133 Nev., Advance Opinion 10
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
BRIAN YU, No.034a
7
Appellant,
vs.
FILED
ROURONG YU, NOV 2 2 2017
Respondent.
• tire rt A. BROWN
CO
BY 4 01WThill •■-
1
CHIEF D
Jurisdictional prescreening of an appeal from a district" court
order entered after a decree of divorce. Eighth Judicial District Court,
Family Court Division, Clark County; Bill Henderson, Judge.
Appeal may proceed.
Brian Yu, Las Vegas,
in Pro Se.
Rourong Yu, Las Vegas,
in Pro Sc.
BEFORE HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and STIGLICH, JJ.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a district court order ruling on several
post-judgment issues and declaring the parties to be vexatious litigants. We
consider whether the post-judgment vexatious litigant determination,
which is not independently appealable, Peck v. Grouser, 129 Nev. 120, 124,
295 P.3d 586, 588 (2013), may be considered in this appeal or must be
challenged via an original writ petition. We conclude that a post-judgment
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vexatious litigant determination may be considered in an appeal from an
otherwise appealable order, and thus allow this appeal to proceed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant Brian Yu and respondent Rourong Yu were divorced
via a decree entered in 2015. Thereafter, Brian filed several motions to
reopen the decree and alter its terms The district court entered an order
that, among other things, denied Brian's requests, granted Rourong an
additional $88,000 from certain accounts, and declared both Brian and
Rourong to be vexatious litigants. Brian timely appealed.
This court entered an order directing Brian to show cause why
this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We questioned
whether the portion of the order declaring Brian to be a vexatious litigant
was appealable where no statute or court rule appeared to authorize an
appeal from such an order.' See NRAP 3A(b) (listing appealable orders);
Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 100 Nev. 207, 209,
678 P.2d 1152,
1153 (1984) (stating that this court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal
only when the appeal is authorized by statute or court rule); see also Jones
ix Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev. 493, 497,
330 P.3d 475, 478 (2014)
(noting that a petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper means to
challenge an order restricting a litigant's access to the courts). Brian filed
a response arguing that orders resolving a "mixed bag" of issues, some of
We also questioned whether the remainder of the order was
appealable. Having considered Brian's response and the documents before
this court, it appears that the order is otherwise appealable as a special
order after final judgment or an order denying a motion pursuant to NRCP
60(b). NRAP 3A(b)(8); Holiday Inn Downtown v. Barnett, 103 Nev. 60, 63,
732 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987).
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2
which are reviewable through an appeal and some through a writ petition,
should be reviewable in their entirety via an appea1. 2 He asserts that
requiring litigants to file both an appeal and a writ petition from the same
order is contrary to Nevada's public policy of promoting judicial economy by
avoiding piecemeal review. He also suggests that such a requirement could
result in confusion. Finally, Brian points to Lewis v. Lewis, 132 Nev., Adv.
Op. 46, 373 P.3d 878 (2016), in support of his assertion that an appeal is the
proper method to challenge an order containing a "mixed bag" of issues.
DISCUSSION
A post-judgment order declaring a party to be a vexatious
litigant is not appealable and may only be challenged via an original writ
petition. 3 Peck, 129 Nev. at 124,
295 P.3d at 588. The question here is
whether litigants who seek to challenge a post-judgment vexatious litigant
determination contained within an otherwise appealable order must file an
original writ petition to challenge the vexatious litigant determination. We
conclude they need not.
We agree with Brian that requiring litigants to file both a notice
of appeal and an original writ petition to challenge different portions of the
same order is inconsistent with Nevada's "interest in promoting judicial
economy by avoiding the specter of piecemeal appellate review." Barbara
2 The response was filed by Brian's counsel, who has since withdrawn.
3 Brian's alternative assertion that the vexatious litigant
determination is appealable under Jordan v. State ex rel. Department of
Motor Vehicles & Public Safety, 121 Nev. 44,
110 P.3d 30 (2005), abrogated
on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224,
228 n.6, 181 P.3d 670, 672 n.6 (2008), lacks merit because the determination
here was made in a post-judgment order rather than in an order
interlocutory to a final judgment. Peck, 129 Nev. at 123-24,
295 P.3d at 587-
88.
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Ann Hollier Tr. v. Shack, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 59, 356 P.3d 1085, 1090 (2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Such a requirement could also cause
unnecessary confusion for attorneys and pro se litigants seeking this court's
review. Thus, allowing consideration of a post-judgment vexatious litigant
determination in an appeal from an otherwise appealable order both
promotes judicial efficiency and simplifies the review process. Cf. Winston
Prods. Co. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 526,
134 P.3d 726, 732 (2006)
(interpreting NRAP 4(a)(4) in such a manner as to avoid piecemeal
litigation and confusion regarding the time for filing a notice of appeal).
Allowing review of a post-judgment vexatious litigant
determination on appeal from an otherwise independently appealable order
is also consistent with our recent decision in Vaile v. Valle, 133 Nev., Adv.
Op. 30, 396 P.3d 791 (2017). In that case, the appellant challenged a post-judgment order concerning both child support and contempt. Id. at 794-95.
Although a contempt order is not independently appealable, Pengilly v.
Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Ass'n, 116 Nev. 646, 649,
5 P.3d 569, 571
(2000), we concluded that we had jurisdiction to consider a contempt finding
or sanction on appeal, so long as it "is included in an order that is otherwise
independently appealable." Valle, 133 Nev., Adv. Op. 30, 396 P.3d at 794-
95; see also Lewis, 132 Nev., Adv. Op. 46, 373 P.3d at 881 (considering a
challenge to contempt findings in an appeal from a post-judgment order
modifying custody of a minor child and child support obligation). Similar
treatment of non-appealable contempt orders and non-appealable post-judgment vexatious litigant orders will further serve to lessen confusion for
those seeking review.
CONCLUSION
A post-judgment vexatious litigant determination may be
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appealable order. Accordingly, we may consider the vexatious litigant
determination in the context of this appeal, and this appeal may proceed.
Brian shall have 30 days from the date of this opinion to file
either 1) a brief that complies with the requirements of NRAP 28(a) and
NRAP 32, or 2) an "Informal Brief Form for Pro Se Parties" provided by the
clerk of this court. NRAP 28(k). Rourong need not file a response unless
directed to do so by this court. NEAP 46A(c). We caution Brian that failure
to timely comply may result in the imposition of sanctions, including
dismissal of this appeal.
/ite,t ted,,t; , J.
Hardesty
ex.ts? e t J.
Parraguirre Stiglich
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