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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
QUINZALE MASON, No. 67830
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
FILED
Respondent. JUN 1 6 2016
CIE K. LINDEtAAN
CIIERKIOE SIIRRE.MEcertiR
DEP CLERK
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant t A jury
verdict, of battery with a deadly weapon, assault with a deadly Weapon,
and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Second Judicial District
Court, Washoe County; Elliott A. Sattler, Judge.
Affirmed and remanded with instruction.
Jeremy T. Bosler, Public Defender, and John Reese Petty, Chief Deputy
Public Defender, Washoe County,
for Appellant.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
District Attorney, and Joseph R. Plater, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe
County,
for Respondent.
BEFORE HARDESTY, SAITTA and PICKERING, JJ.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
In this opinion, we address the mandatory duty of the district
court judges under NRS 176.035(1) to pronounce the aggregate minimum
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and maximum terms of imprisonment when imposing consecutive
sentences for offenses committed on or after July 1, 2014.
Appellant Quinzale Mason fired several shots at another male
outside an apartment building in August 2014; the bullets missed the
male but a ricochet from one of the bullets hit and injured a girl nearby.
Following a jury trial, Mason was convicted of battery with a deadly
weapon as to the girl (count 1), assault with a deadly weapon as to the
male (count 2), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 3). The
district court imposed a prison term of 3 to 10 years for count 1, a
consecutive prison term of 2 to 5 years for count 2, and a concurrent prison
term of 2 to 5 years for count 3.
On appeal, Mason argues that the district court erred at
sentencing by failing to pronounce the aggregate minimum and maximum
terms of imprisonment as required by statute.' NRS 176.035(1) provides
in relevant part, "For offenses committed on or after July 1, 2014, if the
court imposes the sentences to run consecutively, the court must
pronounce the minimum and maximum aggregate terms of
imprisonment." Here, the district court imposed consecutive sentences for
'Mason's remaining contention—that the district court plainly erred
in instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent with respect to
the battery count—lacks merit. The instruction did not relieve the State
of its burden to prove that Mason willfully used force or violence upon the
victim, the jury was properly instructed on the elements of battery and the
definition of "willful," and sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to
support the battery conviction. See NRS 200.481(1)(a). Accordingly,
Mason fails to demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial rights.
See Green v. State,
(2003) (applying
plain error analysis to unpreserved claims of instructional error).
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offenses committed after July 1, 2014, but failed to state the minimum and
maximum aggregate terms of imprisonment.
The district court's mandatory duty under NRS 176.035(1) to
pronounce the aggregate terms of imprisonment in the judgment of
conviction is of significant importance. The Legislature placed this
statutory duty on district courts in an effort to simplify the sentence
structure and, in turn, promote confidence in the criminal justice system
and reduce confusion as to when an inmate is eligible for parole to the
street. See Hearing on S.B. 71 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm.,
77th Leg. 5-6 (Nev., April 19, 2013). Whereas previously inmates had to
be paroled from or expire a sentence before beginning to serve the next
consecutive sentence, the effect of aggregating consecutive sentences is
that inmates will now serve the minimum time for the total consecutive
sentences before being eligible for a parole hearing.
Id.
Thus, the
aggregation of consecutive sentences is a necessary step for the district
court to take to apprise all parties, as well as the Department of
Corrections and the public, as to when an inmate is actually eligible for
parole. Accordingly, we conclude that it was error for the district court not
to aggregate the sentences in the judgment of conviction but that error
does not warrant a new sentencing hearing as it does not affect the
sentences imposed for each offense.
Because Mason's arguments fail to demonstrate that his
convictions or sentences are infirm, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
However, we remand for the district court to correct the judgment of
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conviction to include the aggregate minimum and maximum terms of his
consecutive sentences as required by NRS 176.035(1). 2
J.
Hardesty
J.
Saitta
tz,
Pickering
, J.
2The corrected judgment of conviction should be entered nunc pro
tunc to the original sentencing date of March 17, 2015.
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