[Cite as State v. Randle,
2016-Ohio-3059.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 103264
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
MARION RANDLE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-14-591024-A
BEFORE: Keough, P.J., S. Gallagher, J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 19, 2016
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert L. Tobik
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
By: John T. Martin
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Patrick J. Lavelle
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Marion Randle (“Randle”), appeals from the trial
court’s judgment finding him guilty of drug trafficking and sentencing him to three years
in prison. We affirm.
I. Background
{¶2} In November 2014, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Randle on
three counts. Count 1 charged drug possession in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A); Count 2
charged drug trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); and Count 3 charged
possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A).
{¶3} Randle subsequently pleaded guilty to amended Count 2, trafficking in
heroin in an amount equal to or exceeding ten grams but less than fifty grams, in violation
of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a second-degree felony, with a forfeiture specification.
{¶4} During the trial court’s plea colloquy with Randle, upon questioning,
Randle told the judge that he was not on community control sanctions in any other case.
The judge verified that Randle understood what constitutional rights he was waiving by
pleading guilty. The judge then reviewed the nature of the charge with Randle, and
informed him that by pleading guilty, he would be subject to a mandatory prison term of
two to eight years, a mandatory fine, and forfeiture of three cell phones and $638. The
prosecutor informed the judge that at sentencing, the state would be seeking more than
the minimum two-year prison term.
{¶5} At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the court advised that it had reviewed
Randle’s presentence investigation report, a TASC assessment regarding Randle’s
substance abuse issues, the defense sentencing memorandum, and a status report from
Randle’s probation officer. The court acknowledged that as a result of his guilty plea in
this case, Randle had violated community control conditions in two other cases,
CR-12-567167 and CR-12-564291, which Randle had not told the court about when he
pleaded guilty to the trafficking offense.
{¶6} The court then heard from the prosecutor, defense counsel, Randle’s
probation officer, and Randle. Defense counsel acknowledged that Randle had a
criminal history and had previously been to prison. Counsel asserted that Randle had
completed his community control sanctions without incident, but acknowledged that the
incident leading to the charges in this case occurred a month prior to the expiration of the
two-year probation sanctions that were imposed in the other two cases. The trial court
then reviewed Randle’s criminal history, noting that this was his ninth felony offense.
The court also noted that Randle had been released from prison in 2009 and charged with
the other two cases, both of which were drug related, relatively soon after his release.
The court further noted that Randle, who admitted at the plea hearing that he was selling
drugs to support his habit, had deceived his probation officer because although he always
tested negative on his drug tests, he was still using drugs.
{¶7} The trial court then sentenced Randle to a total of three years incarceration:
three years for the drug trafficking offense in this case, concurrent with three years for the
community control sanctions violation in CR-12-567167, and 18 months for the violation
in CR-12-564291. The court terminated community control sanctions in case Nos.
CR-12-567167 and CR-12-564291, and imposed a $15,000 fine, as well as mandatory
three years postrelease control and a six-months driver’s license suspension upon
Randle’s release from prison.
{¶8} The court noted that in imposing the sentence, it had considered the
purposes and principles of sentencing, as well as the likelihood of Randle’s recidivism,
and the fact that Randle was on probation in two other cases when he committed this
offense.
{¶9} Randle now appeals from the sentence, arguing that his guilty plea in this
case was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently because he was not aware
that his guilty plea carried potential consequences regarding the two cases for which he
was on community control sanctions. In short, Randle contends that the trial court did not
fully explain to him the effect of his plea.
{¶10} Under Crim.R. 11(C)(2), in a felony case, a trial court shall not accept a
guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally and (1) determining that the
defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with an understanding of the nature of the
charges and of the maximum penalty involved, (2) informing the defendant of and
determining that the defendant understands the effect of the guilty plea and that the court,
upon accepting the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence, and (3) informing the
defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea, the defendant
is waiving the rights to a jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot
be compelled to testify against himself.
{¶11} A trial court must strictly comply with the Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requirements
regarding the waiver of constitutional rights, which means that the court must actually
inform the defendant of the constitutional rights he is waiving and make sure the
defendant understands them. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176,
2008-Ohio-5200,
897
N.E.2d 621, ¶ 18. For nonconstitutional rights, such as the right to be informed of the
effect of the plea, we review for substantial compliance with the rule. Id. at ¶ 14, citing
State v. Stewart,
51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92,
364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). Substantial compliance
means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant understands the
implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving. State v. Carter,
60 Ohio St.2d 34,
38,
396 N.E.2d 757 (1979).
{¶12} The record reflects that at the plea hearing, the trial court explained to
Randle that as amended, the Count 2 trafficking charge was a second-degree felony with
a forfeiture specification. The court also carefully explained the possible penalties to
Randle: a mandatory two to eight years in prison, a six months to five years mandatory
driver’s license suspension, a mandatory fine, and forfeiture of three cell phones and
$638. The court also explained that upon release from prison, Randle would be subject
to three years of mandatory postrelease control; it also explained the possible
consequences for violating postrelease control. Randle informed the court that he
understood and had no questions about his rights, the nature of the charge to which he
was pleading guilty, or any of the possible penalties involved in his guilty plea to
amended Count 2. Thus, the record reflects that the trial court explained and Randle
understood the effect of his plea regarding the trafficking charge in amended Count 2.
{¶13} Nevertheless, the record reflects that the trial court did not advise Randle of
the effect of his plea on the two cases for which he was on community control sanctions.
We presume this is because Randle specifically advised the court at the plea hearing that
he was not on community control sanctions on any other case. The court apparently only
learned after the plea hearing that Randle was on community control sanctions in Case
Nos. CR-12-567167 and CR-12-564291.1
{¶14} Informing a defendant of the effect of his plea is a nonconstitutional right
and, therefore, subject to review for substantial compliance. State v. Richardson, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100838, 2014-Ohio-2984, ¶ 25, citing State v. Griggs,
103 Ohio
St.3d 85,
2004-Ohio-4415,
814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 11. A defendant must show prejudice
before a plea will be vacated for a trial court’s error involving Crim.R. 11(C) procedure
when nonconstitutional aspects of the colloquy are at issue. Veney,
120 Ohio St.3d 176,
2008-Ohio-5200,
897 N.E.2d 621, at ¶ 18. “‘[E]ven if the [trial] court failed to
substantially comply with explaining the effect of his plea,’ the defendant still has to
1
In light of Randle’s deceptiveness regarding his drug testing, we are not
persuaded by his assertion on appeal that at the time of his plea, he did not know
he was on community control sanctions in the other two cases.
prove that he was prejudiced by the court’s failure.” State v. Mannarino, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 98727, 2013-Ohio-1795, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Simonoski, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 98496,
2013-Ohio-1031, ¶ 11. The test for prejudice is whether the plea
would have otherwise been made. State v. Owens, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100398 and
100399,
2014-Ohio-2275, ¶ 12, citing State v. Clark,
119 Ohio St.3d 239,
2008-Ohio-3748,
893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 32.
{¶15} We find that the trial court substantially complied with its obligation to
inform Randle of the effect of his plea. This court and others have noted that “neither
Crim.R. 11 nor Ohio law generally require a court to explain every potential consequence
of a guilty plea before accepting the defendant’s guilty plea.” State v. Hoffman, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 53749, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4382, *2 (Nov. 3, 1988); State v. Bryant,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 36778,
1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 9448, *2 (Jan. 12, 1978); State v.
Dixon, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00254,
2009-Ohio-3137, ¶ 20; State v. Lane, 2d Dist.
Greene No. 2001-CA-92,
2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1912, *4 (Apr. 19, 2002). More
specifically, Crim.R. 11 does not require the trial court to advise a defendant of the
consequences a guilty plea has on prior felony convictions. Dixon at ¶ 20.
{¶16} Accordingly, the trial court was under no obligation to advise Randle of the
consequences his guilty plea would have on his community control. The court’s
explanation to Randle that he would be subject to a mandatory prison term of two to eight
years, a mandatory fine, and forfeiture of three cell phones and $638, and Randle’s
acknowledgment that he understood the penalties involved in his guilty plea, was full
compliance with the trial court’s duty to inform Randle of the effect of his guilty plea.
{¶17} Moreover, even if we were to find that the trial court should have informed
Randle of the consequences of his plea upon his community control in the two other cases
(which we do not), Randle does not argue that he would not have pleaded guilty to drug
trafficking, as amended in Count 2, had the court advised him that his guilty plea carried
consequences (i.e., a prison sentence) with respect to those two cases. Furthermore, he
cannot demonstrate that he was, in fact, prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to so advise
him because the court ran the three-year sentence in this case concurrent with the prison
sentences on the other two cases.
{¶18} Accordingly, because the record reflects that the trial court fully complied
with Crim.R. 11, and Randle’s guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently, the assignment of error is overruled.
{¶19} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, PRESIDING JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR
