133 Nev., Advance Opinion 1 10
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
DANIEL JAMES RODRIGUEZ, No. 71920
Appellant,
vs. FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
DEC 782017
2017
Respondent.
DE'
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuantLti a jury
verdict, of battery with the use of a deadly weapon. Second Judicial District
Court, Washoe County; Lynne K. Simons, Judge.
Affirmed.
Martin H. Wiener, Reno,
for Appellant.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
District Attorney, and Stephan Hollandsworth, Deputy District Attorney,
Washoe County,
for Respondent.
BEFORE HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and STIGLICH, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:
At issue in this appeal is the definition of "deadly weapon"
within the context of battery. Daniel Rodriguez contends the jury
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instruction that led to his conviction for battery with the use of a deadly
weapon was erroneous because the object he used to stab his victim—a
screwdriver—is not designed to be inherently dangerous. We disagree
because, within the context of battery, "deadly weapon" includes an
instrument which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily
capable of causing substantial bodily harm or death. The jury instructions
accurately stated that definition. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant Daniel Rodriguez used a screwdriver to stab a 66-
year-old man in the neck. The screwdriver was four to six inches long. It
broke through the victim's skin, causing bleeding and one night of
hospitalization. The State charged Rodriguez with battery with the use of
a deadly weapon, causing substantial bodily harm, against a person at least
sixty years of age.
Prior to trial, Rodriguez repeatedly contested the "deadly
weapon" allegation, arguing that a screwdriver could not meet the narrow
definition of "deadly weapon" he claimed applies to NRS 200.481(2)(e),
which governs the crime of battery with the use of a deadly weapon. The
district court rejected Rodriguez's motions to dismiss the deadly weapon
allegation.
When it came time to settle jury instructions, Rodriguez and
the State submitted competing "deadly weapon" definitions. Rodriguez
submitted an "inherently dangerous" definition:
A deadly weapon is any instrument which, if used
in the ordinary manner contemplated by its design
or construction, will, or is likely to cause a lifethreatening injury or death.
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The State offered a "functional" definition:
A "deadly weapon" is defined as any weapon,
device, instrument, material or substance which,
under the circumstances in which it is used,
attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is
readily capable of causing substantial bodily harm
or death.
The district court instructed the jury according to the State's definition.
The jury convicted Rodriguez of battery with the use of a deadly
weapon but found substantial bodily harm did not result. He was sentenced
according to the statutory guidelines, NRS 200.481(2)(e)(1), with an
enhancement because his victim was over the age of sixty, NRS 193.167.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the jury instructions
accurately defined "deadly weapon" within the context of NRS 200.481(2)(e),
battery with the use of a deadly weapon.
DISCUSSION
Rodriguez argues that the district court abused its discretion by
instructing the jury on the "functional" definition of deadly weapon, to wit,
that a deadly weapon includes any "instrument. . . which, under the •
circumstances in which it is used. . . is readily capable of causing
substantial bodily harm or death." We review a district court's settling of
jury instructions for an abuse of discretion or judicial error, but we review
de novo whether those instructions correctly state the law. Nay v. State,
123 Nev. 326, 330,
167 P.3d 430, 433 (2007).
Rodriguez contends that, within the context of NRS •
200.481(2)(e), the Legislature intended to define "deadly weapon" according
to the inherently deadly definition, as opposed to the broader functional
definition applied by the district court. Both of these definitions have roots
in Nevada caselaw. According to the functional definition, virtually any
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object can constitute a "deadly weapon," so long as it is used in a "deadly
manner." Zgombic v. State, 106 Nev. 571, 573,
798 P.2d 548, 549 (1990)
(discussing both tests and ultimately adopting inherently dangerous
definition for sentence enhancement statute purposes), superseded by
statute, 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 455, § 1, at 1431. Under the inherently
dangerous definition, by contrast, a screwdriver would not qualify as a
"deadly weapon" because a screwdriver is "not intended by [ I nature or
design to be used to cause injury." Hutchins v. State, 110 Nev. 103, 111,
867
P.2d 1136, 1141 (1994) (reviewing sentence enhancement under inherently
dangerous test). To the extent that the Legislature's intent is unclear,
Rodriguez urges this court to apply the ruleS of lenity to resolve ambiguity
in his favor.
"The ultimate goal of interpreting statutes is to effectuate the
Legislature's intent." In re CityCenter Constr. & Lien Master Litig., 129
Nev. 669, 673,
310 P.3d 574, 578 (2013). When interpreting a statute, our
starting point is the statute's plain meaning See Robert E. v. Justice Court,
99 Nev. 443, 445,
664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983).
NRS 200.481 criminalizes battery, the "willful and unlawful use
of force or violence upon the person of another." MRS 200.481(1)(a). Absent
aggravating factors, battery is a misdemeanor, NRS 200.481(2)(a), but it
becomes a category B felony if the batterer used a "deadly weapon," MRS
200.481(2)(e). "Deadly weapon" is not defined within the statute, and we
find no clues within the statute itself as to how the term should be defined.
Therefore, the plain language of MRS 200.481(2)(e) is ambiguous as to what
constitutes a "deadly weapon."
When a statute's plain language is ambiguous, "we turn to other
legitimate tools of statutory interpretation." Castaneda v. State, 132 Nev.,
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Adv. Op. 44, 373 P.3d 108, 111 (2016). Of relevance here is the presumption
that, "[w]hen a legislature adopts language that has a particular meaning
or history. . . the legislature intended the language to have meaning
consistent with previous interpretations of the language." Beazer Homes
Nev., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 575, 580-81,
97 P.3d 1132,
1135-36 (2004).
In 1971, when the Legislature enacted NRS 200.481(2)(e), see
1971 Nev. Stat., ch. 612, §§ 1-3, at 1384-85, the functional definition was
one of two accepted "deadly weapon" definitions within Nevada caselaw. As
early as 1870, this court defined objects as "deadly weapons" if they satisfied
either the inherently dangerous or the functional test. State v. Napper, 6
Nev. 113, 115 (1870) (defining deadly weapon as "a weapon deadly either in
its nature, or capable of being used in a deadly manner"); see also State v.
McNeil, 53 Nev. 428, 436,
4 P.2d 889, 890 (1931) ("IW] e can easily conceive
of many circumstances in which a given weapon could be equally deadly in
many ways, regardless of the purpose for which it is mainly intended to be
used."); State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 407, 413 (1879) ("It was peculiarly within
the province of the jury, under the facts of this case, to determine, as a fact,
whether the club in defendant's hand, as it was used by him, was likely to
produce fatal consequences or not."). Thus, because our caselaw defined
"deadly weapon" according to the functional definition when the Legislature
enacted NRS 200.481(2)(e), we presume that the Legislature intended the
functional definition to apply. See Beazer Homes, 120 Nev. at 580-81,
97
P.3d at 1135-36.
Rodriguez cites to Zgombic v. State as support for applying the
inherently dangerous definition. 106 Nev. at 574,
798 P.2d at 550. In
Zgombic, we rejected the functional definition for "deadly weapon" within
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the context of NRS 193.165. 1 Id. NRS 193.165 provides enhanced sentences
for crimes committed with a deadly weapon, but it does not apply to crimes
like NRS 200.481(2)(e) that contain "deadly weapon" as a "necessary
element" of the underlying crime. NRS 193.165(4). In rejecting the
functional definition, we reasoned, "NRS 193.165 is designed to deter
injuries caused by weapons, not by people," so "interpreting the deadly
weapon clause in NRS 193.165 by means of a functional test was not what
our legislature intended." Zgombic, 106 Nev. at 574, 576,
798 P.2d at 550-
51.
But Zgombic is inapposite for two reasons. First, Zgombic
explicitly exempted statutes like NRS 200.481(2)(e) from its holding. Id. at
574,
798 P.2d at 550 ("We have no dispute with [I cases which use the
functional test to define a deadly weapon when a deadly weapon is an
element of a crime. Indeed, that is the interpretation generally followed in
Nevada."). Second, five years after Zgombic was decided, our Legislature
superseded its holding by amending NRS 193.165 to define "deadly weapon"
according to both the inherently dangerous and the functional definitions.
1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 455, § 1, at 1431. The Legislature's rejection of Zgombic
indicates its continued approval of the functional definition.
Finally, Rodriguez directs us to NRS 193.165 itself. NRS
193.165(6) contains an introductory clause that limits its definitions of
"deadly weapon" to "this section." Because NRS 200.481(2)(e) is exempt
from NRS 193.165's enhancement provisions, Rodriguez argues that
extending the definitions to NRS 200.481(2)(e) contravenes NRS
193.165(6)'s express limitation. This court rejected a similar argument in
'At the time Zgombic was decided, NRS 193.165 did not define
"deadly weapon." 1981 Nev. Stat., ch. 780, § 1, at 2050.
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Funderburk v. State, 125 Nev. 260, 262,
212 P.3d 337, 338-39 (2009). In
that case, Samaja Funderburk was convicted of burglary while in possession
of a deadly weapon for burglarizing a McDonald's with a BB gun. Id. at
261-62,
212 P.3d at 338; see also NRS 205.060(4) (burglary while in
possession of a deadly weapon) This court rejected Funderburk's argument
that NRS 193.165(6)'s definitions are inapplicable to crimes that include
"deadly weapon" as an element of the crime. Funderburk, 125 Nev. at 262
n.4, 212 P.3d at 339 n 4 Instead, we held those definitions to be
"instructive" within the context of charges of burglary while in possession
of a deadly weapon. Id. at 261,
212 P.3d at 337. As relevant here, then,
Funderburk demonstrates that although NRS 193.165(6)'s definitions do
not necessarily extend beyond NRS 193.165, nothing prevents them from
helping to define "deadly weapon" within other statutes.
In sum, the Legislature intended "deadly weapon" within NRS
200.481(2)(e) to be interpreted broadly, according to both the functional
definition and the inherently dangerous definition. Because we find the
Legislature's intent to be sufficiently clear on this issue, we decline
Rodriguez's invitation to apply the rule of lenity. See State v. Lucero, 127
Nev. 92, 99,
249 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2011) ("[T]he rule [of lenity] only applies
when other statutory interpretation methods . . . have failed to resolve a
penal statute's ambiguity.").
Therefore, the district court had discretion to determine which
definition of "deadly weapon" was appropriate given the facts of this case.
Given that a screwdriver clearly fails the inherently dangerous definition,
see Hutchins, 110 Nev. at 111,
867 P.2d at 1141, the district court properly
exercised its discretion in instructing the jury according to the functional
definition. As we find no legal error or abuse of the district court's discretion
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in settling the jury instructions, and Rodriguez does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we affirm Rodriguez's
conviction of battery with the use of a deadly weapon.
CONCLUSION
Because this court has consistently defined "deadly weapon"
according to both the functional and the inherently dangerous definitions,
the district court acted within its discretion in settling the jury instructions
in the context of battery according to the functional definition. Accordingly,
we affirm Rodriguez's conviction for battery with the use of a deadly
weapon.
Stiglich
We concur:
kit4
Hardesty
Parraguirre
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