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2018 DNH 53

Perry v. Lydick, et al.

New Hampshire District Court

Decided March 15, 2018

New Hampshire District Court · decided 2018-03-15

Relies on Ashcroft v. Iqbal · Securities & Exchange Commission v. Tambone · Aponte-Torres v. University of Puerto Rico

Decided 2018-03-15

                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE



James R. Perry

   v.                                    Civil No. 16-cv-469-LM
                                         Opinion No. 
2018 DNH 053
FNU Lydick, et al.


                             O R D E R

    Plaintiff James R. Perry, an inmate at the New Hampshire

State Prison in Concord, brings this action against the State of

New Hampshire (the “State”) and a number of state correctional

officers.   Perry raises constitutional and tort claims against

the officers, and claims under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act against the State.   Before

the court is the State’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).   Perry objects to the motion.    For the

following reasons, the State’s motion is granted.


                        STANDARD OF REVIEW

    Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the factual

allegations in the complaint as true, construe reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and “determine whether the

factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint set forth a

plausible claim upon which relief may be granted.”   Foley v.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
772 F.3d 63, 71
 (1st Cir. 2014)


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(internal quotation marks omitted).    A claim is facially

plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.”    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009).


                            BACKGROUND

    The following allegations are taken from the amended

complaint, unless otherwise noted.    Perry alleges that his

emotional and psychological impairments render him a “qualified

individual with a disability under the ADA and Rehabilitation

Act.”   Doc. no. 18 at 2-3 (internal quotation marks omitted).

On July 13, 2016, correctional officers conducted a “shakedown”

in the prison’s Special Housing Unit, where Perry’s cell was

located.   While in Perry’s cell, Lieutenant Paul Carroll damaged

and destroyed Perry’s personal property.   He also taunted Perry

and told him, “If you are going to act up, do it on my shift,

don’t be a pussy and wait until second shift.”    Id. at 4.

    Becoming distraught and suicidal as a result, Perry placed

cardboard over his cell window.   After Perry refused to remove

the cardboard, despite requests by a correctional officer and a

mental health worker, an extraction team was sent to Perry’s

cell.   Perry alleges that, upon entering the cell, the team

placed him on the floor, punched him in the head, neck, and


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back, banged his head against the floor, and used a taser on

him.    Perry suffered serious physical and emotional injuries.

       In October 2016, Perry, acting pro se, filed this action.

Subsequently, counsel appeared on Perry’s behalf and filed an

amended complaint.    In the amended complaint, Perry brings

various constitutional and state tort claims against the

correctional officers involved in the incident.

       Separately, Perry brings claims for violations of the ADA

and Rehabilitation Act against the State (Count II).    The

entirety of his allegations against the State, besides those

described above, are as follows:

       37. [Perry] is disabled as defined by the ADA and
       Rehabilitation Act; he is a qualified individual with
       disabilities. Defendants knew or should have known of
       his disability.

       38. The ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
       require that no qualified individual with a disability,
       on the basis of that disability, be excluded from
       participation in or be denied the benefit of the
       services, programs, activities, or to otherwise be
       discriminated against by a public entity.

       39. [The State] has discriminated against [Perry]
       because of his disability and deprived him of services
       he was entitled to. The policies and procedures of the
       [State] are constitutionally inadequate to provide
       emotionally disturbed individuals, such as [Perry], with
       the services he requires and to prohibit discrimination
       against him due to his disability.

       40. Additionally, [the State] had a legal duty to modify
       their procedures to accommodate [Perry’s] disability.




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     41. As a result of the [State’s] actions, [Perry] has
     been injured and suffered physical injuries, medical
     expenses, emotional distress, pain and anguish.

     42. [The State’s] actions were intentional and with
     reckless disregard and deliberate indifference to the
     plaintiff’s rights as a person with disabilities.

Id. at 6-7.


                            DISCUSSION

     The State moves to dismiss Count II, arguing that the

amended complaint does not state a plausible claim for relief

under either the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.1   The State finds

fault with the amended complaint because, among other things, it

fails to identify how the State discriminated against Perry,

what services were denied, or what policies or procedures are

inadequate.   The State also notes that the insufficiency of the

allegations is prejudicial because the State cannot meaningfully

evaluate whether it may be entitled to sovereign immunity.

     Perry responds that the amended complaint survives scrutiny

under Rule 12(b)(6).   In his brief—though not in his complaint—

Perry alleges that the New Hampshire Department of Corrections’

“cell integrity check procedures and . . . cell extraction



     1 The State also moves to dismiss Counts I and III, but
Perry has made clear that the State is “named as a defendant
only in the ADA/Rehabilitation cause of action.” Doc. no. 17 at
2; see also doc. no. 26 at 1. Therefore, the State’s motion, to
the extent it seeks dismissal of Counts I and III, is denied as
moot.

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procedures” have a discriminatory effect on disabled individuals

like Perry.   Doc. no. 26 at 4.   He proposes a few policy changes

that the Department of Corrections could enact to ensure that

such procedures reasonably accommodate inmates suffering from

mental illness.

    Even under the liberal standard of review required by Rule

12(b)(6), the court concludes that the amended complaint does

not state a plausible claim for relief.    The ADA and

Rehabilitation Act “provide, in nearly identical language, that

‘no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

entity.’”   Nunes v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 
766 F.3d 136, 144
 (1st

Cir. 2014).   “A plaintiff can press several different types of

claims of disability discrimination.”     
Id.
   Actionable

discrimination may occur where a facially neutral government

policy “falls more harshly” on disabled individuals, or where “a

public entity has refused to affirmatively accommodate [an

individual’s] disability where such accommodation [is] needed to

provide meaningful access to a public service.”     
Id. at 145

(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).

    Here, however, Perry’s amended complaint fails to provide

any facts to support a disability discrimination claim, whatever

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his theory may be.2   For example, Perry does not identify any

state policy or describe even in basic terms how such policy

falls more harshly upon disabled individuals like him.    Nor does

Perry make any factual allegations to support his reasonable-

accommodation theory of liability.

     Because the allegations in the amended complaint are “too

meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief

from the realm of mere conjecture,” dismissal is warranted.

S.E.C. v. Tambone, 
597 F.3d 436, 442
 (1st Cir. 2010).    However,

as noted above, Perry’s objection fleshes out the factual basis

for his claim.   This order does not preclude Perry from filing a

motion under Rule 15(a)(2) to amend his complaint to incorporate

those allegations.    See Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 
445 F.3d 50
, 58 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that a “request to file a second

amended complaint need[s] leave of court, which as a general

proposition will be ‘freely given when justice so requires’”).




     2 The court does not consider the allegations that Perry
raised for the first time in his objection. See, e.g., Winne v.
Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-1, No. 1:16-cv-229,
2017 WL 3573813
, at *6 (D. Me. Aug. 17, 2017) (“Factual
allegations made for the first time in a responsive memorandum
are not properly considered in evaluating the sufficiency of a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).”).

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                            CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the State’s motion to dismiss

(doc. no. 24) is granted, without prejudice to Perry moving to

amend the complaint.

      SO ORDERED.


                               __________________________
                               Landya McCafferty
                               United States District Judge


March 15, 2018

cc:   Lynmarie C. Cusack, Esq.
      Francis Charles Fredericks, Esq.
      Lawrence A. Vogelman, Esq.




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