131 Nev., Advance Opinion 65
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
CARRIE SUZANNE MERLINO, No. 65273
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
FILED
Respondent. SEP 1
TRA K. RK
Lc
D _ERIC
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for burglar entered
following a jury trial. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Elissa
F. Cadish, Judge.
Vacated in part.
Philip J Kohn, Public Defender, Howard S. Brooks, Chief Deputy Public
Defender, and Jasmin D. Spells, Deputy Public Defender, Clark County,
for Appellant.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson,
District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
Colleen R. Baharav, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County,
for Respondent.
BEFORE GIBBONS, C.J., TAO and SILVER, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, TAO, J.:
Under Nevada law, a defendant commits the crime of burglary
when he or she enters a building with the intent to commit a predicate
crime inside the building. The question raised in this appeal is whether
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NRS 193.0145, NRS 205.060(1), and NRS 205.060(5), which define the
acts that can constitute an entry into a building for purposes of the
burglary statute, encompass selling stolen property through the
retractable sliding tray of a pawn shop's drive-through window.
A jury convicted appellant Carrie Suzanne Merlino of burglary
for doing exactly that. On appeal, we conclude that no reasonable person
could conclude that the sliding tray fell within the outer boundary of the
building that housed the pawn shop, and therefore the evidence
introduced at trial was insufficient to demonstrate that Merlino
committed an unlawful entry of the building as defined in the burglary
statutes. Accordingly, we vacate the conviction on count five.
FACTS
Merlino and her boyfriend, Dennis Byrd, befriended neighbor
Teresa Wilson and would occasionally visit her in her apartment. During
their visits, Merlino would sometimes bring Wilson food, clean her
apartment, and run errands for her. Wilson eventually noticed that some
jewelry was missing from her apartment and reported the theft, informing
detectives with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department that
Merlino and Byrd might be responsible for the missing items During
their investigation, the detectives learned that Merlin° had pawned items
matching the descriptions of Wilson's missing jewelry. Wilson identified
the pawned items as belonging to her and indicated that Merlino did not
have permission to possess those items. Merlino was subsequently
charged by way of indictment with conspiracy to commit a crime, grand
larceny, and three counts of burglary. She was convicted on all counts but
on appeal challenges only her conviction on count five, one of the three
counts of burglary.
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Count five of the indictment charged Merlino with entering an
EZ-Pawn store on October 24, 2011, with the intent to obtain money under
false pretenses by pawning items stolen from Wilson. The evidence
introduced at trial in support of this count demonstrated that, on that
date, Merlino pawned five items of jewelry through the drive-through
window of the EZ-Pawn by placing them onto a metal tray that slid in and
out of the building.
EZ-Pawn employee Leonard Yazzie described the drive-through window and its tray. Yazzie could not recall the particular
transaction involving Merlino but testified that, in general, pawn
transactions through the drive-through window required a customer
outside the store to place items onto a sliding tray, which the cashier
would extend out to the customer and then pull back into the interior of
the store. The cashier would retrieve the items from the tray and place
documents and money onto the tray before sliding it back outside the store
to where the customer could access the tray. Only when extended could
the customer access the tray; when retracted, the tray was enclosed
entirely within the walls of the building and could not be accessed from
outside.
After the close of evidence, the district court instructed the
jury. Among the instructions given was Instruction No. 23, which stated
that "Lain entry is deemed complete when, however slight, any portion of
the intruder's body penetrates the space within the building." Based upon
this definition, the State argued that the sliding tray constituted part of
the structure of the building and, therefore, Merlino entered the building
by using the tray to pawn Wilson's property. Merlino maintained that no
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part of her body entered the interior of the building and, consequently, no
entry occurred.
ANALYSIS
In this appeal, Merlino challenges only one of her three
burglary convictions, namely, count five, which charged her with entering
the EZ-Pawn store on October 24, 2011, with the intent to commit the
crime of obtaining money under false pretenses.Merlino concedes that
substantial evidence was introduced at trial to support her convictions on
the remaining counts.
As to count five, however, Merlino contends that insufficient
evidence exists to support her conviction. The test for sufficiency of the
evidence in a criminal case is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56,
825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992)
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). "[I]t is the jury's
function, not that of the court, to assess the weight of the evidence and
determine the credibility of witnesses." Id. (citing Walker v. State,
91 Nev.
724, 726,
542 P.2d 438, 438-39 (1975)).
Merlin° argues that the crime of burglary requires "entry" into
the premises, and no such "entry" occurred when she merely placed items
onto, and removed money from, the sliding tray of the drive-through
window. The principal authority cited by Merlino is Smith v. First
Judicial District Court, 75 Nev. 526,
347 P.2d 526 (1959), in which the
Nevada Supreme Court held that removing items from the open bed of a
pickup truck was not a burglarious "entry" of the truck itself. In response,
the State argues that the sliding tray was part of the building, and
therefore when Merlino's hand entered the tray, the hand necessarily
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entered the building itself. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with
Merlino
Nevada's burglary scheme
In Nevada, the offense of burglary is defined by NRS 205.060,
which states, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. Except as otherwise provided in
subsection 5, a person who, by day or night, enters
any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop,
warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or
other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, vehicle trailer,
semitrailer or house trailer, airplane, glider, boat
or railroad car, with the intent to commit grand or
petit larceny, assault or battery on any person or
any felony, or to obtain money or property by false
pretenses, is guilty of burglary.
An essential element of the offense of burglary is that the
offender "entered" a "building." NRS 193.0145 defines "enter" for purposes
of the burglary statute as follows:
"Enter," when constituting an element or part of a
crime, includes the entrance of the offender, or the
insertion of any part of the body of the offender, or
of any instrument or weapon held in the offender's
hand and used or intended to be used to threaten
or intimidate a person, or to detach or remove
property.
NRS 193.0125 defines a "building" as including "every house,
shed, boat, watercraft, railway car, tent or booth, whether completed or
not, suitable for affording shelter for any human being, or as a place where
any property is or will be kept for use, sale or deposit."
1-This
definition is broader than the common-law definition, which
defined "building" as a "structure with four walls and a roof, esp. a
permanent structure." Black's Law Dictionary 234 (10th ed. 2014).
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The question before us is whether the evidence at trial,
construed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to
demonstrate that Merlin° entered the EZ-Pawn within the meaning of
NRS 193.0125, NRS 193.0145, and NRS 205.060, by pawning items
through the sliding tray of the drive-through window. In this case, there
is no evidence that Merlino used a weapon or otherwise "threaten [edit or
intimidate[d]" any person during the commission of the charged crime.
Therefore, for Merlino's conviction to stand, the evidence adduced at trial
must demonstrate that some part of Merlino's body, or something held in
her hand, entered the building in question within the meaning of Nevada's
burglary statutes.
Determining whether such an entry occurred in this case
reveals a gap in Nevada's statutory burglary scheme. NRS 193.0125
defines the term "building" with reference to the functionality of a
structure; specifically, a structure is a "building" that can be burglarized if
it is functionally suitable to afford shelter or to keep property for use, sale,
or deposit. NRS 193.0145 defines "entry" with respect to the offender's
body or any tools that he or she uses. But the burglary statutes do not
define the terms "enter" or "building" with reference to the size, shape,
dimensions, or physical appearance of a particular structure.
Consequently, the statutes do not delineate where the outer boundary of a
structure begins and ends for purposes of determining when a particular
structure has, or has not, been entered within the meaning of NRS
193.0145. Yet this is precisely the question before us in this appeal.
Thus, resolving this appeal requires us to look outside of the statutes for
guidance.
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When the Legislature has not stepped in to address a
particular question, we may look to the common law for an answer. See
Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249, 285 (1872) (stating that the common law,
"so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with, the constitution or
laws of the United States, or the laws of the territory of Nevada, shall be
the rule of decision in all courts of this territory. . . . [The common law]
should remain in force until repealed by the legislature" (internal
quotations omitted)).
Burglary at common law
The crime of burglary was originally a creature of the common
law, but lo]f all common law crimes, burglary today perhaps least
resembles the prototype from which it sprang." Minturn T. Wright III,
Note, Statutory Burglary—The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. Pa.
L. Rev, 411, 411 (1951). At common law, burglary was the breaking and
entering of a dwelling in the nighttime, and the law was intended to
protect the sanctity of residences when its inhabitants were likely to be
asleep and vulnerable. Id. at 411-12. Thus defined, burglary was not an
offense against real or personal property, but rather one against the
habitation. See People v. Davis, 958 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Cal. 1998).
Consequently, burglary was originally "a crime of the most precise
definition, under which only certain restricted acts were criminal."
Wright, supra, at 411. Most states, however, have replaced the common-law crime with broader statutory definitions under which burglary "has
become one of the most generalized forms of crime," encompassing not only
personal abodes but also myriad other structures and even vehicles and
commercial businesses in which people are unlikely to reside. Id.
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Nevada adopted and applied the common-law definition of the
crime of burglary until 1911, when it enacted the original statutes that,
over time, evolved into MRS 193.0125, NRS 193.0145, and MRS 205.060.
The statutory definition of burglary originally created in 1911, and whose
core has survived until today, is significantly broader than the common-law definition in important ways. 2 But, as noted, Nevada never
legislatively defined the term "building" in a way that objectively explains
where one begins and ends or, put another way, whether and when one
has been "entered" or not under NRS 193.0145. In reviewing the common
law for guidance, the problem we encounter is that many of the terms
historically used to describe the crime of burglary were somewhat illdefined. For example, an "entry" was traditionally deemed to occur "when
any part of the defendant's person passes the line of the threshold." 3
Wharton's Criminal Law § 322 (15th ed. 1995); see also 12A C.J.S.
Burglary § 28 ("For purposes of a burglary conviction, a person must
penetrate whatever forms a structure's outer boundary. .").
2 For example, under the current statute, breaking is no longer an
essential element of the crime. State v. Adams, 94 Nev. 503, 505,
581 P.2d
868, 869 (1978); see also MRS 205.060(1). Rather, the crime only requires
an entry with the proper intent to commit an enumerated crime. Id.
Further, the entry no longer needs to be forcible, nor does the crime need
to occur at night. See Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 513, 531,
50 P.3d
1100, 1113 (2002); see also NRS 205.060(1). Also, consent to the entry is
not a defense to burglary if the person "acquired the entry with felonious
intent." Barrett v. State, 105 Nev. 361, 364,
775 P.2d 1276, 1277 (1989).
Finally, like many other states, Nevada has expanded the types of
structures that can be burglarized to include houses, boats, watercraft,
railway cars, tents, or booths, and the like. MRS 193.0125; MRS
205.060(1).
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Consequently, the traditional definition of an "entry" and the traditional
definition of a "building" were defined primarily in relation to each other;
a building was entered when its threshold or outer boundary was
penetrated.
At common law, the most widely used legal test for defining
the outer boundary of a building, and when a building has been "entered,"
was to inquire whether the "airspace" contained within it has been
penetrated. 3 See Davis, 958 P.2d at 1094 (Baxter, J., dissenting); Gant v.
State, 640 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), receded from on
other grounds by Norman v. State, 676 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
As some courts have noted, "[i] t is the nature of the enclosure that creates
[prohibited space]." State v. Holt, 352 P.3d 702, 706 (N.M. Ct. App.)
(citation omitted), cert. granted, P.3d (N.M. Ct. App, 2015). See
People v. Valencia, 46 P.3d 920, 925 (Cal. 2002) ("The airspace of a
building is not independent of the outer boundary of a building; rather, the
airspace of a building simply is that which is surrounded by the building's
outer boundary."), overruled in part on other grounds by People v.
Yarborough, 281 P.3d 68 (Cal. 2012).
When analyzing conventional buildings that were most
commonly constructed decades ago, courts developed an understanding
over time regarding where the boundaries of most such buildings were
located. In most states, a structure's outer boundary was generally
3 Theinstruction given to the jury in this case (Instruction No. 23)
appeared to have been modeled after the common-law test.
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understood to include its roof, walls, doors, and windows. 4 The case at
hand, however, involves a feature constructed onto a building that was not
as common a few decades ago as it is today, and here we see the common-law test fall short. A century ago, most abodes and businesses were
conventionally constructed of a primarily rectangular shape with four
walls, a roof, and clearly defined doors and windows; defining the
boundaries of such simple structures was a relatively straightforward
endeavor and the "airspace" test could be easily applied in most instances.
But in an era in which buildings are no longer exclusively rectangular and
may have such features as retractable roofs, sliding partitions, moveable
awnings, or rolling shutters, and in which the outer boundaries of a
4 SeeHolt, 352 P.3d at 706 ("[Bn general, the roof, walls, doors, and
windows constitute parts of a building's outer boundary, the penetration of
which is sufficient for entry.' (quoting Valencia, 46 P.3d at 925)); State v.
Kindred, 307 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) ("a person must
penetrate whatever forms a structure's outer boundary—a door, window,
or wall, for example—but need not go further to have entered the
structure"). Other courts have held that such things as the door jamb,
window screen, and screen door also fall within the building's outer
boundary. See People v. Garcia, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833, 840 (Ct. App. 2004)
(jamming crowbar into door jamb penetrated outer boundary of building);
People v. Moore, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104, 106 (Ct. App. 1994) (penetrating
area between screen door and door sufficient for entry into outer
boundary); Commonwealth v. Burke, 467 N.E.2d 846, 848-49 (Mass. 1984)
(breaking outer storm window constituted entry even if inner window
intact); Williams v. State, 997 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
(breaking a door frame was burglarious entry); Ortega v. State, 626 S.W.2d
746, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (a failed attempt to open a wooden door
after removing its screen door constituted entry into outer boundary); but
see Stamps v. Commonwealth, 602 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Ky. 1980) (breaking
exterior surface of cinder block wall not entry; interior of the blocks
themselves was "not a protected space").
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building are no longer necessarily either fixed in place or easily
recognizable, any test focused upon a building's "airspace" becomes
increasingly subjective and arbitrary. As in this case, many commercial
businesses today conduct at least some of their business through deposit
windows, drop boxes, sliding trays, chutes, portals, tubes, slides, ramps,
canisters, and slots of various configurations which may move in various
ways, and which may, or may not, have lids, doors, covers, walls, tops,
raised edges, or other features. Inquiring whether these features fall
within the "outer boundary" of a building and serve to define "airspace"
verges on an exercise in empty rhetoric rather than a search for a rigorous
and meaningful definition of an essential element of a felony crime.
Indeed, courts applying the "airspace" test frequently find
themselves wrestling over such minutiae as the distinction between an
inner window and an outer window, Commonwealth v. Burke, 467 N.E.2d
846, 849 (Mass. 1984); whether the interior of a home begins at the
exterior surface or interior surface of a door, State v. Kindred, 307 P.3d
1038, 1040-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013); where the last barrier to the interior
of the house was located, State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Mo. 1958);
and whether the distance between a roof and a ceiling falls within the
"airspace" of a home, Miller v. State, 187 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966).
Consequently, California (whose burglary statute
substantially mirrors Nevada's) 5 expressly rejected the "airspace" test as a
5See
State v. White, 130 Nev. , n.1, 330 P.3d 482, 485 n.1
(2014) ("California's burglary statute is nearly identical to Nevada's. ...").
Cal. Penal Code § 459 (West 2010) provides, in relevant part, that leivery
person who enters any. . . tenement, shop, warehouse, store . . . or other
continued on next page...
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comprehensive test for determining the boundary of a building or
inquiring whether it has been entered. See Valencia, 46 P.3d at 925 ("[We
have misgivings about the general usefulness of an airspace test to define
the outer boundary of a building for purposes of burglary."); People v.
Nible, 247 Cal. Rptr. 396, 399 (Ct. App. 1988) ("in our view, the 'air space'
test, although useful in some situations, is inadequate as a comprehensive
test for determining when a burglarious entry occurs"). Some other states
have also limited the "airspace" test. See Holt, 352 P.3d at 707 (reviewing
cases from several states).
Instead, recognizing that modern burglary statutes exist to
protect a property owner's "possessory interest in a building" and the
safety of its occupants, California has supplemented the "airspace" test
with a "reasonable belief' test, articulated as follows: whenever the outer
boundary of a building is not self-evident under the common-law
"airspace" test, the outer boundary legally includes "any element that
encloses an area into which a reasonable person would believe that a
member of the general public could not pass without authorization."
Valencia, 46 P.3d at 926. This test was designed to more closely mirror
the normal expectations of privacy and safety that attach to property
ownership and habitation. Id. at 924-25 (quoting Nible, 247 Cal. Rptr. at
399) ("The proper question is whether the nature of a structure's
composition is such that a reasonable person would expect some protection
from unauthorized intrusions . . . [and whether the feature was] a
permanent part of the dwelling. .. on which the occupants rely for
...continued
building. . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is
guilty of burglary."
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protection and that to open such a door. . . is a violation of the security of
the dwelling house which is the peculiar gravamen of a burglarious
breaking." (internal quotations omitted)).
The Supreme Court of Nevada recently explored the purpose
of Nevada's burglary statute in some detail and concluded that Nevada
follows California burglary law in important respects. State v. White, 130
Nev. , ,330 P.3d 482, 485 (2014) ("We agree with the analysis of the
California Supreme Court in [People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365 (Cal. 1975)1,
which relied upon these policies to reach the conclusion that a person with
an absolute right to enter a structure cannot commit burglary of that
structure."). The court concluded that Nevada's burglary scheme was
designed to protect the same interests as California's, namely, to protect
the owner's possessory right in his property or premises and to prevent the
danger associated with a felonious entry of the structure. Id.
Because the scope and purpose of Nevada's statutory scheme
fundamentally mirrors that of California, it follows that we may consider
California jurisprudence in defining the "outer boundary" of a building
and analyzing when it has been "entered" under NRS 193.0145 and NRS
205.060. See generally, City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof Plaza,
LLC, 129 Nev. , n.4, 293 P.3d 860, 865 n.4 (2013) ("This court has
often relied on the decisions of other jurisdictions when, as here, it is faced
with issues of first impression.").
We conclude that, when dealing with unorthodox contours or
features such as the sliding tray in this case, the "reasonable belief' test
represents a superior method for identifying the protected outer boundary
of a structure than the common-law "airspace" test. Thus, whenever the
outer boundary of a building is not self-evident from the shape and
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contours of the structure itself, the outer boundary is legally defined to
include "any element that encloses an area into which a reasonable person
would believe that a member of the general public could not pass without
authorization." Valencia, 46 P.3d at 926. On the other hand, if the outer
boundary of the structure is self-evident because the shape and features of
the structure are traditional, then the common-law "airspace" test may be
satisfactory. 6
Under this test, stepping onto an unenclosed front porch has
been held not to constitute a burglarious entry because a reasonable
person would not believe that he or she would need permission to merely
step onto the porch. Id. (citing People v. Brown,
8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 517
(Ct. App. 1992). On the other hand, opening and walking through a screen
door to an enclosed porch, or a locked gate covered with iron mesh in front
of an enclosed and roofed stairway, has been held to constitute a
burglarious entry because a reasonable person would believe that he or
she needed permission to do so. Id. (citing People v. Wise,
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
413, 415-18 (Ct. App. 1994)); Bowers v. State,
297 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. Ct. App.
1982). Similarly, climbing over the railing of a second-floor balcony
bounded by a railing has also been held to constitute a burglarious entry.
See Yarborough, 281 P.3d at 698.
8Although we apply the "reasonable belief' test as a legal test to the
facts of this case, in future cases, the district courts of this state should
consider utilizing this test as a jury instruction whenever the jury is
tasked with defining the "outer boundary" of a building or structure
having unusual features and when such a building has been "entered."
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The evidence in this case
At trial, the State argued that Merlino entered the EZ-Pawn
store by placing items onto—and removing money from—the sliding tray
connected to the building while the tray was open. The dispositive
question, however, is not whether she entered the tray, but rather
whether she crossed the outer boundary of the building. Accordingly, the
inquiry is whether the tray falls inside, or outside, the outer boundary of
the building. Applying the "reasonable belief" test, the question becomes
whether the tray, when open, constitutes an element that encloses an area
into which a reasonable person would believe that a member of the
general public could not pass without authorization. We conclude that it
does not.
Our conclusion arises from the natural operation of the tray,
which is worth describing in detail. The tray in this case is retractable
and can be manually opened and closed by the pawn shop cashier. When
no customer is present, the tray is normally retracted into its closed
position in which it rests entirely inside the perimeter of the wall of the
pawn shop and its outer edge is flush with the wall. While closed, nothing
can be placed into the tray from outside the building. When a customer
wishes to do business through the drive-through window, the pawn shop
cashier can manually push the tray outwards toward the customer so that
it temporarily extends beyond the perimeter of the wall, giving the
customer access to the tray for a few seconds during the transaction. After
items have been placed inside the tray, the cashier may withdraw the tray
into the perimeter of the wall into its closed position. A customer may
place items into the tray while it is open, but the tray cannot be fully
retracted into the store until the customer lets go of it.
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When the tray is retracted entirely within the perimeter of the
wall in its closed position, no reasonable person would believe that a
member of the general public could force or pry the tray open without
authorization in order to gain access to the interior of the building. While
retracted into the building, the outer edge of the tray encloses an area that
can reasonably be considered to fall within the permanent possessory
rights of the building's owner. Thus, forcing open a tray that has been
closed would clearly constitute a violation of the building's outer boundary.
However, the analysis is very different when the tray is
extended outward in its open position. When open, the tray temporarily
(for only as long as it takes to complete the transaction) extends some
distance outside of the perimeter of the wall and occupies an area outside
of the wall, a few feet above the ground. No reasonable person would
believe that violation of the area temporarily enclosed within the tray
while extended threatened the owner's permanent possessory rights in the
building See People v. Davis, 958 P.2d 1083, 1089 (Cal. 1998) (holding
that passing a forged check through the window chute of a business's
walk-up window did not constitute a burglarious entry, because doing so
did not violate the owner's possessory interest in the building). A building
owner may construct a tray or box that attaches to the building in some
way and moves around, but that does not mean that the owner necessarily
"owns" the space within the box whenever it goes outside of the building as
an incident of owning the building itself. 7 In this case, the sliding tray
fails the "reasonable belief' test, and an item placed within the sliding
7 He may own the box, but it is not because he owns the building.
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tray cannot in any realistic sense be considered to be inside the boundary
of the building until, and unless, the cashier manually draws it inside by
retracting the tray.
In this case, the retractable tray is far more akin to a tool or
instrument that can be manipulated to move objects into and out of the
outer boundary of the building than it is a part of the boundary itself At
common law, the use of an instrument to breach a building could
constitute a burglarious entry. See id. at 1086 ("[Al burglary may be
committed by using an instrument to enter a building—whether that
instrument is used solely to effect entry, or to accomplish the intended
larceny or felony as well."). But under NRS 193.0145, the instrument
must be held in the offender's hand, or at least operated by the defendant,
to constitute an "entry." NRS 193.0145 (entry can be through an
"instrument or weapon held in the offender's hand and used. . . to detach
or remove property").
Here, the tray was operated not by Merlino, but rather by the
cashier, whose independent actions caused the tray to enter the building
but who could have refused to do so. Thus, fairly described, Merlino
placed stolen items into an instrument operated by someone else to cause
something to enter the building after it left her hands. Her actions
initiated a chain of events that ultimately caused the building to be
entered, but the success of that chain of events depended upon the
cooperation of the cashier. Merely setting in motion a chain of events
involving other people that culminates in stolen property entering the
building does not equate to a criminal entry of the building by Merlino
herself. Were it otherwise, then Merlino could conceivably have been
convicted of burglary for hiring a courier to carry stolen property into the
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building, or even for mailing stolen items to the pawn shop through the
U.S. mail. NRS 193.0145 was not intended to encompass these
circumstances. 8 See Davis, 958 P.2d at 1087-88 (noting that mailing a
forged check into a bank through the mail, sliding a ransom note under a
door, or accessing a bank's computer via the Internet from a home
computer, "cannot reasonably be argued" to constitute burglaries).
Moreover, placing objects into the tray while standing outside
does not implicate the same kinds of security and safety concerns as would
arise had Merlino physically entered the pawn shop and potentially
initiated a confrontation. See White, 130 Nev. at , 330 P.3d at 485
(noting that "[b]urglary statutes 'are based primarily upon a recognition of
the dangers to personal safety. . . that the intruder will harm the
occupants in attempting to perpetrate the intended crime or to escape and
the danger that the occupants will in anger or panic react violently to the
invasion' (quoting People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1368 (Cal. 1975)). Her
conviction for burglary cannot stand and must therefore be vacated. 9
8 The State argues that similar acts have been considered
burglarious in various federal cases. See United States v. Goudy, 792 F.2d
664 (7th Cir. 1986) (walk-up window of bank's drive-up facility); United
States v. Phillips, 609 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1979) (taking money from bank's
drive-up window); United States v. Lankford, 573 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir.
1978) (bank's night depository chute). But those cases were decided
pursuant to federal bank robbery statutes that are substantially
dissimilar to Nevada burglary law.
9 Our conclusion may be different had Merlino pried the tray open
from its closed position in order to insert items into, or remove items from,
the pawn shop. It might even be different had Merlino placed something
into the tray while it was open and then forcefully pushed it into the
building against the resistance of the cashier. In either of these cases, a
reasonable person could believe that the tray was being used to breach the
continued on next page...
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
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(0) 19479
In closing, in response to various arguments raised by the
State, we note in passing that our disposition of this appeal does not
depend upon whether Merlino was considered to have entered the store
with her entire body, or merely a small portion of it such as her hand;
either would suffice to constitute a burglarious entry had the actual
boundary of the store been penetrated. Even the slightest penetration into
a building (had the building been penetrated) would suffice to support a
burglary conviction. 10
...continued
building in a way that violated the owner's property rights in the building.
But no evidence was presented that Merlino did either of these things.
I-NRS 193.0145; see Sears v. State, 713 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1986) ("[An] intruder enters by entry of his whole body, part of his
body, or by insertion of any instrument that is intended to be used in the
commission of a crime."); Valencia, 46 P.3d at 928 ("Entry that is just
barely inside the premises, even if the area penetrated is small, is
sufficient"); State v. Faria, 60 P.3d 333, 339-40 (Haw. 2002) (even slight
penetration by hand, foot, or instrument is sufficient to constitute
burglary); Hebron v. State, 627 A.2d 1029, 1038 (Md. 1993) ("the term
'entering' requires that some part of the body of the intruder or an
instrument used by the intruder crosses the threshold, even momentarily,
of the house"); see also Edelen v. United States, 560 A.2d 527, 530 (D.C.
1989); State v. Nichols, 572 N.W.2d 163, 164 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Ervin, 573 P.2d 600, 601-02 (Kan. 1977); State v. Sneed,
247 S.E.2d 658,
659 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978); Griffin v. State,
815 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991).
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
19
(0) 1947B
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Merlino's conviction on
count five.
We concur:
CA.
Gibbons
J.
Silver
COURT OF APPEALS
OF
NEVADA
20
(0) 1947B )1Ricr!t0
