2015 Pa. Super. 193 - Commonwealth v. Hoffman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “§ 9804. County intermediate punishment programs (a) Description. — County intermediate punishment program options shall include the following; (1) Restrictive intermediate punishments providing for the strict supervision of the offender including programs that: (1) house the offender full or part time; (ii) significantly restrict the offender’s movement and monitor the offender’s compliance with the program; or (iii) involve a combination of programs that meet the standards set forth under subparagraphs (i) and (ii). (2) When utilized in combination with restrictive intermediate punishments, restorative sanctions providing for noncon-finement sentencing options that: (i) Are the least restrictive in terms of the constraint of the offender’s liberties. (ii) Do not involve the housing of the offender, either full or part time. (iii) Focus on restoring the victim to pre-offense status. (b) Eligibility.— (1) No person other than the eligible offender shall be sentenced to a county intermediate punishment program. (2) The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing shall employ the term "eligible offender” to further identify offenders who would be appropriate for participation in county intermediate punishment programs. In developing the guidelines, the commission shall give primary consideration to protection of the public safety. [[Image here]] (4)(i) Any person receiving a penalty imposed pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b) (relating to driving while operating privilege is suspended or”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2017 Pa. Super. 59 - Commonwealth v. Watson

2. “§ 9763. Sentence of county intermediate punishment (a) General rule. — In imposing a sentence of county intermediate punishment, the court shall specify at the time of sentencing the length of the term for which the defendant is to be in a county intermediate punishment program established under Chapter 98 (relating to county intermediate punishment) or a combination of county intermediate punishment programs. The term may not exceed the maximum term for which the defendant could be confined and the program to which the defendant is sentenced. The court may order a defendant to serve a portion of the sentence under section 9755 (relating to sentence of partial confinement) or 9756 (relating to sentence of total confinement) and to serve a portion in a county intermediate punishment program or a combination of county intermediate punishment programs. * * * (c) Restriction.— (1) Any person receiving a penalty imposed pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b) (relating to driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked), former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804 (relating to penalties) for a first, second or third offense under 75 Pa.C.S. Ch. 38 (relating to driving after imbibing alcohol or utilizing drugs) may only be sentenced to county intermediate punishment after undergoing an assessment under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3814 (relating to drug and alcohol assessments). (2) If the defendant is determined to be i”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2017 Pa. Super. 59 - Commonwealth v. Watson

3. “The legislative intent in adopting [CIP] as a sentencing alternative was to give judges another sentencing option which would lie between probation and incarceration with respect to sentencing severity; to provide a more appropriate form of punishment/treatment for certain types of non-violent offenders; maintaining public safety.... The grant or denial of a defendant’s request for [CIP] largely within the sound discretion of the trial court. The same discretion applies to [CIP] in the context of a qualified first, second or third DUI offender, regardless of the mandatory sentence set forth in the DUJ statute, because the specific provisions in 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9763 and 9804 permit the court to sentence such offenders to [CIP] after they have undergone assessment— notwithstanding the mandatory sentencing provisions of Section 3804 of the DUI statute.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2017 Pa. Super. 59 - Commonwealth v. Watson