideration
whatsoever” of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. For this reason, he claims that his sentence is
void, and we should therefore vacate his sentence.
{¶14} There is still no “mandate,” however, for the sentencing court to engage in
any factual findings under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12. State v. Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2012-03-049, 2013-Ohio-150, ¶ 49, citing State v. Rose, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2011-11-214,
2012-Ohio-5607, ¶ 78; State v. Putnam, 11th Dist. Lake No.
2012-L-026,
2012-Ohio-4891, ¶ 9. Instead, the “trial court still has the discretion to
determine whether the sentence satisfies the overriding purpose of Ohio’s sentencing
structure.” Jones at ¶ 49. Furthermore, “[w]e can presume from a silent record that the
trial court considered the appropriate factors unless the defendant affirmatively shows
that the court has failed to do so.” State v. Bohannon, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130014,
2013-Ohio-5101, ¶ 7; State v. Parsons, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-10-27,
2011-Ohio-168, ¶
15.
{¶15} After review, we find that Haddon has not affirmatively shown that the trial
court failed to consider the principles and purpose of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11
and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. At Haddon’s original
sentencing hearing, the trial court warned him that it would sentence him to eight years in
prison if he violated the terms of his community control sanctions. It only sentenced him
to six years for violating. Moreover, at his probation violation hearing, the trial court
noted how this was not the first time Haddon had violated the terms of his probation, nor
was it the first time that he had been sent to prison. Indeed, the trial court noted how
Haddon had “repeatedly” violated his probation in the past.
{¶16} Accordingly, we overrule Haddon’s assignment of error.
{¶17} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR
