[Cite as State v. Runyon,
2016-Ohio-5730.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2015-CA-63
:
v. : T.C. NO. 15CR102
:
PHILLIP J. RUNYON : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the ___9th___ day of _____September_____, 2016.
...........
ANU SHARMA, Atty. Reg. No. 0081773, Assistant Prosecutor, 61 Greene Street, Xenia,
Ohio 45385
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
CHARLES M. BLUE, Atty. Reg. No. 0074329, 401 E. Stroop Rd., Kettering, Ohio 45429
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
.............
FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} After the trial court overruled his motion to suppress, Phillip Runyon pled no
contest in the Greene County Court of Common Pleas to an amended charge of illegal
assembly or possession of chemicals for manufacture of drugs, a third-degree felony; two
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additional charges were dismissed. The trial court imposed an agreed sentence of 36
months in prison and restitution of $375.
{¶ 2} Runyon appeals from his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence that was seized from the home where he
allegedly stayed and from the motor vehicle he allegedly drove, in addition to any
statements he made at that time. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment
will be affirmed.
I. Standard of Review
{¶ 3} “When confronted with a motion to suppress, a trial court assumes the role
of the trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Burchett, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20167, 2004-
Ohio-3101, ¶ 3, citing State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592,
639 N.E.2d 498 (2d
Dist. 1993). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, broad deference is given
to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.
Id. However, although we give deference to the trial court’s findings of fact, we must
apply those facts de novo to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Ornelas v.
United States,
517 U.S. 690, 691,
116 S.Ct. 1657,
134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).
II. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 4} On April 9, 2015, Runyon filed a motion to suppress all evidence recovered
in the search of his person, the motor vehicle he allegedly drove, and the home at which
he allegedly stayed. Runyon argued that law enforcement lacked probable cause and
consent to search his person, the motor vehicle, and his home, in addition to lacking the
requisite probable cause to arrest and detain him. He asserted the evidence was
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gathered in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 5} On July 8, 2015, a suppression hearing was held. 1 Runyon sought to
suppress the evidence obtained from both warrants. The first warrant and affidavit,
admitted as Exhibit 1, is a search warrant for a particular address in Fairborn (“Premises
Search Warrant”). The second warrant and affidavit, admitted as Exhibit 2, is a search
warrant for a 2003 grey Ford Taurus, Registration Number GDM1785 (“Vehicle Search
Warrant”).
{¶ 6} The events which led to Runyon’s motion to suppress were outlined in the
Premises Search Warrant, the Vehicle Search Warrant, and testimony from Detective
Ben Roman of the Fairborn Police Department. Detective Roman provided the following
reiteration of facts through his testimony and the warrant affidavits.
{¶ 7} Detective Roman is a member of the Greene County A.C.E. Drug Task
Force, which investigates drug traffic complaints, meth labs, and marijuana grows. The
Task Force received information while executing a search warrant in November of 2012
that Runyon was manufacturing methamphetamine and was dating a female named
Tiffany Seiber. Seiber was, at that time, being held in the Greene County Jail.
Additionally, the Task Force learned Runyon’s phone number, which was later
corroborated through New World, a law enforcement database that includes contact
information for those who have come in contact with Greene County law enforcement.
After receiving this information, the detective began to monitor the calls between
1
A second suppression hearing was held on September 8, 2015, but focused solely on
the Miranda warnings and interview of Runyon at the police station. No information
provided in the second hearing is relevant to this appeal.
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Runyon’s telephone and the Greene County Jail. During these monitored phone calls, a
subject named “Phil”, at Runyon’s number, discussed getting “beans” with Seiber.
Detective Roman clarified “beans” commonly refers to pseudoephedrine pills.
{¶ 8} Detective Roman further testified that on January 20, 2015, a member of the
Task Force received an e-mail from the Beavercreek Police Department alerting the Task
Force to suspicious behavior at a local ice-cream shop. The store manager of the shop
had reported that “a suspicious [male] subject was buying dry ice and had purchased
approximately four pounds of dry ice at a time, and he believed it may be meth related.”
The store manager’s report further provided a registration for the vehicle utilized by the
male, GDM1785. After further investigation, Detective Roman learned that the vehicle
was registered to the same Tiffany Seiber in the Greene County Jail.
{¶ 9} On January 27, 2015, the Fairborn Police Department obtained an
anonymous tip that Runyon was manufacturing methamphetamine at a particular address
in Fairborn. This anonymous informant added that Runyon utilized two vehicles, one
with the registration of GDM1785 and one with DA48HT. After further investigation, the
GDM1785 vehicle was found to be a grey 2003 Ford Taurus.
{¶ 10} Detective Roman then surveyed the Fairborn property identified in the tip,
during which time he observed the DA48HT vehicle described by the anonymous
informant. The following day, the Fairborn Police Department obtained a second
concerned citizen tip that Runyon was manufacturing methamphetamine at the same
Fairborn address.
{¶ 11} The following day, the detective performed a MethCheck (a database that
monitors the frequency an individual purchases pseudoephedrine) on Runyon that
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displayed he had purchased pseudoephedrine 14 times between June of 2014 and
January of 2015. This check also provided that Runyon had been blocked from
purchasing pseudoephedrine four additional times within that period.
{¶ 12} After performing the MethCheck, the detective and a fellow Task Force
member conducted a trash pull at the Fairborn address on February 2, 2015. The
detectives found burnt foil and six plastic bags with white residue, which field tested
positive for methamphetamine. The same day, a separate Task Force member prepared
a photo-lineup, including Runyon, which was shown to the ice-cream shop manager by a
Beavercreek Police officer. The manager identified Runyon as the subject of the
suspicious dry ice purchase in January.
{¶ 13} The following day, February 3, 2015, Detective Roman did a second
surveillance of the address, during which he noted both the 2003 Ford Taurus and the
second vehicle that Runyon allegedly used parked at the home. This discovery
prompted the detective to do another search on Runyon through the New World system,
which provided that he had two active warrants for his arrest.
{¶ 14} Using the information and evidence collected, the detective obtained a
search warrant for the Fairborn address. A Fairborn Municipal Court Judge signed the
warrant on February 4. The Premises Search Warrant was executed on February 5.
Upon serving the search warrant, Runyon was located within the residence and taken
into custody and removed from the premises, an action taken due to the active warrants
for his arrest. After Runyon was removed, the Premises Search Warrant was executed.
{¶ 15} During the execution of the Premises Search Warrant, Detective Roman
and other officers spoke to individuals present at the residence. One of these
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individuals, Natasha Randall, represented herself as Runyon’s girlfriend and told the
officers at this time that she believed there was possibly an active “meth cook” inside the
trunk of the 2003 Ford Taurus. She further described the area in which she believed that
car was currently located.
{¶ 16} In addition to this testimony given by Detective Roman at the suppression
hearing, the affidavit sworn to by the detective in support of the Vehicle Search Warrant
details further the communications with Randall that led to the discovery of the “one pot
methamphetamine production.” The affidavit states that Randall told the officers that
Runyon utilized a vehicle belonging to Tiffany Seiber, a 2003 Ford Taurus. Randall
stated that Runyon had told her that all his meth production materials were located in the
vehicle. Further, Runyon had told Randall that “the baby” was in the trunk. Randall
described the bottle Runyon utilized in his meth production as a clear plastic bottle with a
red lid. The detective’s experience and training with meth production led him to the
conclusion that “the baby” is a common reference to the bottle in which methamphetamine
is manufactured.
{¶ 17} After learning this information from the interview with Randall, the officers
located the 2003 Ford Taurus and spoke to a resident at the location provided. This
resident, Burton Dewayne Ison, informed the officer that Runyon had dropped the vehicle
off the night before and was planning on picking it up the following day. Ison further
informed the officers that the vehicle belonged to Runyon’s girlfriend, Tiffany.
{¶ 18} Upon learning this information, the officers at the residence contacted a
prosecutor, and informed her that the bottle utilized to manufacture meth was inside the
trunk of the 2003 Ford Taurus and that it was volatile. The prosecutor then advised that,
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due to the exigent circumstances, the officers were to enter the vehicle and neutralize
any volatile bottles or methamphetamine-making materials.
{¶ 19} The affidavit indicates that the officers opened the trunk to the 2003 Ford
Taurus with the keys, which had been obtained by the detective during the execution of
the Premises Warrant; the officers immediately located the clear bottle with a red lid as
described by Randall, and identified it as an active one-pot methamphetamine production.
After the one-pot was rendered neutral and properly disposed of, no further search was
conducted on the vehicle, and it was towed to the Fairborn Police Department.
{¶ 20} The day following the execution of the Premises Search Warrant, February
6, the Vehicle Search Warrant was signed and issued by a Judge. The Vehicle Search
Warrant and the supporting affidavit contain the same information as the Premises
Search Warrant, with the addition of the evidence provided from the execution of the
Premises Search Warrant. The additional supporting evidence includes the information
learned from Randall, the information learned from Ison, the evidence of
methamphetamine production seized at the Fairborn Address, and the evidence seized
in the search of the 2003 Ford Taurus’s trunk.
{¶ 21} On February 11, 2015, Runyon was indicted on three counts: (1) illegal
manufacture of drugs, a felony of the first degree; (2) illegal assembly or possession of
chemicals for the manufacture of drugs, a felony of the second degree; and (3)
aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree. Runyon originally entered
a plea of not guilty and, he subsequently sought to suppress the evidence obtained from
the home and his motor vehicle, as well as statements he made at the police station after
his arrest on February 5.
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{¶ 22} After hearing Detective Roman’s testimony and reviewing both warrants
and affidavits, the trial court denied Runyon’s motion to suppress in all respects. Of
relevance to this appeal, the trial court stated that the warrantless search of the vehicle’s
trunk was supported by probable cause and the lack of a search warrant was excused by
the exigent circumstances. The court reasoned that the trunk search lasted only long
enough to locate, neutralize, and dispose of the threat; the totality of the information
supported that a methamphetamine laboratory was located in the trunk of the vehicle;
and that the exigent circumstances and public danger caused by active
methamphetamine made the search constitutionally valid.
{¶ 23} With regards to the Vehicle Search Warrant, the trial court held the warrant
was based on sufficient probable cause. Accordingly, the trial court held that, “the totality
of the numerous reliable, corroborated tips, surveillance, first-hand observations by law
enforcement of the presence of an active methamphetamine laboratory in the trunk of the
subject vehicle, and relevant background information constitute sufficient probable cause
that evidence of methamphetamine production would be found in the vehicle.”
{¶ 24} Runyon appeals from the trial court’s judgment, claiming that the trial court
erred in overruling his motion to suppress. Although Runyon’s assignment of error could
encompass all aspects of his motion to suppress, he focuses solely on the warrantless
search of the 2003 Ford Taurus and the subsequent search based on the Vehicle Search
Warrant. Runyon has broken his assignment into two issues presented for review.
III. Exigent Circumstances Exception to Warrant Requirement
{¶ 25} First, Runyon argues the officers searched the trunk of the 2003 Ford
Taurus without probable cause and without a warrant. Consequently, he argues that
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because probable cause was lacking, the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant
requirement fails, rendering the search unconstitutional.
A. Exigent Circumstance Analysis
{¶ 26} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
search warrants shall not be issued “but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched.” The Ohio Supreme
Court has held Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution extends the same protections.
State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266,
2015-Ohio-483,
37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 12, citing State v.
Smith, 124 Ohio St, 3d 163,
2009-Ohio-6426,
920 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 10, fn. 1.
{¶ 27} Exigent circumstances are a well-established exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. State v. Lam, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25336, 2013-
Ohio-505, ¶ 13; State v. Berry, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2005-CA-107, 2006-Ohio-3035, ¶ 12.
The exigent circumstances doctrine requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances
in order to be lawful. State v. Cranford, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20633, 2005-Ohio-
1904, ¶ 18, citing Kirk v. Louisiana,
536 U.S. 635, 638,
122 S.Ct. 2458,
153 L.Ed.2d 599
(2002).
{¶ 28} With regards to exigent circumstances arising from methamphetamine
production specifically, Ohio enacted R.C. 2933.33 (A) which provides:
If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that particular
premises are used for the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine, for the
purpose of conducting a search of the premises without a warrant, the risk
of explosion or fire from the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine
causing injury to the public constitutes exigent circumstances and
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reasonable grounds to believe that there is an immediate need to protect
the lives, or property, of the officer and other individuals in the vicinity of the
illegal manufacture.
R.C. 2933.33(A).
{¶ 29} We have applied this statute to allow officers to conduct searches without a
warrant when they had probable cause to believe methamphetamine production was
occurring. State v. Parson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23398, 2010-Ohio-989, ¶ 15. In
Parson, we held that the officer’s training and experience with methamphetamine
production supported a finding that the officer believed the methamphetamine activity in
the home was dangerous to those in close proximity.
Id. It was after the threat was
assessed by an officer who had personal knowledge of the safety threats caused by meth
production that an exigent circumstance was present and the warrantless search was
permitted .
Id.
{¶ 30} We are hesitant to hold that a legislative statement alone creates a per se
exigent circumstance. However, such a holding is not necessary in this case, as the
testimony from Detective Roman displayed he has personal knowledge of the volatile
nature of methamphetamine production and the safety risks it encompasses. Further,
he stated the officers who entered the trunk without a warrant also had personal
knowledge of these risks. Specifically, the detective stated that throughout the course
of his training, he has dealt personally with over 30 meth labs; knows of the possibility of
explosion and volatile nature of methamphetamine production; and that the two detectives
who opened the trunk were qualified to neutralize potentially volatile methamphetamine
production.
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{¶ 31} Neither the State nor Runyon argues that the “one-pot” discovered in the
2003 Ford Taurus does not meet the standard for an exigent circumstance. Both sides
agree that a methamphetamine production laboratory creates an exigent circumstance,
and because of Detective Roman’s experience in the field, we agree. However, Runyon
argues that the officers did not have probable cause to believe that a methamphetamine
lab was in the vehicle, and therefore, the exigent circumstance exception does not apply.
B. Probable Cause Analysis
{¶ 32} The crux of Runyon’s first argument rests on the notion that the officers did
not have probable cause to believe an exigent circumstance existed in the 2003 Ford
Taurus trunk. Probable cause is not determined by any specific “test”, but by the totality
of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238,
103 S.Ct. 2317,
76 L.Ed.2d
527 (1983). It is judged on a practical, nontechnical conception – meaning it is a “factual
and practical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act.”
Id., citing Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176,
69 S.Ct.
1302,
93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
{¶ 33} We have held that probable cause is “not whether it is reasonable to believe
items to be seized might be found in the place to be searched,” but instead whether the
evidence provides reasonable cause to believe the items would likely be found in the
place to be searched. State v. Cole, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23058, 2009-Ohio-6131,
¶ 23. With regards to drug cases, there must exist an evidentiary link between the
suspected drug activity and the area before the probable cause determination may be
made. Id. at ¶ 26. A mere reasonable belief, without support from evidence linking the
area to the drug activity is not enough to form probable cause. State v. Perez, 2d Dist.
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Montgomery No. 26518, 2015-Ohio-1010, ¶ 19.
{¶ 34} Here, the trial court stated in its judgment denying Runyon’s motion to
suppress that “[t]he totality of the plethora of informant tips, corroborated information, and
background information discussed above sufficiently constitute not only a reasonable
belief, but also probable cause that a methamphetamine laboratory was located in the
trunk of the 2003 grey Ford Taurus … at the time of the warrantless search.” We agree
with the trial court that the record supports finding of probable cause.
{¶ 35} When the officers were executing the Premises Search Warrant, an
identified informant made statements indicating that she knew Runyon well, told them
that he produced methamphetamine, knew the means by which he produced the
methamphetamine, and how frequently he produced it. She informed the police that
Runyon had utilized the Taurus the night prior, and that Runyon told her he had an active
methamphetamine lab in the trunk. She described with specificity the materials Runyon
used in production of methamphetamine. Ultimately, she told the officers where Runyon
had dropped the car off (“Dewayne’s” house) and why (due to mechanical difficulties).
Upon receiving this information, the officers corroborated the informant’s information by
sending officers to the given address. Upon arrival, the car described was at the given
address. The officers then spoke to the owner of the home, Burton Dewayne Ison, who
said Runyon had dropped the car off as described by the informant.
{¶ 36} A reasonable person, given the prior background knowledge of Runyon and
his involvement with methamphetamines, in addition to the informant’s relationship with
Runyon and her ability to communicate details of his methamphetamine production
process, would form a belief that an active methamphetamine lab would be found in that
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trunk. Further, there is evidence linking the vehicle in question to the production of
methamphetamines. The appellant argues that information given by one informant,
without corroboration, is not enough to form probable cause. However, the information
provided by the identified informant was corroborated by speaking to the resident at the
address provided. The informant was cooperative with the police and relayed many
corroborated facts about Runyon’s methamphetamine production and use of the vehicle,
and therefore, there was no reason to question her truthfulness about the meth cook in
the trunk.
{¶ 37} In addition, there was substantial information linking Runyon’s
methamphetamine production with the 2003 Ford Taurus. First, the vehicle was
identified as the vehicle Runyon used to purchase production materials by the ice-cream
shop manager. Runyon told the identified informant he had “the baby” in the trunk, along
with all his other production materials in the vehicle. The informant stated Runyon had
purchased methamphetamine production materials in the vehicle at the ice-cream shop.
Finally, several informants described the car as the one Runyon utilized and as belonging
to Tiffany Seiber.
{¶ 38} Some courts have held that a “reasonable basis” standard applies in exigent
circumstances, rather than a “probable cause” standard, however, we need not address
this issue. We find, as did the trial court, that the totality of the circumstances provides
that probable cause was established. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding the
exigent circumstances exception to be applicable.
IV. Vehicle Search Warrant Analysis
{¶ 39} In his second argument, Runyon argues that the Vehicle Search Warrant
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was issued in violation of the exclusionary rule because it was issued based on evidence
seized as a result of the improper search of the 2003 Ford Taurus’s trunk.
{¶ 40} “The exclusionary rule is a judicially created sanction designed to protect
Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. Under the rule, the state is
precluded from using evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (Citation
omitted.) State v. Brown, 142 Ohio St.3d 92,
2015-Ohio-486,
28 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 12.
{¶ 41} In asserting a violation of the exclusionary rule, Runyon must show that the
evidence used by the State in obtaining the Vehicle Search Warrant was evidence seized
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Because we find the warrantless search of
the 2003 Ford Taurus’s trunk to be proper under the exigent circumstance exception to
the warrant requirement, there is no evidence that was used in obtaining the warrant that
was gathered in violation of Runyon’s Fourth Amendment rights.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 42} Runyon’s assignment of error is overruled, and the trial court’s judgment will
be affirmed.
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FAIN, J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Anu Sharma
Charles M. Blue
Hon. Stephen A. Wolaver
