Thornton v. State

¶111Appellant Justin Thornton appeals from an order of the Lincoln County Circuit Court convicting him of first-degree murder and sentencing him to a term of •forty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Thornton contends that the circuit court erred in (1) denying his motion to dismiss the first-degree murder charge because the State did not present sufficient proof of the purposeful-intent element of first-degree murder, (2) denying his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, (3) denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, (4) denying his motion to dismiss for violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and (5) denying his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to due process. We reverse and dismiss.

¶2I. Factual Background & Procedural History

¶3Following a bench trial held in February-2013, the Lincoln County Circuit Court found appellant Justin Thornton guilty of capital murder, felon in possession of a firearm, ^unauthorized use of a vehicle, and abuse of a corpse for which he was sentenced to life without parole plus ten years for his commission of the murder with a firearm. Thornton appealed to this court, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on the capital-murder charge because the proof failed to establish that he acted with the requisite premeditation and deliberation. Thornton v. State, 2014 Ark. 157, at 1, 433 S.W.3d 216, 217. We held that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Thornton killed the victim with a premeditated and deliberate intent and, we therefore reversed and dismissed. In doing so, we stated, ‘While the evidence cannot sustain the charge of capital murder, we offer no opinion, about whether it would sustain a lesser offense.” Id. at 15, 433 S.W.3d at 224. The case was handed down on April 10, 2014.

¶4Following the issuance of our-mandate on May. 15, 2014, the State did not refile a murder charge against Thornton;1 rather, the State filed in the circuit court on May 29, 2014, a “Motion for Court to Consider Lesser-included Offenses.” In its motion, the State argued that, because this court concluded that there was insufficient evidence, to sustain a charge for capital murder, the circuit court should “now consider the lesser included- offenses of murder in the 1st degree, murder in the 2nd degree and manslaughter” and that, “[s]hould the [circuit] court find the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for a lesser offense, it should enter a judgment of conviction and sentence the defendant appropriately.” Thornton argued |sthat the State’s motion should be denied because this court did not remand the case to the circuit court for any further rulings or. findings of fact; rather, this court reversed- and dismissed. In. its reply, the State- contended that “[t]he fact that the capital murder conviction was. reversed and dismissed rather than remanded does not have any bearing on whether [the circuit] court can now consider lesser-included offenses ... Because this was a bench - trial instead of a jury trial, the .supreme. court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion and dismiss the capital murder charge, simply puts the [circuit] court back into the position it would have been in-had it dismissed the capital murder charge during the trial.”

¶5The circuit ’ court granted the State’s motion and set a hearing for December 1, 2014. At the hearing, Thornton argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the lesser-included offenses, that the conviction of a -lesser-included offense following the reversal and dismissal of a greater offense violates double-jeopardy principles, that his right to a speedy trial was violated, and that the circuit court denied him due process at the hearing when it did not allow him to argue that there was insufficient evidence to sustain convictions of the lesser-included offenses. The circuit court rejected Thornton’s arguments, ruled that the evidence from the February 2013 bench trial was sufficient to prove that Thornton acted with purpose in causing the death of the victim, and found Thornton guilty of first-degree murder.2 The circuit court then sentenced Thornton, as a habitual offender, to forty years’ imprisonment for first-degree murder, enhanced by ten years for its commission with al4firearm.3

¶6II. Jurisdiction

¶7 As a threshold matter, this court must determine whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the State’s “Motion for Court to Consider Lesser-Included Offenses” following this court’s reversal and dismissal in Thornton. This court’s opinion and mandate in 2014 reversed and dismissed Thornton’s conviction for capital murder. Nevertheless, the State contends that the letter and spirit of this court’s opinion and mandate- conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court to consider lesser-included offenses. According to the State, we “invited” the circuit court to hear the State’s “Motion for -Court to Consider Lesser-Included Offenses” when we stated that we “offerfed] no opinion about whether [the evidence] would sustain a lesser offense.” 2014 Ark. at 15, 438 S.W.3d at 224. We disagree. Because the issue of whether the evidence would sustain a, lesser offense was not before the court in 2014, any opinion we offered on that issue would have been advisory. ' It is. not the practice of this court to anticipate future litigation and issue advisory opinions. See Wright v. Keffer, 319 Ark. 201, 203-04, 890 S.W.2d 271, 272 (1995).

¶8Here, the State would have us hold that, in Thornton, when we stated that the case was | ^reversed and dismissed, we meant that the case was reversed and remanded. This we will not do. See Eichelberger v. State, 323 Ark. 551, 557, 916 S.W.2d 109, 113 (1996) (explaining that if substantial evidence was presented, but prejudicial error occurred, the case is reversed and remanded, but “[i]f the evidence [is] insufficient the case is reversed and dismissed”).

¶9We note that the State’s position on appeal is inconsistent with its position in response to Thornton’s pro se petition for writ of mandamus filed on December 17, 2014. In his petition, Thornton sought to have this court direct the circuit judge to enter a new or amended judgment reflecting the dismissal- of the capital-murder charge by this court in Thornton. The State contended that, although Thornton appeared to allege that the Arkansas Department of Correction had not received the mandate in his case, and believed that the opinion issued by this court remanded the case to the circuit court to issue a new judgment-and-commitment order, this court’s opinion did not include a remand to the circuit court. Specifically, the State asserted that this court “did not. remand the .case to the circuit court to enter a new order or take any other action related to the reversed and dismissed capital-murder conviction.” We agreed, stating, “Our decision reversed and dismissed petitioner’s conviction for capital murder; there was no remand requiring any. action by the trial court.” Thornton v. Jones, 2015 Ark. 109, at 2, 2015 WL 1198668 (per curiam).

¶10Thus, we hold that, because the conviction was reversed and dismissed, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear the State’s “Motion for Court to Consider Lesser-Ineluded Offenses.” Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss.

¶11Reversed and .dismissed.

¶15dissenting.

¶16[(¡Because the majority reversed and dismissed Thornton’s conviction in Thornton v. State, 2014 Ark. 157, 433 S.W.3d 216 (“'Thornton 7”), I cannot join the majority’s opinion.

¶17Simply put, the lack of clarity in Thornton I has caused the . majority in Thornton’s case today to attempt, to craft a solution that supports Thornton I and reverses and dismisses Thornton’s first-degree-murder conviction that resulted from a hearing in the circuit court following the majority’s decision in Thornton I. ' The record demonstrates that upon return to the circuit cpurt, the circuit court expressed its reservation on whether it retained'jurisdiction to address “the lesser includeds”: “[T]he [Supreme] court specifically said they were not addressing the lesser includeds. Well, it says, “We offer no opinion about whether it would sustain a lesser offense.’ ... This Court would readily admit that this is a case of first impression to this Court. This court had sought far and near, low and high trying to find a case like this case, and it not one like this case, then one similar to this case and unfortunately was able to find a-case.” I sympathize with the circuit court’s dilemma.. Nevertheless, because the majority reversed and dismissed Thornton’s conviction in Thornton I, there was no remand or return to circuit court. Pursuant to the majority’s mandate in Thornton I, Thornton has no conviction against him at this juncture. ■

¶18In Thornton I, the majority explained that, at trial,

[t]he circuit court denied the motion [for directed verdict], Thornton was the only defense witness and at the close of all the evidence, he again renewed his motions for |7a directed verdict. The circuit court denied the'motions and took the case under advisement. The court then ruled from the bench that the State had proved the charges of capital murder, possession of a firearm, and abuse of a corpse. But, the circuit court reduced, the felony-theft charge to a misdemeanor count of unauthorized use of a vehicle. The circuit court entered a sentencing order on March 4, 2013, finding Appellant guilty as set forth above.

¶192014 Ark. at 152, 3-4, 433 S.W.3d at 218-19.

¶20The majority in Thornton I ultimately held: \ ,

' [We] must reverse Thornton’s conviction for capital murder. While the evidence cannot sustain the charge of capital murder, we offer no opinion about whether it would sustain a lesser offense. See, e.g., Acuff v. State, 263 Ark. 85, 484 S.W.2d 698 (1972).[1]

¶21Reversed and dismissed.

¶22Subsequent to the majority opinion, the State filed a petition for rehearing asserting that “the court should clarify that the convictions of felony theft of property, possession of a firearm, and abuse of a corpse still stand.” In a 5-2 decision, the majority denied the State’s petition for rehearing without opinion. Accordingly, a majority of this court denied the petition for rehearing after the majority dismissed Thornton’s conviction citing to a case that was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

¶23Thereafter, the majority issued its mandate and “reversed and dismissed” his conviction. The mandate stated in pertinent part:

THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL WAS SUBMITTED TO THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT ON THE RECORD OF THE LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT AND BRIEFS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES. AFTER DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS THE DECISION OF THE COURT THÁTJ¿THÉ CONVICTION IS REVERSED AND DISMISSED FOR THE REASONS SET OUT IN THE ATTACHED OPINION. '