[Cite as State v. Lawson,
2016-Ohio-7607.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 103699
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
PAMELA A. LAWSON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-15-592484-B
BEFORE: Boyle, J., McCormack, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 3, 2016
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
John P. Parker
988 East 185th Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44119
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Anna M. Faraglia
Jeffrey Schnatter
Assistant County Prosecutors
1200 Ontario Street, 9th Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Pamela Lawson, pleaded guilty to a single count of
aggravated murder carrying a three-year firearm specification in connection with the
shooting of her former boyfriend (“the victim”). Lawson, who was living with the
victim, along with her two children and the victim’s six-year- old disabled daughter,
recruited codefendant Lekev Spivey to shoot and kill the victim while she and the
children were all present. The trial court sentenced her to 33 years to life in prison.
Lawson challenges her sentence, raising the following single assignment of error:
The court’s sentence is contrary to Ohio law and the trial court failed to
give Miss Lawson an individualized sentencing hearing in light of her
personal mitigating circumstances in violation of Ohio statutes and the
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution and
Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶2} Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
{¶3} In her sole assignment of error, Lawson attacks her sentence as being
contrary to law. She argues that the trial court failed to properly apply R.C. 2929.12 and
consider the mitigating factors weighing in her favor when the court imposed life in
prison with parole eligibility after serving 30 full years imprisonment. Lawson further
attacks her sentence as being disproportionate to her codefendant who received a lesser
sentence. We have no authority, however, to review or modify the sentence imposed
based on the arguments raised.
{¶4} Lawson was convicted of aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(A), which
carries a life sentence. See R.C. 2929.02(A). Pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(A)(1)(a)-(d), the
life sentence can either be without or with parole eligibility after serving 20 to 30 years.
In this case, Lawson was sentenced to life in prison, with parole eligibility after serving
30 full years imprisonment as set forth in R.C. 2929.03(A)(1)(d). Although Lawson
believes her sentence is too harsh, she acknowledges that her sentence falls within the
statutory range for aggravated murder.
{¶5} R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) provides that “[a] sentence imposed for aggravated
murder or murder pursuant to sections 2929.02 to 2929.06 of the Revised Code is not
subject to review under this section.” We therefore have consistently recognized that
R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) expressly excludes sentences imposed for aggravated murder from
appellate review. State v. Nitsche, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103174, 2016-Ohio-3170, ¶
66, citing State v. White, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101576,
2015-Ohio-2387, ¶ 67-68. As
this court has previously explained, the general felony sentencing statutes are inapplicable
to aggravated murder because “aggravated murder is governed by a special statutory
scheme, carries a mandatory punishment, is not classified by degree of felony, and is
expressly exempted from … sentencing requirements applicable to felonies of lesser
degrees.” State v. Hollingsworth,
143 Ohio App.3d 562, 567,
758 N.E.2d 713 (8th
Dist.2001); see also State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100125,
2014-Ohio-3583, ¶
62 (applying Hollingsworth).
{¶6} In Jackson, the defendant raised the exact argument that Lawson presents,
arguing that the trial court failed to properly consider mitigating evidence in the record,
thereby rendering his sentence contrary to law. In rejecting the defendant’s claim, we
specifically noted that evidentiary review of a sentence imposed by a trial court pursuant
to R.C. 2929.03 is precluded. Id. at ¶ 64; see also State v. Hilliard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 102214, 2015-Ohio-3142, ¶ 29-31 (defendant’s claim that he was remorseful and had
no prior criminal record, that his crime “stemmed from a failed relationship that seemed
to have provoked [his] behavior” and that mitigating factors warranted a lesser sentence
was not subject to appellate review under R.C. 2953.08(D)(3)). Indeed, the Ohio
Supreme Court has made clear that R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) is “unambiguous” and “a sentence
for aggravated murder imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.02 to 2929.06 cannot be
reviewed.” Jackson at
id., citing State v. Porterfield,
106 Ohio St.3d 5,
2005-Ohio-3095,
829 N.E.2d 690. Accordingly, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(3), we lack statutory
authority to review Lawson’s sentence for aggravated murder on an evidentiary basis and
overrule the sole assignment of error.
{¶7} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is
terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
TIM McCORMACK, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
