[Cite as State v. Kuhns,
2016-Ohio-5312.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 28027
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
STEVEN W. KUHNS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 15 07 2323
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 10, 2016
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Steven Kuhns, appeals the judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas convicting him of theft, a fifth-degree felony. While we affirm the trial
court’s finding of guilt, we hold that the trial court erred by sentencing Kuhns for the crime of
theft as a fifth-degree felony.
I.
{¶2} The Summit County Grand Jury indicted Kuhns on one count of theft in violation
of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2) as a result of his failing to return or pay for a gasoline-powered
Husqvarna K 760 II cut-off saw that he had rented from Falls Tool Rental, a business located in
Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio. A violation of this section typically constitutes petty theft, which is a
first-degree misdemeanor. R.C. 2913.02(B)(2). However, because the value of the cut-off saw
was alleged to be between $1,000.00 and $7,500.00, the State sought to enhance Kuhns’ theft
charge to a felony of the fifth degree pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(B)(2). Kuhns pled not guilty to
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the sole count in the indictment and also waived his right to a jury trial. The matter then
proceeded to a bench trial.
{¶3} During the course of the proceedings, the parties stipulated that Kuhns committed
a theft offense by renting and not returning the cut-off saw. The parties further stipulated that the
sole issue at trial concerned the value of the cut-off saw, which would directly impact whether
Kuhns was guilty of a first-degree misdemeanor or a fifth-degree felony if he were to be
convicted. See R.C. 2913.02(B)(2). At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Kuhns made a
Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis that insufficient evidence was presented
demonstrating that the value of the cut-off saw was at least $1,000.00. The trial court denied
Kuhns’ motion. The defense then rested without calling any witnesses. The trial court
subsequently found Kuhns guilty of the sole count contained in the indictment and sentenced
Kuhns to a suspended term of imprisonment on the condition that Kuhns serve a period of 18
months of community control. The trial court also ordered Kuhns to pay restitution to the victim
in the amount of $1,632.98.
{¶4} Kuhns filed this timely appeal and raises three assignments of error for this
Court’s review. To facilitate our analysis, we elect to address Kuhns’ first and second
assignments of error together.
II.
Assignment of Error I
The trial court erred as a matter of law because the State failed to establish
on the record sufficient evidence to support the charges levied against Mr.
Kuhn in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 1, 10 & 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
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Assignment of Error II
Mr. Kuhn’s convictions [sic] are against the manifest weight of the evidence [
] in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, Section 1, 10 & 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶5} Although Kuhns has couched his challenges as sufficiency of the evidence and
manifest weight claims, the gist of his argument is that the trial court improperly determined the
value of the stolen property which affected the trial court’s determination of the level of his
offense for sentencing purposes. Because we agree with Kuhns’ argument, we reverse and
remand for resentencing.
{¶6} This matter implicates Kuhns’ conviction for theft in violation of R.C.
2913.02(A)(2), which prohibits a person, “with purpose to deprive the owner of property or
services, [from] knowingly obtain[ing] or exert[ing] control over either the property or services *
… [b]eyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the owner or person authorized to
give consent.” A violation of R.C. 2913.02(A) is generally a misdemeanor of the first degree.
R.C. 2913.02(B)(2). However, where the value of the property or services stolen is $1,000.00 or
more, but less than $7,500.00, a violation of R.C. 2913.02 constitutes a felony of the fifth degree.
Id. While the special findings identified in R.C. 2913.02(B)(2) that are required for an
enhancement affect the sentence that is available upon conviction for the offense, they are not
part of the definition of the crime of theft set forth in R.C. 2913.02(A). See State v. Smith,
121
Ohio St.3d 409,
2009-Ohio-787, ¶ 13.
{¶7} Here, the parties disagree as to whether it was appropriate for the trial court to
include the rental fee as part of the saw’s value. At trial, the store employee testified that Kuhns
agreed to rent the cut-off saw for a period of one day, but that Kuhns never returned the saw.
The employee testified that after Kuhns failed to return the saw after one month, the store’s
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owner filed charges against Kuhns and terminated the rental agreement. Lastly, the owner
testified that the rental agreement explicitly states that if the saw was not returned for any reason,
the renter would still owe the full rental amount, which for this particular saw was $750.00 per
month. The trial court ultimately determined that the $750.00 rental fee did constitute part of the
saw’s value. The trial court also determined that the aggregate value of the cut-off saw exceeded
$1,000.00, but was less than $7,500.00, and proceeded to sentence Kuhns on a fifth-degree
felony.
{¶8} The State maintains that because R.C. 2913.01(E) defines “services” to include
“rental services,” it was appropriate for the trial court to include the rental fee as part of the
saw’s value. Kuhns disagrees with the State’s position and argues that the value of the saw is
strictly limited to its replacement value. We agree with Kuhns on this point.
{¶9} When determining the value of property or services involved in a theft offense,
R.C. 2913.61(D)(2) provides that:
[t]he value of … materials, supplies, equipment, and fixtures used in the
profession, business, trade, occupation, or avocation of its owner … and which
retains substantial utility for its purpose regardless of its age or condition, is the
cost of replacing the property with new property of like kind and quality.
Thus, the value of equipment that is used in the business of its owner, such as the cut-off saw at
issue in this case, is the replacement value of that piece of equipment. As R.C. 2913.61(D)(2)
does not provide for rental fees when ascertaining the value of a stolen piece of business
equipment, we conclude that rental fees are not to be included in such a calculation. Because the
trial court concluded otherwise, we determine that the trial court erred in its calculation of the
value of the cut-off saw.
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{¶10} Moreover, R.C. 2913.02(A)(2) states that “[n]o person, with purpose to deprive
the owner of property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the
property or services … [b]eyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the owner or
person authorized to give consent.” (Emphasis added.) The plain language of this statute
signifies that property and services are two different things, though both are capable of being
stolen. The State is correct in noting that R.C. 2913.01(E) explicitly defines the term “services”
to include “rental services.” However, Kuhns was charged with stealing a power tool, which is a
tangible piece of property, not a service. As such, the fact that R.C. 2913.01(E)’s definition of
“services” includes “rental services” is irrelevant to determining the value of a stolen piece of
property. Because Kuhns was charged with theft of a cut-off saw from a business, the applicable
law limits the valuation of stolen business equipment solely to its replacement value. And,
because the cut-off saw’s value does not include the $750.00 rental fee, we determine that the
trial court erred by sentencing Kuhns for a fifth-degree felony. Accordingly, we vacate the trial
court’s sentence in this matter and remand for the trial court to determine the correct value of the
cut-off saw in light of R.C. 2913.61(D)(2).
{¶11} Kuhns’ first and second assignments of error are sustained.
Assignment of Error III
Mr. Kuhn was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed
under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Sections
1, 10 & 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶12} In his third assignment of error, Kuhns argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Specifically, Kuhns contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by
stipulating to the material elements of theft while not understanding that “rental services” were to
be included in the valuation of stolen property. Thus, Kuhns’ ineffective assistance of counsel
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argument is premised on being convicted of a fifth-degree felony instead of a first-degree
misdemeanor. However, in sustaining Kuhns’ earlier assignments of error, we determined that
the trial court incorrectly calculated the value of the stolen property at issue in this matter and
remanded the matter for further proceedings. As such, Kuhns’ ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is not ripe in light of this Court’s reversal.
III.
{¶13} Kuhns’ first and second assignments of error are sustained insofar as the trial
court erred in its calculation of the stolen property. Kuhns’ third assignment of error is not yet
ripe for review. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and
this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed to Appellee.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
CONCURS.
MOORE, P. J.
CONCURRING IN PART, AND DISSENTING IN PART.
{¶14} I concur that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed; however, I would
send the matter back with instructions for the trial court to sentence Mr. Kuhns to a first-degree
misdemeanor.
{¶15} Mr. Kuhns was indicted for stealing “saws and/or other items[.]” He was not
indicted for the theft of rental services. The parties do not dispute that the State presented
evidence that the saw could be purchased from the manufacturer for over $1000. However,
evidence was also presented that the saw and the two blades could be purchased elsewhere for
$882.98. The trial court adopted the latter value as the value of the saw. The trial court also
included the value of the monthly rental fee, $750, in determining the total value. Thus, the trial
court found the value to be $1632.98, and accordingly found Mr. Kuhns guilty of a felony.
{¶16} R.C. 2913.02(A)(2) states that “[n]o person, with purpose to deprive the owner of
property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services
… [b]eyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the owner or person authorized to
give consent[.]” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the plain language of the statute indicates that a crime
occurs when either property or services is taken. R.C. 2913.61(D) provides in part that the listed
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“criteria shall be used in determining the value of property or services involved in a theft offense
….” (Emphasis added.) The plain language of that statute thus provides that the value at issue
from an applicable theft offense consists of the value of the property or the value of the services,
not a combination of the two.
{¶17} However, here the trial court only found the total value met the felony level
threshold by combining the value of the saw and the blades along with the value of the rental
services. As the statutes at issue do not authorize aggregation, and the value of the saw and
blades, the items the indictment alleged Mr. Kuhns stole, was determined to be less than
$1000.00, Mr. Kuhns could not be convicted of a felony offense. Thus, to the extent that Mr.
Kuhns has asserted he could not be convicted of a felony, I would sustain his first and second
assignments of error and remand the matter with instructions for the trial court to sentence Mr.
Kuhns to a first-degree misdemeanor.
{¶18} Given that resolution, to the extent that Mr. Kuhns has argued that his counsel
was ineffective by stipulating at trial to all other elements of theft, aside from the value of the
items stolen, I would proceed to address the merits of the third assignment of error.
APPEARANCES:
PAUL M. GRANT, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
