[Cite as State v. Rike,
2016-Ohio-1098.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2014-CA-92
:
v. : T.C. NO. 14CR318
:
RYAN RIKE : (Criminal appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the ___18th___ day of _____March_____, 2016.
...........
RYAN A. SAUNDERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0091678, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 50 E.
Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JEFFREY T. GRAMZA, Atty. Reg. No. 0053392, Talbott Tower, Suite 1210, 131 N.
Ludlow Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
DONOVAN, P.J.
{¶ 1} This matter is before the Court on the Notice of Appeal of Ryan Rike. Rike
appeals from his July 22, 2014 Judgment Entry of Conviction, following a guilty plea, to
one count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the second
degree, with an accompanying firearm specification. A second specification to count one
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as well as an additional count of tampering with evidence were dismissed in exchange
for Rike’s plea. Rike received a sentence of seven years for the felonious assault
offense, and three years for the firearm specification, to be served consecutively for an
aggregate term of ten years. We hereby affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} Rike was indicted on May 5, 2014, and he entered pleas of not guilty on May
13, 2014. Rike withdrew his pleas of not guilty on July 1, 2014. The following exchange
occurred in relevant part at Rike’s plea hearing:
…
THE COURT: Is this your signature on this written plea document?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Did you have a chance to go over this document with
your lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand everything in it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
…
THE COURT: Do you understand that you have the right to a trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: At that trial you would have the right to require the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the
offense to which you’re pleading guilty and you could only be convicted
upon the unanimous verdict of a jury.
You would have the right to confront witnesses who testify against
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you and your attorney could cross-examine those witnesses.
You would have the right to use the Court’s subpoena power to
compel the attendance of witnesses on your behalf; and you would also
have the right to testify, but you could not be forced to do so. Do you
understand all of those rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: By pleading guilty you would be giving up all of those
rights. Are you telling the Court that you want to give those rights up and
plead guilty to felonious assault with the firearm specification?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The Court finds that the defendant has knowingly,
voluntarily, intelligently waived his rights and entered a plea of guilty to that
offense. Based upon his plea, I find him guilty.
…
Rike’s written plea agreement provides in part as follows: “ … I know at trial I could not
have to take the witness stand and could not be forced to testify against myself and that
no one could comment if I chose not to testify. ….”
{¶ 3} Rike’s sole assigned error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
ACCEPTED APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT FIRST
ENNSURING THAT THE PLEA WAS MADE KNOWINGLY,
INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY.
{¶ 4} Rike argues as follows:
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At the plea hearing in the instant case, the Trial Court did state that
Appellant had the right to testify but that he could not be forced to do so.
The Court failed to inform Appellant - - - at that point or at any time - - - that,
if Appellant were to choose to exercise his right to remain silent and not
testify, no one could comment on his decision. This statement was
essential to a full explanation of Appellant’s constitutional rights that he had
and that he was waiving by entering a guilty plea. Failing to provide that
crucial information to Appellant constituted a failure to follow the mandate
of Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(c), the constitutional requirements expressed
beyond the criminal rule, and holding of the Supreme Court in State v.
Ballard [,66 Ohio St.2d 473,
423 N.E.2d 115 (1981).]
Informing Appellant that he had a right to remain silent did not satisfy
the requirement that he be informed in “a reasonable manner” of his right
not to testify, nor did it follow the Supreme Court ruling that the Trial Court
must refer to a defendant’s constitutional rights in a “manner reasonably
intelligible to that defendant.” Informing a defendant that, because he has
the right not to testify, no one can comment at this trial on his choice to
exercise that right constitutes informing that defendant of his right in a
reasonable manner and in a manner reasonably intelligible to that
defendant, as it [is] the only way that the true meaning of that right can be
adequately set forth. It is the only way that the constitutional requirements
expressed beyond Criminal Rule 11(C) can be satisfied.
A defendant who is informed only that he is not required to testify or
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that he has the right to remain silent may reasonably believe that he could
exercise the right, remain silent at his trial, and then sit helplessly while the
prosecutor criticized him in his closing argument for not telling the jury his
side of the story, or while the prosecutor argued to the jury that he remained
silent because he must have had something to hide and that was why he
was not testifying in his own behalf. …
In addition to Ballard, Rike directs our attention to State v. Singh, 141 Ohio App.3d 137,
750 N.E.2d 598 (11th Dist. 2000).
{¶ 5} The State responds that by “telling Rike that he had the right to testify but
could not be forced to do so, the trial court adequately apprised Rike of his right not to
testify against himself pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).” The State directs our attention
to State v. Smiddy, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-148, 2015-Ohio-4200, and asserts that
“even if the court’s explanation is found to be ambiguous, the written plea may be used
to resolve the ambiguity.”
{¶ 6} Crim.R. 11(C) governs pleas of guilty in felony cases and provides in
relevant part as follows:
…
(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or
a plea of no contest and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest
without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the
following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty
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involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or
for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court,
upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial,
to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require the state to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the
defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
…
{¶ 7} In Ballard, Arnold Ballard argued that “he was not informed of his
constitutional right to trial by jury.” Id.,66 Ohio St.2d 473, 476. The Supreme Court of
Ohio determined that in accepting a guilty plea, “the best method of informing a defendant
of his constitutional rights is to use the language contained in Crim.R. 11(C), stopping
after each right and asking the defendant whether he understands the right and knows
that he is waiving it by pleading guilty.” Id. at 479. The Court further determined,
however, that “failure to so proceed will not necessarily invalidate a plea. The underlying
purpose, from the defendant’s perspective, of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey to the defendant
certain information so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to
plead guilty.” Id. at 479-80. The Court noted that “the basis of Crim.R. 11 is to assure
that the defendant is informed, and thus enable the judge to determine that the defendant
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understands that his plea waives his constitutional right to a trial.” Id. at 480. The Court
concluded as follows:
Applying this standard to the present cause, we hold that the trial
court did meaningfully inform the appellant of his right to a trial by jury. The
court informed the appellant that neither judge nor jury could draw any
inference if the appellant refused to testify. Immediately after that
statement the trial court informed the appellant that he was entitled to a fair
and impartial trial under law. In each instance, the defendant was asked if
he understood. The defendant, in each instance, responded affirmatively.
These statements and answers, taken together, lead us to the conclusion
that the appellant was informed of his right to a trial by jury.
Id. at 480-81.
{¶ 8} In Singh, The Eleventh District considered whether the trial court erred in
accepting Jndbr Jit Singh’s guilty pleas “because the record clearly indicates that he was
not asked if he understood the nature of the charges against him,” and because he was
not informed of his right against self-incrimination. Id. at 140, 142. The court noted that
“the trial court need only substantially comply with the non-constitutional requirements set
forth in Crim.R. 11(C),” and it found that “based on the totality of the circumstances,”
Singh entered his pleas “with an understanding of the charges, the implications of his
plea, and the rights he was waiving.” Id. at 142. Regarding his right to be informed of his
right against self-incrimination, the record before the Eleventh District reflected that in the
course of his plea hearing, the judge indicated to Singh, “ ‘You could testify but you need
not testify if you desire not to; do you understand that?’ ” Id. The court noted that “the
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right against self-incrimination is a right of constitutional proportion, requiring strict
compliance with Crim.R. 11(C).” The Eleventh District determined as follows:
Thus, after reviewing Ballard, it is clear that Crim.R. 11(C) exists as
a vehicle by which a defendant’s constitutional rights are communicated to
him or her. From that perspective, it is apparent that Crim.R. 11(C) is
subservient to the constitutional principles it serves to communicate.
Accordingly, Crim.R.11(C) also must be read in a manner in which it
complies with constitutional requirements expressed beyond the rule itself.
In this matter, the trial judge’s statement, “You could testify but you
need not testify if you desire not to …,” fails to adequately apprise
appellant of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Furthermore,
even though the written plea form, signed by appellant, states that he
cannot be compelled to testify against himself, that right must be properly
explained by the trial judge in the plea colloquy. Accordingly, the trial court
failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C). Thus, appellant’s second assignment
of error is wellfounded.
Id. at 143.
{¶ 9} In Smiddy, upon which the State relies, Charles Smiddy argued that the trial
court failed to comply with CrimR. 11(C) “because the court did not tell him, prior to
accepting his plea, that he was waiving his constitutional right to a jury trial. Instead, the
court only informed Smiddy that he was waiving his right to a trial.” This Court conducted
the following analysis:
“The rights enunciated in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) are constitutional in
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nature.” State v. Perkins, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22956, 2010-Ohio-
2640, ¶ 42, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176,
2008-Ohio-5200,
897
N.E.2d 621, ¶ 21. In Veney, the Supreme Court of Ohio “reaffirmed that
strict, or literal compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) is required when
advising the defendant of the constitutional rights he is waiving by pleading
guilty or no contest.” State v. Barker,
129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-
4130,
953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 15, citing Veney at ¶ 18. As a result, “a trial court
must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally advise a defendant
before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives (1) the right to a jury trial
….” Veney at ¶ 31.
In Barker, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio also stressed that
“an alleged ambiguity during a Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy may be clarified
by reference to other portions of the record, including the written plea, in
determining whether the defendant was fully informed of the right in
question.” Barker at ¶ 25.
The issue in the case before us is whether the trial court failed to
comply with Crim.R. 11 requirements by omitting the word “jury” when
advising Smiddy of his right to a jury trial. We previously addressed this
particular issue in State v. Courtney, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013-CA-73, 2014-
Ohio-1659, where the trial court had also advised the defendant that “she
had ‘the right to a trial,’ and explained that: ‘At that trial you would have the
right to require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and
every element of the offense to which you are pleading guilty, and you could
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only be convicted upon the unanimous verdict of a jury.’ ” (Emphasis sic.)
Id. at ¶ 9. We concluded that the trial court sufficiently explained the
defendant’s right to a jury trial because “an average person of [her]
intelligence would know that a trial requiring a ‘unanimous verdict of a jury’
to convict necessitates a jury trial ….” Id.
The same considerations apply here, in nearly identical
circumstances. Smiddy was 51 years old at the time of the plea, and there
is no indication in the record that he lacked the intelligence to understand
the trial court’s explanation.
We further stressed in Courtney that even if we had found the court’s
explanation ambiguous (which we did not), the written plea specifically
referenced the right to a jury trial, and the defendant, therefore, was “fully
informed of her right to a jury trial.” Id. at ¶ 10. This is consistent with the
decision in Barker. In the present case, the discussion during Smiddy’s plea
colloquy was not ambiguous, but any ambiguity would have been resolved
by the written plea agreement that Smiddy signed. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d
472,
2011-Ohio-4130,
953 N.E.2d 826, at ¶ 25.
Id., ¶ 11-15; see also State v. Howard, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-3,
2016-Ohio-426, ¶
12 (finding strict compliance with Crim.R.11(C)(2)(c) where “Howard advised the trial
court that he reviewed the plea form with his attorney and that he understood everything
contained therein.”)
{¶ 10} Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not violate
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) in accepting Rike’s plea, and that Rike entered his plea knowingly,
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intelligently, and voluntarily. The court specifically advised Rike that he could not be
compelled to testify. While the court did not advise Rike that no one could comment if
he exercised his right against self-incrimination (a requirement not found in Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(c)), reference to the plea form clarifies that Rike was fully informed that “… no
one could comment if I chose not to testify.” At the plea hearing, Rike advised the trial
court that he signed the plea form, that he went over it with his attorney, and that he
understood everything contained therein. Accordingly, Rike’s assigned error lacks merit,
and it is hereby overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
..........
HALL, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Ryan A. Saunders
Jeffrey T. Gramza
Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter
