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← 2014 Pa. Super. 227 - Commonwealth v. Ranson

2014 Pa. Super. 227 - Commonwealth v. Ranson’s Empirical Analysis

2014

Citation profile

6
cited by 6 later decisions
1
states following
December 2018
most recently cited

6 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Alabama v. White · In the Interest of L.J. · Commonwealth v. Ellis · Commonwealth v. Jones · Commonwealth v. Jackson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontra-dicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review. [Commonwealth v. Jones, 605 Pa. 188 , 988 A.2d 649, 654 (2010)]. Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress. See In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126 , 79 A.3d 1073 , [1080] ([Pa.] 2013).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual is engaging in criminal conduct. This standard, less stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as reasonable -suspicion. In order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. In making this determination, we must give due weight to the specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw from .the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even -a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “It is well-established that there are three categories of interaction between citizens and police officers. As our Supreme Court has clearly articulated: The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention[,]” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.