[Cite as State v. Dew,
2016-Ohio-274.] -1-
STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO ) CASE NO. 13 MA 174
)
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE )
)
VS. ) OPINION
)
GREGORY DEW )
)
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT )
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from the Court of
Common Pleas of Mahoning County,
Ohio
Case No. 07 CR 1262
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Paul J. Gains
Mahoning County Prosecutor
Atty. Ralph M. Rivera
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor
Youngstown, Ohio 44503
For Defendant-Appellant: Gregory Dew, Pro se
#543-986
Trumbull Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 901
Leavittsburg, Ohio 44430
JUDGES:
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Gene Donofrio
Hon. Mary DeGenaro
Dated: January 21, 2016
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.]
WAITE, J.
{¶1} Appellant Gregory Dew appeals an October 31, 2013 judgment entry
denying his Crim.R. 33(A)(6) motion for a new trial. Following jury trial Appellant was
convicted on four counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2)(B); two counts of
gross sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1)(B); and one count of
corrupting a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A). Appellant has filed several
appeals with this Court since his conviction.
{¶2} Appellant now contends that the trial court erroneously denied his
motion for a new trial. He additionally argues that the trial court judge exhibited bias
against him. As each of Appellant’s arguments have been raised on direct appeal or
should have been so raised, they are barred by res judicata. Accordingly, his
arguments are without merit and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶3} In 2007, Appellant was convicted on four counts of rape, two counts of
gross sexual imposition, and one count of corruption of a minor. He was sentenced
to an aggregate term of 43 years of incarceration. Appellant appealed his conviction
and was partially successful in State v. Dew, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 62, 2009-Ohio-6537
(“Dew I”). Shortly thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to reopen his appeal to
challenge his conviction based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in State
v. Dew, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 62,
2012-Ohio-434 (“Dew II”). This motion was denied.
{¶4} Appellant then filed a Crim.R. 33(A)(6) motion for a new trial with the
trial court. The trial court dismissed Appellant's motion based on the belief that the
court lacked jurisdiction. However, we reversed the trial court’s decision because the
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -2-
court did have such jurisdiction. State v. Dew, 7th Dist. No. 12 MA 18, 2013-Ohio-
2549 (“Dew III”).
{¶5} While Dew III was pending before us, Appellant filed a fourth appeal
requesting a delayed reopening of his case based on claims surrounding the
preservation of a wiretap recording. State v. Dew, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 62, 2014-
Ohio-4042. This appeal was denied.
{¶6} Appellant has also filed two separate motions with the Chief Justice of
the Ohio Supreme Court requesting recusal of the trial court judge based on a claim
of bias. The chief justice denied each of these motions and an additional motion for
reconsideration. Hence, Appellant’s motion for a new trial was heard by the same
judge who presided over his trial.
{¶7} The trial court conducted a Crim.R. 33 evidentiary hearing pursuant to
Appellant’s motion for a new trial. Appellant presented the following arguments: (1)
someone within the jury commission office intentionally tampered with the computer
software that generates a jury venire and caused Appellant's jury venire to have a
disproportionate number of persons related to local law enforcement; (2) the state
intentionally tampered with a DVD file that contained Appellant's interrogation video;
(3) the state “steered” the case to a specific judge to gain a perceived advantage
over Appellant; and (4) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on force or threat
of force. Appellant introduced several affidavits from various witnesses in support of
his arguments.
{¶8} At the Crim.R. 33 hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant was
barred from raising the alleged error related to the jury venire pursuant to Crim.R. 29,
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -3-
which requires a defendant to raise any such errors before the trial begins. In the
trial court's judgment entry, the court found that Appellant failed to present evidence
to suggest that anyone in the jury commission office tampered with the software. As
to the DVD file, the trial court similarly held that Appellant failed to provide evidence
to show that someone tampered with the file. The court also found that the
“evidence” was not newly discovered, as Appellant had been provided the DVD
before his trial began. Next, the trial court held that Appellant was barred from
contesting the jury instructions as that issue had already been resolved by this Court.
Finally, the trial court found that Appellant had failed to provide evidence that his
case was “steered” by the state to a specific judge. As each of Appellant's
arguments lacked merit, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial. Appellant
has filed a timely appeal of the trial court's ruling. For ease of understanding,
Appellant’s assignments of error will be discussed out of order.
Third Assignment of Error
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTION ON THE MERITS.
{¶9} Before a trial court may grant a motion for a new trial in a criminal case
on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the defendant must show that the new
evidence: (1) raises a strong probability that the result of the case will change if a
new trial is granted, (2) has been discovered since the trial, (3) could not have been
discovered prior to trial through the exercise of due diligence, (4) is material to the
issues, (5) is not cumulative to other known evidence, and (6) does not merely
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -4-
impeach or contradict the other known evidence. State v. Barber,
3 Ohio App.3d
445, 447,
445 N.E.2d 1146 (10th Dist.1982), citing State v. Petro,
148 Ohio St. 505,
76 N.E.2d 370 (1947).
{¶10} A criminal defendant is barred “from raising and litigating in any
proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of
due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial
that resulted in that judgment of conviction or on appeal from that judgment.” Dew III
at ¶26, citing State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175,
226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph
nine of the syllabus.
{¶11} Failure to raise an issue in the trial court waives all but a plain error
review. State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 196,
749 N.E.2d 274 (2001), citing State v.
Williams,
51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117,
364 N.E.2d 1367 (1972). “Plain error is one in
which but for the error, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” State v.
Peck, 7th Dist. No. 12 MA 205,
2013-Ohio-5526, ¶13, citing State v. Hancock, 7th
Dist. No. 09-JE-30,
2010-Ohio-4854, ¶55, citing State v. Long,
53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97,
372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). “Plain error should only be recognized in exceptional
circumstances to prevent the miscarriage of justice.” State v. Love, 7th Dist. No. 02
CA 245,
2006-Ohio-1762, ¶14, citing State v. Lundgren,
73 Ohio St.3d 474, 485,
653
N.E.2d 304 (1995).
{¶12} Appellant raises several sub-issues within this assignment of error. For
ease of understanding, each argument will be addressed separately.
Workable DVD Not Provided to Defense/DVD Altered
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -5-
{¶13} Appellant concedes that the state provided him with a DVD containing a
file of the video of his interrogation. However, he claims that the file was password
protected and he was not provided with a working password. Appellant claims that
he later learned that the video statement was longer in duration than the audio file,
which was used at trial. As he was unable to open and view the video file, he argues
that he could not determine that the file was corrupted until after the trial ended.
Appellant concedes that the DVD itself was technically available to him at the time of
trial but argues that his later analysis of the DVD is separate and newly discovered
evidence that was not available during trial, and provides grounds for a new trial.
{¶14} The state responds by arguing that Appellant has failed to produce any
evidence to suggest that he was unable to timely view the contents of the DVD file.
Even so, the state offers an explanation as to why the video statement is longer than
the audio file, which was used at trial. The state explains that Det. Flara controlled
the audio recorder and when he left the room after the interrogation ended, the
recorder was turned off. The state explains that the video recorder, on the other
hand, was turned on before the interrogation began and remained on even after the
interrogation ended and additionally contains video of Appellant signing paperwork.
Thus, even if the time discrepancy were considered newly discovered evidence,
there is nothing to suggest tampering took place and the “evidence” not exculpatory.
{¶15} At the Crim.R. 33 motion hearing, Appellant presented an affidavit from
SecureState, an independent computer forensic laboratory as evidence on the issue
of the alleged tampering. Attached to the affidavit was a report generated from
SecureState’s investigation of the DVD file. According to the report, there was a 1
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -6-
hour, 14 minute and 25 second time difference between the length of the audio and
video files. According to an affidavit by Appellant's brother, Roy J. Dew, who is
described as a “Certified Information Systems Auditor,” he was able to view the file
after he was able to determine the password and open the file.
{¶16} During the motion hearing, the trial court pointed out that the state had
provided Appellant with the DVD before the trial began, thus it was not newly
discovered. The court explained that it was the defense’s obligation at the time to
inform the court if the video could not be viewed. Accordingly, the trial court
concluded that any alleged tampering was discoverable before the trial commenced.
However, the trial court agreed to accept the affidavit and consider Appellant’s
arguments before making a final ruling. In its judgment entry, the trial court held that
Appellant had not presented any evidence to suggest that the state violated Crim.R.
16 or withheld any evidence related to the DVD.
{¶17} Appellant concedes that the DVD itself is not newly discovered
evidence. He argues that the analysis performed by SecureState is newly
discovered evidence, as it was not available to him until recently, after he was finally
able to open the file. However, as Appellant had access to the DVD file before his
trial began, the trial court correctly determined that none of his “evidence” is newly
discovered. While Appellant claims that he could not open the file at the time of trial,
there is nothing in the record to show why Appellant could not have simply asked for
the password or sought and obtained an expert to determine the password (as
Appellant's brother was able to do in 2011) and timely view the DVD. Importantly,
Appellant had a remedy available to him in the form of a direct appeal. Not only did
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -7-
he fail to raise this issue on direct appeal, he also failed to raise it in three appeals
filed subsequent to his direct appeal. As such, he is barred by the principle of res
judicata from raising this argument, now.
{¶18} Appellant argues that res judicata does not prevent this Court from
reviewing his argument for plain error. However, as Appellant could have obtained
the evidence with reasonable diligence at the time of trial, and the state has a
plausible argument for the alleged discrepancy, Appellant cannot show that “but for”
some error, the outcome would be different. Therefore, he has not shown plain error.
Alleged Tampering with Jury Venire Software
{¶19} Appellant argues that it is almost statistically impossible for software to
randomly select such a high number of persons for a jury venire who are related to
members of local law enforcement as it did in his case. Based on this statistical
improbability, Appellant argues that someone within the Mahoning County Jury
Commission Office tampered with the software before his jury venire was generated.
To support his argument, Appellant presented affidavits from Laurence Miller, Ph.D.
and Jude Summerfeld, P.E. According to Appellant, the affidavits discussed the
statistical improbability of his jury venire and the potential bias that families of law
enforcement might hold. Appellant also argues that several code numbers that are
used to randomly generate a jury venire are missing from the printout, which also
suggests to Appellant that someone tampered with the software.
{¶20} During the motion hearing, the trial court stated that Appellant had
waived this argument. Pursuant to Crim.R. 24, issues regarding the makeup of a jury
venire must be addressed before the commencement of trial. Despite this procedural
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -8-
bar, the trial court agreed to accept Appellant’s affidavits and review them before
entering a final ruling. The trial court ruled in its final judgment entry that Appellant
failed to present any actual evidence to support his theory that someone in the jury
commission office tampered with the jury venire process.
{¶21} Crim.R. 24(F) states:
The prosecuting attorney or the attorney for the defendant may
challenge the array of petit jurors on the ground that it was not selected,
drawn or summoned in accordance with law. A challenge to the array
shall be made before the examination of the jurors pursuant to division
(B) of this rule and shall be tried by the court.
No array of petit jurors shall be set aside, nor shall any verdict in any
case be set aside because the jury commissioners have returned such
jury or any juror in any informal or irregular manner, if in the opinion of
the court the irregularity is unimportant and insufficient to vitiate the
return.
{¶22} Despite the procedural bar placed on Appellant’s argument by Crim.R.
24(F), the trial court made a final ruling on the merits of his argument. Either way, as
was the case with the DVD file, any alleged tampering with the jury venire software
could and should have been raised in Appellant’s direct appeal. Appellant argues
that this evidence was not available to him, as he would need to compare his jury
venire report to subsequent jury venire reports in order to determine that his was
abnormal.
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -9-
{¶23} Even if we were persuaded by his argument, Appellant not only failed to
raise this issue on direct appeal but also failed to raise it in his three subsequent
appeals. He has offered no explanation as to why he could not obtain jury venire
printouts from other trials in a more timely manner. This is significant, as six years
passed between his conviction and his filing of the Crim.R. 33 motion. It is
implausible that it would take such a long period of time to merely obtain other jury
venire printouts. Further, while his statistical arguments are interesting, they provide
absolutely no evidence of tampering. We find that his tampering claim could have
been raised on direct appeal, and is barred by the principle of res judicata.
Allegation of “Case Steering”
{¶24} Appellant argues that he presented evidence to demonstrate that the
state improperly steered his case to a specific judge in order to obtain a perceived
advantage. First, he claims that he has recently been able to view portions of his
videotaped interrogation, including the portion where Det. Flara identifies the judge
assigned to his case. Appellant argues that his case should not have been assigned
to a judge at that point as he had not yet been arraigned.
{¶25} Appellant again resorts to statistical analysis. He argues that there are
only five common pleas court judges in Mahoning County, giving him a twenty
percent chance of being assigned to any one judge. As he believes that these odds
are low, he argues that it provides support for his argument that his case was steered
to a judge favorable to the prosecution. Also, according to Appellant, the Ohio
Supreme Court’s Case Flow Management and Operational Review of Mahoning
County Courts of Common Pleas revealed that cases within the county were
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -10-
improperly assigned at bindover instead of at arraignment, as required. Appellant
believes that this also evidences case steering.
{¶26} Case steering, also referred to as “judge shopping,” occurs when a
party attempts to have their case assigned to a particular judge based on a perceived
advantage and belief that the desired judge will issue a favorable ruling to that party.
As evidence of case steering, Appellant relies on the previously discussed DVD file,
statistics, and a report from the Ohio Supreme Court. However, this record
demonstrates that all of this evidence was available to Appellant at trial and could
have been addressed in a direct appeal.
{¶27} As we have already discussed, it is because of Appellant’s own lack of
diligence in obtaining an expert to open the DVD file that he was allegedly prevented
from viewing the file. Not only was this DVD file of Det. Flara's alleged statement
previously available to Appellant, but Det. Flara apparently made the statement
directly to Appellant at the interrogation. Clearly, Appellant then knew about Det.
Flara’s statement before his trial began. He also knew that he had not yet been
arraigned. As such, this argument was available to him and he could have raised this
issue on direct appeal. As to the statistical analysis, even if this could be used as
evidence of case steering, it is also information that was previously available to
Appellant using due diligence. Finally, the Supreme Court report to which Appellant
refers was generated in 2007. It was certainly available to him years ago.
{¶28} Based on the availability of each piece of evidence offered at his motion
hearing, Appellant could have raised this argument on direct appeal. As Appellant
failed to do so, he is now barred by res judicata.
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -11-
Incorporated Arguments
{¶29} Appellant also incorporates by reference arguments which appear on
pages nineteen through forty-two of his written motion for a new trial. Appellant has
not properly raised these additional arguments on appeal. However, a review of
these arguments demonstrates that most have been waived, as they pertain to trial
issues that should have been raised on direct appeal. These include allegations of:
(1) trial court error in holding the arraignment without Appellant or his counsel
present; (2) trial court error allowing the state to refile charges against him after the
first set of charges were dismissed; (3) trial court stating that it viewed the DVD, yet
Appellant’s copy could not be opened; (4) trial court attempts to “coerce” Appellant
into taking a plea deal; (5) trial court failure to comply with sentencing statutes (R.C.
2929.11 – 2929.14); (6) trial court determining that the victims suffered psychological
harm pursuant to R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(a); (7) trial court error in ruling on certain
objections made at trial; (8) trial court allowing the state to make “false” statements
during closing arguments; (9) trial court permitting the state to refer to him as a “con
artist, liar, and sex abuser”; (10) trial court allowing the state to admit “surprise
evidence”; (11) trial court’s sealing of Appellant’s files shortly after a photograph of
the judge and the jury commissioner appeared in “The Vindicator;” and (12) trial court
improperly denying his Crim.R. 29 motion at trial. As all of these alleged errors could
and should have been raised on direct appeal, they are barred by res judicata
{¶30} In addition to these unpreserved errors, Appellant has already raised
the following alleged errors in Dew I, Dew II, Dew III, and Dew IV: (1) there was no
physical force or threat of force used in commission of the crimes and a coach does
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -12-
not qualify as in loco parentis; (2) the trial court improperly denied his request to view
the Grand Jury transcripts; (3) the trial court improperly granted the state’s motion for
joinder; (4) the trial court improperly allowed the state to alter the wiretap; and, (5) the
trial court provided incorrect jury instructions. As these issues were already raised
and decided on appeal, res judicata also bars Appellant from raising these issues a
second time.
{¶31} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
First Assignment of Error
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE A HEARING BEFORE AN
UNBIASED, UNPREJUDICED AND DISINTERESTED JUDGE WHO
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
{¶32} It is well-established that a criminal defendant who is tried before a
biased judge has been denied due process. State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181,
2002-Ohio-2128,
767 N.E.2d 166, ¶34, citing Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570, 577,
106
S.Ct. 3101,
92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 534,
47 S.Ct. 437,
71 L.Ed. 749 (1927).
{¶33} However, an appellate court does not have the authority to disqualify a
trial court judge or to void his or her judgment based on a claim of judicial bias.
Paparodis v. Snively, 7th Dist. No. 06 CO 5,
2007-Ohio-6910, ¶48, citing State v.
Ramos,
88 Ohio App.3d 394, 398,
623 N.E.2d 1336, (9th Dist.1993). Furthermore,
[Cite as State v. Dew,
2016-Ohio-274.] -13-
“once the Chief Justice has dismissed an affidavit of disqualification as not well
taken, the ruling of the Chief Justice is res judicata as to the question.” Paparodis at
¶50, citing State v. Getsy,
84 Ohio St.3d 180, 185,
702 N.E.2d 866 (1998).
{¶34} Here, Appellant claims various instances of judicial bias during both his
trial and Crim.R. 33 hearing. The first alleged instance of bias occurred prior to trial
when the trial court judge was featured in a photograph with the Mahoning County
Jury Commissioner on the front page of the local newspaper. Appellant believes that
this photograph was taken to either show the judge’s support for the jury commission
office or to intimidate Appellant. The second alleged instance occurred during the
sentencing hearing when the trial court judge compared him to a doctor who worked
at a Nazi concentration camp. Third, Appellant argues that the trial court judge
refused to hear expert witness testimony at the Crim.R. 33 hearing.
{¶35} Fourth, Appellant complains that the trial court judge contradicted
himself by granting him leave to file a motion for a new trial but denying the actual
motion itself. Fifth, Appellant contends that the trial court entered its ruling on
October 31, 2013 but the court’s entry was signed two days before, on October 29,
2013. Finally, Appellant takes issue with a comment made by the trial court judge at
the Crim.R. 33 hearing:
Your client in his brief in effect calls me a liar for saying that I reviewed
the videotape. He really has trouble believing that I did that and says
things that are offensive to me. And it doesn’t have anything to do with
-- I mean, I got to be able to take it or I wouldn’t be sitting here, but
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -14-
those things are particularly offensive and completely unnecessary and
really -- I’m not allowed to use certain words by direction of our Court of
Appeals -- but certainly unwise on the part of someone who’s asking
somebody for relief, I mean as a practical matter. Of course you got to
say the things that you need to say to make the point, but I want the
record to be very clear that I would never represent to anyone in a trial
that I have done something imposed upon me by my sworn duty and
misrepresent that. That’s so offensive to me. Even he should
understand that
(8/26/13 Motion Hrg., pp. 44-45.)
{¶36} While the trial court judge’s statement, here, may be inartful, all of
Appellant’s claims regarding judicial bias are barred by res judicata. Appellant has
filed two motions to disqualify the trial court judge (and one motion for
reconsideration) with the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court. The Chief Justice
denied each of these motions and cautioned Appellant that “the filing of any more
affidavits with these repeated and unsubstantiated allegations may result in the
imposition of appropriate sanctions.” (7/18/13 Judgment Entry, p. 2.) As we stated in
Paparodis, “once the Chief Justice has dismissed an affidavit of disqualification as
not well taken, the ruling of the Chief Justice is res judicata as to the question.” Id. at
¶50. The Chief Justice has ruled on this issue three times. Appellant is barred from
presenting this argument yet again.
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -15-
{¶37} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
WITNESSES AT HIS HEARING IN VIOLATION OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
{¶38} Although the trial court judge initially told Appellant that he would be
able to present witness testimony at his motion hearing to supplement his affidavits,
the judge changed his mind and refused to allow such testimony. Appellant believes
that due process requires a judge to allow witness testimony where, as in this case,
the evidence involves technical details that a layperson cannot properly articulate.
Appellant urges that this is supported by the judge’s admission that he presented
witness testimony in similar hearings when he was a trial lawyer. Moreover,
Appellant believes that a judge is required to allow witness testimony pursuant to
State v. Gaines, 1st Dist. No. C-090097, 2010-Ohio-895. Appellant urges that it is
impossible for a judge to rule on the merits of a motion without first hearing expert
testimony where complicated issues have been presented.
{¶39} The state responds by refuting Appellant’s contention that a judge is
required to hear witness testimony during an evidentiary hearing. The state
emphasizes that Appellant’s motion was made pursuant to Crim.R. 33(A)(6), which
requires affidavits but makes no mention of witness testimony. As the language of
Crim.R. 33(A)(6) clearly does not require a judge to permit witness testimony, the
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -16-
state urges that Appellant’s argument is incorrect. The state also argues that the
evidence presented by Appellant could have been discovered at the time of trial.
Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant’s motion, which was
based on a claim of newly discovered evidence.
{¶40} Pursuant to Crim.R. 33(A)(6),
When new evidence material to the defense is discovered which the
defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial. When a motion for a new trial is made upon the
ground of newly discovered evidence, the defendant must produce at
the hearing on the motion, in support thereof, the affidavits of the
witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, and if time
is required by the defendant to procure such affidavits, the court may
postpone the hearing of the motion for such length of time as is
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case. The prosecuting
attorney may produce affidavits or other evidence to impeach the
affidavits of such witnesses.
{¶41} Appellant specifically argues that the trial court refused to hear witness
testimony as to his arguments regarding the DVD file and the alleged tampering with
the jury venire software. As both of these arguments are barred by res judicata, the
trial court did not err when it declined to hear witness testimony based on procedural
grounds on these issues. Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit
and is overruled.
[Cite as State v. Dew, 2016-Ohio-274.] -17-
Conclusion
{¶42} Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his Crim.R.
33 motion for a new trial and that the trial court was biased against him. Each of
Appellant’s arguments within his Crim.R. 33 motion are barred by res judicata. The
trial court did not err in denying the motion or in refusing to hear expert witnesses on
these arguments. Further, the Chief Justice has already ruled that there is no basis
for disqualifying the trial court judge in this case. This argument is similarly barred by
res judicata. Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments are entirely without merit and the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed in full.
Donofrio, P.J., concurs.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.
