State v. McCray

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL - DUE PROCESS - COUNSEL - JURIES - JURY INSTRUCTIONS - MURDER - FELONIOUS ASSAULT - WEAPONS - PROSECUTOR - WITNESSES: The defendant's right to due process was not violated by the use of his prior juvenile adjudication to prove the disability element of his convictions for having a weapon under a disability, under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). [But see DISSENT: A juvenile adjudication alone is not sufficiently reliable to sustain proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the disability element of the adult crime of having a weapon while under a disability.] Where the case had been reported in the media, the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to outline the facts and evidence during voir dire, because the prosecutor was reasonably attempting to learn what, if anything, prospective jurors knew about the case. The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to reasonably explore during voir dire the possibility that prospective jurors might be disinclined to believe the testimony of witnesses who were accomplices in the offenses. The trial court did not err by allowing the prosecutor to ask prospective jurors if they would blame a homicide victim for putting himself near the scene of a fight where he was fatally shot, because the prosecutor was inquiring into potential bias to determine if prospective jurors could fairly weigh the evidence. Where the defendant admitted during his trial testimony that he had repeatedly lied to the police, the prosecutor's remarks in closing argument about the defendant's credibility were reasonably drawn from the evidence and constituted fair comment on the discrepancy between his statements to police and his trial testimony. The prosecutor's remarks in closing argument that the detectives had done "an excellent job of interviewing" the defendant, and that it was not "until the police do their job and do a great job in this case, and get those photos" of the defendant holding a gun so that he could not deny that the gun was his, did not constitute improper vouching where the remarks addressed the thoroughness of the investigation and not the credibility of the detectives, and were based upon the evidence produced at trial. The prosecutor's isolated remark in closing argument that the "only justice" for the homicide victim was to find the defendant guilty was not inherently improper and fell within the creative latitude afforded both parties in closing argument. Where the defendant was charged with murder and felonious assault, defense counsel's failure to request jury instructions on the lesser offenses of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, because the request for instructions would have been at odds with the defendant's testimony that he had not been the shooter, and the decision by counsel to seek acquittal rather than inviting conviction on lesser offenses was a matter of trial strategy.