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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-150474
TRIAL NO. C-04CRB-3163
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
O P I N I O N.
:
MICHAEL GLYNN,
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 1, 2016
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Marguerite Slagle,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
FISCHER, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Michael Glynn appeals the decision of the
Hamilton County Municipal Court denying his application to seal a criminal
conviction. Because we determine that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
denying Glynn’s application by relying on the state’s objection that a sealed
conviction could not be located by other law-enforcement officials, we must reverse
the decision of the trial court.
{¶2} In 2004, Glynn pleaded no contest to violating a domestic-relations
protective order, a first-degree misdemeanor, after kicking the front door of his ex-
wife’s home, breaking the lock, and twisting his ex-wife’s arm while she held their
six-month-old baby. In 2015, Glynn moved to seal the record of his conviction, and
the trial court held a hearing on his motion. At the hearing, the prosecutor objected
to Glynn’s application, in part, on the grounds that another police department or
prosecutor would not know to search for the sealed conviction, and that the past
conviction then could not serve to enhance a future charge.
{¶3} After a hearing, the trial court denied Glynn’s request to seal his
conviction based, in part, on the prosecutor’s objection, and this appeal ensued.
{¶4} In three assignments of error, Glynn challenges the trial court’s denial
of his application to seal his criminal conviction. In general, we review a trial court’s
decision regarding a motion to expunge and seal a record for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Spohr, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110314,
2012-Ohio-556, ¶ 5
. But, if the issue
involves a purely legal question, our standard of review is de novo.
Id.
{¶5} An eligible offender may file an application to seal records of a
criminal conviction under R.C. 2953.32. The statute allows the prosecutor to file
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
objections to the application. See R.C. 2953.32(B). In determining whether to grant
or deny the application, the trial court must then:
(a) Determine whether the applicant is an eligible offender …;
(b) Determine whether criminal proceedings are pending against the
applicant;
(c) [D]etermine whether the applicant has been rehabilitated to the
satisfaction of the court;
(d) If the prosecutor has filed an objection …, consider the reasons
against granting the application specified by the prosecutor in the
objection;
(e) Weigh the interests of the applicant in having the records
pertaining to the applicant’s conviction … against the legitimate
needs, if any, of the government to maintain those records.
See R.C. 2953.32(C)(1).
{¶6} R.C. 2953.32 specifically allows a law-enforcement officer or
prosecutor to inspect a sealed record to determine whether that sealed record could
enhance a charge. See R.C. 2953.32(D)(1). Where a “prime reason for denying
expungement [is] rooted in a misconception of the law, a court of appeals may
reverse the trial court’s decision denying expungment.” State v. Greene,
(1991). Because the prosecutor’s objection and the
trial court’s decision relied on a misconception of law, we must sustain Glynn’s
assignments of error. The trial court’s decision is reversed and this cause is
remanded with instructions to the trial court to reconsider Glynn’s application
pursuant to the law and this opinion.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
HENDON and STAUTBERG, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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