[Cite as In re Y.D.,
2017-Ohio-9254.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: Y.D., Y.D., and Y.D. : APPEAL NO. C-170525
TRIAL NO. F-13-1547z
:
O P I N I O N.
:
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 27, 2017
Christopher P. Kapsal for Appellant Mother,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Marjorie Davis,
Assistant Public Defender, Guardian ad Litem for Y.D., Y.D., and Y.D.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
M ILLER , Judge.
{¶1} Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental
rights, and granting the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services
(“HCJFS”) permanent custody of Y.D. (“Ya.D.”), Y.D. (“Yr.D.”) and Y.D. (“Ye.D.”).
We agree with Mother that the issue of permanent custody was not properly before
the trial court. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Procedural Posture and Facts
{¶2} HCJFS’s involvement with these children began in 2013. Following
allegations that the children’s extended family members were physically and sexually
abusive, the children were adjudicated dependent and placed in HCJFS’s temporary
custody. The children were eventually returned to Mother, with protective orders
prohibiting her from allowing the children’s grandmother or uncle to have contact
with them. There was evidence that grandfather had been sexually abusive to family
members, but Mother represented to the court that grandfather did not live in town
and so the protective orders did not extend to him.
{¶3} On April 22, 2015, after HCJFS learned that Mother was allowing her
abusive family members to have access to her children, HCJFS filed a new complaint
alleging that the children were abused and dependent. HCJFS requested that the
court (1) grant temporary custody of the children to HCJFS, (2) award legal custody
to a suitable relative, or (3) impose protective supervision orders. HCJFS later
amended the complaint to add allegations that grandfather had slept in bed with
Ya.D. and had touched her inappropriately.
{¶4} Following a hearing, the magistrate adjudicated Ya.D. neglected and
dependent, and adjudicated Yr.D. and Ye.D. dependent, finding that the children had
almost daily contact with their abusive grandparents in the children’s home. The
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
magistrate placed Ya.D. in the temporary custody of HCJFS. He returned Yr.D. and
Ye.D. to their mother with protective orders prohibiting contact with the
grandparents.
{¶5} The trial court rejected the magistrate’s decision remanding custody of
Yr.D. and Ye.D. to their mother. In its decision, the court detailed the rampant
sexual and physical abuse attributed to the children’s grandparents and uncle that
had taken place in the children’s home. The abuse had continued even after the
court’s protective orders prohibiting Mother from allowing the children to have
contact with these family members. The trial court remanded the cause to the
magistrate to take additional evidence, and (1) to issue a dispositional order or (2) “if
the magistrate is satisfied now, based on evidence that the children will be safe in
mother’s care, the Magistrate may again order them returned to Mother.” The court
indicated that temporary custody might be the most appropriate choice, and that it
might consider awarding permanent custody to HCJFS if requested.
{¶6} The magistrate conducted a dispositional hearing in accordance with
the trial court’s mandate. That same day, the children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”)
filed a motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody for all three
children.1 The parties were aware that the hearing was not on the permanent custody
motion, and was only on the scope of the remand, which related to the April 22, 2015
complaint. Further, the parties had not been properly served with the permanent
custody motion.
{¶7} Mother and Mother’s Catholic Charities counselor testified at the
remanded dispositional hearing. Based on their testimony, the magistrate
1 It is questionable whether the GAL had the authority to file for permanent custody. See R.C.
2151.413 (providing that a public children services agency or private child placing agency may
move for permanent custody). Further, only Ya.D. was in the temporary custody of HCJFS.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
determined that Mother would be able to keep her children safe. He therefore
returned all three children to Mother’s custody, and dismissed the GAL’s motion to
modify temporary custody to permanent custody.
{¶8} The GAL objected to the magistrate’s decision arguing that the
decision to return the three children to their Mother was against the manifest weight
of the evidence and was not in the children’s best interest.
{¶9} The trial court conducted a hearing on the objection, but took no
further evidence. It found that all three children were at risk of sexual and physical
abuse by members of Mother’s extended family. The court also found that Mother
had proven she was unable or unwilling to protect her children from these abusers,
and that it was not in the children’s best interest to be returned to Mother. The court
awarded permanent custody of Ya.D., Yr.D. and Ye.D. to HCJFS.
Mother’s Due-Process Rights Were Violated
{¶10} In her first assignment of error, Mother contends that the trial court
erred by awarding permanent custody of her children to HCJFS without affording
her notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mother is correct.
{¶11} A parent’s right to raise his or her child is an essential and basic civil
right. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157,
556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990). Permanent
termination of parental rights has been described as “ ‘the family law equivalent of
the death penalty in a criminal case.’ ” In re B.C.,
141 Ohio St.3d 55,
2014-Ohio-4558,
21 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 19, quoting In re Smith,
77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16,
601 N.E.2d 45 (6th
Dist.1991). Therefore, parents must be afforded every procedural and substantive
protection the law allows. (Internal quotation and citation omitted.) Id.; see R.C.
2151.01(B) (R.C. Chapter 2151 should be construed to afford the parties a fair
hearing, and to recognize and enforce their constitutional and other legal rights). To
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
this end, before the termination of parental rights, natural parents must be afforded
notice and an opportunity to be heard. In re Greer 70 Ohio St.3d 293, 298,
638
N.E.2d 999 (1994), citing Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248,
103 S.Ct. 2985,
77
L.Ed.2d 614 (1983); see R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) (a trial court must give notice and
conduct a hearing before permanently divesting a parent of his or her parental
rights).
{¶12} Mother was not afforded these basic protections. The trial court had
before it only the GAL’s objections to the magistrate’s dispositional order from
HCJFS’s April 22, 2015 complaint. The April 22, 2015 complaint did not request
permanent custody. See R.C. 2151.353(C) (“no order for permanent custody …
shall be made unless the complaint alleging the abuse, neglect, or dependency
contains a prayer requesting permanent custody.”); In re A.B. 110 Ohio St.3d 230,
2006-Ohio-4359852 N.E.2d 1187, syllabus (juvenile court cannot order disposition
that has not been requested where request is required by statute).
{¶13} Because Mother’s due-process rights were violated, we sustain
Mother’s first assignment of error. The trial court was without authority to award
permanent custody of Ya.D., Yr.D. and Ye.D. to HCJFS, and we therefore reverse the
trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
{¶14} In her second assignment of error, Mother contends that the trial
court’s judgment terminating her parental rights was against the weight and the
sufficiency of the evidence. Resolution of Mother’s first assignment of error renders
this one moot, and we decline to address it. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Conclusion
{¶15} In sum, we reverse the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s
parental rights and placing the children in the permanent custody of HCJFS, and we
remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with the law and this opinion.
Judgment accordingly.
C UNNINGHAM , P.J., and D ETERS , J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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