134 Nev., Advance Opinion I I
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
PAUL PAWLIK, No. 71055
Appellant,
vs.
SHYANG-FENN DENG AND LINDA
Fi
HSIANG-YU CHIANG DENG, MAR 0. 1 2018
TRUSTEES OF THE SHYANG-FENN kirrH. ,,„ BROWN
AND LINDA HSIANG-YU CHIANG BL;i2RDAB COURT
DENG REVOCABLE TRUST DATED
AUGUST 18, 2006; VANETTA
APPLEYARD, TREASURER OF THE
CITY OF LAS VEGAS; AND THE CITY
OF LAS VEGAS, A POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION,
Respondents.
Appeal from a district court order granting a motion to dismiss
and denying a petition for a writ of mandamus in an action to quiet title.
Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michelle Leavitt, Judge.
Affirmed.
Walsh, Baker & Rosevear P.C. and James M. Walsh, Reno,
for Appellant.
Black & LoBello and Steven J. Mack, Las Vegas,
for Respondents Shyang-Fenn Deng and Linda Hsiang-Yu Chiang Deng,
Trustees of the Shyang-Fenn and Linda Hsiang-Yu Chiang Deng Revocable
Trust dated August 18, 2006.
Bradford R. Jerbic, City Attorney, and John A. Curtas, Deputy City
Attorney, Las Vegas,
for Respondents Vanetta Appleyard, Treasurer of the City of Las Vegas, and
the City of Las Vegas.
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BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, GIBBONS, J.:
In this appeal we are asked to interpret NRS 271.595, a statute
governing redemption of property sold for default on city tax assessments.
The issue is how to interpret two distinct redemption periods in NRS
271.595: one that creates a clear redemption period of two years for
residential properties, and a second that creates an ambiguous 60-day
redemption window after notice that the certificate of sale holder will
demand a deed for the property. The parties dispute whether the 60-day
period begins at the end of the first two-year redemption period, or whether
the 60-day period may run concurrently at the end of the two-year period.
The district court read NRS 271.595 as creating two distinct redemption
periods that cannot overlap and dismissed appellant Paul Pawlik's quiet
title action and petition for a writ of mandamus. We agree with the district
court, and, to protect the redemption rights of former owners, we hold that
NRS 271.595 creates two consecutive redemption periods.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondents Shyang-Fenn Deng and Linda Hsiang-Yu Chiang
Deng, as trustees of their revocable trust (the Dengs), defaulted on special
assessments on their Las Vegas residential real property, which entered
delinquency. As a result, the property underwent a duly noticed and
authorized sale, under NRS Chapter 271. On January 27, 2014, Pawlik (or
his predecessor-in-interest) purchased the real property at the sale and was
issued a sales certificate. Under NRS 271.595(1), the Dengs were then
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entitled to a two-year redemption period from that date.' On January 7,
2016, Pawlik began attempting to serve the Dengs with notice of the
upcoming expiration of the redemption period and Pawlik's intent to apply
for a deed pursuant to NRS 271.595(3).
On March 14, 2016, 47 days after the Dengs' two-year
redemption period expired and 67 days after Pawlik began attempting
service, Pawlik applied to respondent the Las Vegas City Treasurer for
issuance of a deed to the property. The Treasurer refused to issue the deed
1 NRS 271.595 states in relevant part:
1. Any property sold for an assessment. . . is
subject to redemption by the former owner. . . (a)
If there was a permanent residential dwelling
unit . . . on the property at the time [of] sale. . . , at
any time within 2 years. . . after the date of the
certificate of sale. . . .
3. If no redemption is made within the [2-
year] period of redemption. . . the treasurer shall,
on demand of the purchaser. . . execute. . . a deed
to the property. No deed may be executed until
the holder of the certificate of sale has notified the
owners of the property that he or she holds the
certificate, and will demand a deed therefor.
The notice must be given by personal service upon
the owner. However, if an owner is not a resident
of the State or cannot be found within the State
after diligent search, the notice may be given by
publication. . . .
4. If redemption is not made within 60 days
after the date of service, or the date of the first
publication of the notice, as the case may be, the
holder of the certificate of sale is entitled to a
deed. . . .
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to Pawlik, and the Dengs later redeemed on April 6, 2016, by making full
payment to the City of Las Vegas. Pawlik subsequently filed a complaint to
quiet title and applied for a writ of mandamus in the district court
compelling the Treasurer to issue the deed. In turn, the Dengs filed a
motion to dismiss. The district court granted the Dengs' motion to dismiss
and denied Pawlik's petition for a writ of mandamus, interpreting NRS
271.595 to require that the 60-day notice and additional redemption period
begin after the end of the two-year redemption period. Because Pawlik had
attempted service on the Dengs prior to the end of the two-year redemption
period and because this provided the Dengs with less than two years and 60
days of redemption, the district court found Pawlik had provided the Dengs
with premature and ineffective notice. Accordingly, the Dengs were allowed
to redeem their property. Pawlik now appeals that order.
DISCUSSION
NRS 271.595(3) creates an additional 60-day notice and redemption period
This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de
novo. Pankopf v. Peterson, 124 Nev. 43, 46,
175 P.3d 910, 912 (2008); City
of Las Vegas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 540, 554,
188 P.3d 55,
58 (2008) ("Even in the context of a writ proceeding, we review questions of
statutory interpretation de novo."). "When the language of a statute is clear
on its face, this court will not go beyond the statute's plain language." J.E.
Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Corus Constr. Venture, LLC, 127 Nev. 72, 79,
249 P.3d
501, 505 (2011) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). However, if
the statutory language is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations,
the statute is ambiguous, and we then look beyond the statute to the
legislative history and interpret the statute in a reasonable manner "in light
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of the policy and the spirit of the law." Id. (internal quotations omitted); see
Pankopf, 124 Nev. at 46,
175 P.3d at 912.
Pawlik argues the district court's interpretation of NRS 271.595
is incorrect because the statute contains no language mandating that the
60-day notice period begin only after the two-year redemption period
expires. In response, the Dengs argue Pawlik's interpretation would allow
a certificate holder to completely overlap the 60-day period with the two-year period, thus rendering the additional• 60-day redemption period
meaningless. However, Pawlik counters that attaching the 60-day period
to the end of the two-year period causes "at least 26 mandatory months to
exist in a statute that contemplates 24 months of redemption period."
NRS 271.595(3) states "[i]f no redemption is made within the
period of redemption as determined pursuant to subsection 1, the treasurer
shall, on demand of the purchaser or the purchaser's assigns,. . . execute to
the purchaser or the purchaser's assigns a deed to the property." This
provision is plainly a mandate to the treasurer to execute a deed once the
certificate holder has fulfilled the requirements of NRS 271.595.
Additionally, "[n]o deed may be executed until the holder of the certificate
of sale has notified the owners of the property that he or she holds the
certificate, and will demand a deed therefor." This plainly mandates that
the owners of the property must be notified prior to execution of the deed
and the treasurer may not act until that notice has been given. Based on
this provision alone, it would appear that a certificate holder could notify
the owners at any time subsequent to obtaining the certificate of sale that
he intends to demand the deed at the expiration of the redemption period
set forth in subsection 1.
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However, NRS 271.595(4) further states as follows:
If redemption is not made within 60 days after the
date of service, or the date of the first publication of
the notice as the case may be, the holder of the
certificate of sale is entitled to a deed.
This provision creates ambiguity. As Pawlik argues, it is a reasonable
interpretation of this statute that the entire notice period could take place
during the redemption period prescribed in subsection 1, thus making the
property owner automatically eligible for a deed at the end of that
prescribed redemption period. However, the Dengs are also correct that this
interpretation ignores portions of NRS 271.595(4) as they relate to the rest
of the statute. Under the other provisions of NRS 271.595, the holder of the
certificate of sale is not entitled to a deed after giving 60 days of notice,
rather he must wait the remainder of the period outlined in subsection 1.
Thus, the only way the certificate holder would be entitled to a deed at the
end of a 60-day notice period is if the redemption period prescribed in
subsection 1 had already expired. Additionally, under the other provisions
of NRS 271.595, owners are given the full period outlined in subsection 1 to
redeem, not 60 days. The only way property owners seeking redemption
would be limited to a 60-day window is if that 60-day window exists outside
the window prescribed in subsection 1. Therefore, it is also a reasonable
interpretation of NRS 271.595 that the 60-day notice and redemption period
outlined in subsection 4 must occur after the end of the redemption period
outlined in subsection 1.
Thus, when viewing NRS 271.595 as a whole, both parties'
interpretations of subsection 4 are reasonable, and so we look beyond NRS
271.595 to resolve this ambiguity. In doing so, we recognize that "[a] statute
must be construed as to give meaning to all of [its] parts and
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language . . . [and] a statute should not be read in a manner that renders a
part of a statute meaningless." V& S Ry. LLC v. White Pine Cty., 125 Nev.
233, 239,
211 P.3d 879, 882 (2009) (internal quotations omitted) (citations
omitted) (quoting Harris Assocs. v. Clark Cty. Sch, Dist., 119 Nev. 638, 642,
81 P.3d 532, 534 (2003)).
We determine the meaning of a statute's words by "examining
the context and the spirit of the law" by looking to "the statute's multiple
legislative provisions as a whole." Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 405,
168
P.3d 712, 716 (2007). MRS Chapter 271 states in relevant part that its
provisions should be "broadly construed" and that the "notices herein
provided are reasonably calculated to inform each interested person of his
or her legally protected rights." NRS 271.020(5)-(6). NRS 271.595 carves
out a redemption period for the former owners of the property who have
become delinquent on city tax assessments. The statute outlines a number
of hurdles the certificate holder must overcome to divest the former owners
of their power of redemption and rights to the property. While the
certificate holder does indeed have a right to an eventual deed upon
compliance with MRS 271.595, the overriding interest of the statute is to
create a process designed to protect the redemption rights of the former
owner. Thus, NRS 271.595 should be "broadly construed" so that
"notices . . . are reasonably calculated to inform [the former owners of their]
legally protected rights."
Beyond the statutory context, when interpreting ambiguous
statutes, this court also "look [s] to the statute's legislative history and
construe[s] the statute in a manner that conforms to reason and public
policy." Zohar v. Zbiegien, 130 Nev. 733, 737,
334 P.3d 402, 405 (2014)
(internal quotations omitted). The legislative minutes for the 1969 adoption
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of NRS 271.595 indicate the statute was based on similar Idaho and
Wyoming statutes. Meeting on S.B. 74 Before the Committee on Federal,
State and Local Governments, 169 Leg., 55th Sess. (Nev. 1969) (Minutes of
the Meeting—March 6, 1969) ("The remedy of summary sale is based on
existing Idaho and Wyoming statutes and only applies when the municipal
treasurer is collecting assessment."). The relevant Wyoming statute
mirrors• NRS 271.595's language almost verbatim, and Wyoming has
expressly identified the 60-day period as an additional redemption period
as well as a notice period. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1977 § 15-6-418 (1965); Collier
v. Hilltop Nat'l Bank, 920 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Wyo. 1996) ("In addition to this
two year redemption period, it also provides owners with a final sixty day
window within which they can redeem their property." (emphasis added)).
Further, the Nevada Legislature has contemplated an
additional redemption window in another similar, but distinguishable,
municipal redemption statute. "[Under NRS 361.603, if a local government
wishes to purchase property which was not redeemed during the two-year
redemption period, notice must first be given to the last known owner of the
property. The owner is then given an additional 90 days in which to redeem
the property by paying the delinquent taxes, plus penalties, interest and
costs." Casazza v. A-Allstate Abstract Co., 102 Nev. 340, 346,
721 P.2d 386,
390 (1986) (interpreting NRS 361.585 and NRS 361.603 together)
(emphases added); see NRS 361.603(3) ("The last known owner may, within
90 days after the notice, redeem the property by paying to the treasurer the
amount of the delinquent taxes, plus penalties, interest and costs."). NRS
361.603 and NRS 361.585 thus demonstrate some evidence of the
Legislature's intent to create a second chance redemption window in certain
circumstances.
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Considering the legislative history and the context of the
statute, the district court's interpretation of NRS 271.595 is the most
reasonable. 2 See Stockmeier v. Psychological Review Panel, 122 Nev. 534,
540, 542,
135 P.3d 807, 810, 812 (2006) (explaining that this court's
statutory interpretation should reach a reasonable result). We have long
recognized the importance of a former owner's right to redeem and have
held that such a right "will not be taken away except upon strict compliance
with steps necessary to divest it." Robinson v. Durston, 83 Nev. 337, 355,
432 P.2d 75, 86 (1967). Thus, we hold the district court did not err in its
interpretation and NRS 271.595(3) and (4) create a 60-day notice and
redemption period, notice of which may only be given and which may only
begin after the end of the redemption period described in NRS 271.595(1).
2 This court and another Nevada district court have arguably
interpreted NRS 271.595 to mean the 60-day period is an additional
redemption period; however, neither case hinged on the issue. Las Vegas
Paving Corp. v. RBC Real Estate Fin., Inc., Nos. 60599, 60822, *3 (Order of
Reversal and Remand, Sept. 21, 2015) ("NRS 271.595(3) requires the
treasurer to provide a deed to the purchaser at the tax sale, but only after
notice of a demand for the deed has been given by the holder of the
certificate of the tax sale to the owners of the property. Further, if
redemption is not made within 60 days after the date of service of the notice
required in NRS 271.595(3), the deed may issue." (emphasis added)); see
also Weiner v. Kramer, No. 15A715904 (Decision and Order, Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, Sept. 16, 2015) (wherein certificate holders were issued a
certificate of sale on July 24, 2012, but deed was not recorded until February
27, 2015, after "60 days lapsed with no redemption under NRS [Chapter]
271"). This court's interpretation of the notice as "notice of a demand"
rather than notice of the intent to demand indicates that notice would occur
after the two-year window, once the certificate holder is capable of
demanding a deed from the treasurer. Additionally, the district court order
clearly reads the 60-day period as an additional redemption period.
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Li.
Applying this holding to this case, Pawlik (or his predecessor-in-interest) purchased the real property at a January 27, 2014, sale and the
Dengs' initial two-year redemption period ran until January 26, 2016. NRS
271.595(1)(a). After the end of that two-year redemption period, Pawlik was
permitted to serve the Dengs with a 60-day notice that he was the holder of
the certificate of sale and that he would demand a deed from the City
Treasurer. NRS 271.595(3). The Dengs were then entitled to redeem within
that 60-day notice period. NRS 271.595(4). Upon expiration of that 60-day
notice and redemption period, Pawlik would have been entitled to a deed
and the City Treasurer would have been compelled to issue it. NRS
271.595(3)-(4). Pawlik, however, began his attempts to serve the Dengs
with notice on January 7, 2016, and finished his attempts before the
expiration of the two-year redemption period on January 26, 2017. He then
requested a deed from the Treasurer on March 14, 2016, less than 60 days
after the Dengs' two-year redemption period expired. Thus, under NRS
271.595, Pawlik provided premature notice to the Dengs and was not
entitled to a deed at the time of his application.
While not in strict compliance with our interpretation of NRS
271.595, Pawlik argues that he substantially complied with NRS 271.595
and that the notice he provided was sufficient to start the 60-day period
running at the end of the initial two-year period. Thus, he argues the
Treasurer's issuance of the deed should have been automatically compelled
upon expiration of the two-year and 60-day period. We find this argument
unpersuasive.
NRS 271.595 requires strict compliance
As we have explained, "[a] [statute] may contain both
mandatory and directory provisions." Markowitz v. Saxon Special
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Servicing, 129 Nev. 660, 664,
310 P.3d 569, 571 (2013) (citing Leven,
123
Nev. at 408 n.31,
168 P.3d at 718 n.31; see also Einhorn v. BAG Home Loans
Servicing, LP, 128 Nev. 689, 696,
290 P.3d 249, 254 (2012)). A statute's
provisions are mandatory "when its language states a specific time and
manner for performance." Id. at 664, 310 P.3d at 572 (internal quotation
omitted). "Time and manner refers to when performance must take place
and the way in which the deadline must be met." Id. In contrast, directory
provisions are those governing "form and content," which "dictate who must
take action and what information that party is required to provide" and "do
not implicate notice." Id. at 664-65,
310 P.3d at 572 (internal quotations
omitted). An additional consideration is that "the right to redeem. . . will
not be taken away except upon strict compliance with steps necessary to
divest it." Robinson, 83 Nev. at 355,
432 P.2d at 86.
In this case, we interpret NRS 271.595(3) and (4) to require a
60-day notice and redemption period occurring after the initial redemption
period in NRS 271.595(1). NRS 271.595(3) and (4) require certain notice
and provide a specific time and manner of performance to complete that
notice and inform the City Treasurer of its completion. Further, NRS
271.595(3) and (4) operate to divest a former owner of his or her right to
redeem. Thus, we hold that NRS 271.595, implicating both notice and
redemption, contains mandatory provisions.
"[Tin determining whether strict or substantial compliance is
required, [we] examine. . . policy and equity considerations" in addition to
the statute's provisions. Leven, 123 Nev. at 406-07,
168 P.3d at 717. In the
context of relevant notice, we have held that substantial compliance may be
appropriate when providing notice of mechanics' liens or notice of default.
Las Vegas Plywood & Lumber, Inc. v. D & D Enters., 98 Nev. 378, 380, 649
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P.2d 1367, 1368 (1982) (holding substantial compliance is appropriate
under NRS 108.227); see also Schleining v. Cap One, Inc., 130 Nev. 323, 330,
326 P.3d 4, 8 (2014) (holding substantial compliance is appropriate under
NRS 107.095). However, we have not applied the same analysis to notice
under NRS Chapter 271, and we decline to do so now.
The assessments here, imposed by the city after making
improvements benefiting the homeowner, are somewhat analogous to a
mechanic's lien under NRS Chapter 108 in that they secure payment for
those improvements. See In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings, LLG,
128 Nev. 566, 574-75,
289 P.3d 1199, 1210 (2012). The policy rationale
behind NRS Chapter 271 is to facilitate the city's ability to levy taxes for
necessary improvements brought on by population growth. NRS
271.020(1)-(4). The statutes within the chapter are to be construed broadly
"for the accomplishment of [that] purpose[ ]." NRS 271.020(5). However,
that purpose is served whether the city receives payment through the
former homeowner or the certificate holder. Thus, the purpose of NRS
Chapter 271, protecting the city's right to repayment, is still served by
protecting the rights of the former homeowner through strict compliance
with NRS 271.595. Here, the City of Las Vegas suffered no injury by
requiring strict compliance from Pawlik, as it eventually received full
payment through the Dengs' redemption. Thus, while this court has held
"mechanic's lien statutes are remedial in character and should be liberally
construed," the remedial nature of NRS 271.595 is limited and the
substantial compliance analysis inapposite where the City of Las Vegas
itself denied Pawlik's application and is joined in this matter as a
respondent. See In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings, 128 Nev. at 574-
75, 289 P.3d at 1210.
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Additionally, our analysis in Schleining, wherein we applied
substantial compliance to notice under NRS 107.095, was primarily driven
by the fact that the language "substantially comply" was located elsewhere
within the chapter and showed "the Legislature specifically envisioned that
the purposes behind NRS 107.080's notice and timing requirements could
be achieved even if these requirements were not strictly adhered to." 130
Nev. at 330, 326 P.3d at 8. No such express language exists within NRS
Chapter 271, and we decline to insert it. Furthermore, the notice here
concerns a relatively obscure assessment levied by the city, not a loan
default or a mechanic's lien levied by a private party. Additionally, rather
than the first notice of a default or perfection of a lien, NRS 271.595 governs
the final notice required to completely divest a former owner of any right to
redeem his or her property.
Here, no legislative intent or policy considerations compel us to
divert from the interpretation that the requirements in NRS 271.595
implicate notice, are mandatory, and require strict performance. 3 Pawlik
attempted to give premature notice prior to the expiration of the two-year
redemption period in NRS 271.595(1)(a). Thus, Pawlik failed to strictly
comply with NRS 271.595, and his attempted notice was ineffective to
trigger the second 60-day redemption period.
CONCLUSION
We hold that NRS 271.595(3) and (4) create a 60-day notice and
redemption period that must occur after the redemption period described in
NRS 271.595(1) and that NRS 271.595 mandates strict compliance.
3 Accordingly we need not address appellant's arguments that
respondents were not prejudiced by early notice.
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Accordingly, Pawlik's notice did not comply with the statutory provisions,
and we affirm the district court's order.
Gibbons
I concur:
r-c , C.J.
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HARDESTY, J., with whom PICKERING and STIGLICH, JJ., agree,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent to the majority's interpretation of NRS
271.595. Contrary to the plain language of NRS 271.595 and the statutory
scheme found in NRS 271.540 to 271.630, the Dengs argue, and the majority
accepts, that two additional months are added to the two-year redemption
period following a Municipal Treasurer's sale for defaulted tax assessments.
I disagree.
"When a statute is clear on its face, we will not look beyond the
statute's plain language." Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
122 Nev. 1298, 1302,
148 P.3d 790, 792-93 (2006).
NRS 271.595 states, in relevant part:
1. Any property sold for an assessment. . . is
subject to redemption by the former owner,
(a) If there was a permanent residential
dwelling unit or any other significant permanent
improvement on the property at the time the sale
was held. . . at any time within 2 years. . . after the
date of the certificate of sale . . . .
3. If no redemption is made within the period
of redemption as determined pursuant to subsection
1, the treasurer shall, on demand of the purchaser
or the purchaser's assigns, and the surrender to the
treasurer of the certificate of sale, execute to the
purchaser or the purchaser's assigns a deed to the
property. No deed may be executed until the holder
of the certificate of sale has notified the owners of
the property that he or she holds the certificate, and
will demand a deed therefor. The notice must be
given by personal service upon the owner.
However, if an owner is not a resident of the State
or cannot be found within the State after diligent
search, the notice may be given by publication. . .
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4. If redemption is not made within 60 days
after the date of service, or the date of the first
publication of the notice, as the case may be, the
holder of the certificate of sale is entitled to a deed.
(Emphasis added.)
The plain language of NRS 271.595(1)(a) creates a two-year
redemption period for the former owner to redeem the property. And, NRS
271.595(3) mandates the Treasurer to issue a deed to the certificate holder
"Mt' no redemption is made within the period of redemption as determined
pursuant to subsection 1 . ." (Emphasis added.)
The Dengs argue that the notice provision in subsection 4
provides the owner an additional 60 days to redeem the property. While
NRS 271.595(3) and NRS 271.595(4) require the certificate holder to provide
notice to the owner that he or she holds the certificate and will seek a deed,
nothing in those subsections requires that notice be given after the two-year
redemption period expires. Instead, the notice assures that the owner is
informed that the certificate holder possesses the certificate and intends to
seek a deed to the property. See NRS 271.020(6) (stating that notices
provided in NRS Chapter 271 "are reasonably calculated to inform each
interested person of his or her legally protected rights") The Dengs'
argument ignores the function and purpose of the notice provision in the
statutory scheme, which is to alert the former owner that the purchaser will
seek a deed. The 60-day period measures the time that must elapse before
the Treasurer is compelled to issue the deed and recognizes the obvious—if
redemption has already occurred, no deed issues. But, nothing in that
process allows for an extra two months to redeem the property.
The majority maintains that NRS 271.595 is ambiguous. But
to be ambiguous, each party must provide a reasonable interpretation of the
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statute. See Irving v. Irving, 122 Nev. 494, 496,
134 P.3d 718, 720 (2006).
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"Where alternative interpretations of a statute are possible, the one
producing a reasonable result should be favored." G & H Assocs. v. Ernest
W. Hahn, Inc., 113 Nev. 265, 272,
934 P.2d 229, 233 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
However, neither party argues that the statute is ambiguous.
Instead, the Dengs argue that subsection 4's "clear language" is susceptible
to only one interpretation and allowing the 60-day notice to be given within
the two-year redemption period renders the 60-day notice requirement
meaningless. Pawlik argues that interpreting the statute to require that
notice be given after the two-year period expires effectively creates a two-year and sixty-day redemption period, which is contrary to the express
language in NRS 271.595(1)(a). But the fundamental defect in the parties'
and majority's interpretations is reading NRS 271.595 to require that notice
be given at a certain time in conjunction with the two-year redemption
period. Neither subsection 3 nor 4 states when the notice must be given,
only that the notice be given before the Treasurer must issue a deed to the
certificate holder. Thus, notice could be given during the two-year
redemption period specified in subsection 1(a), or it could be given after that
period expires. If the notice is given during the two-year period specified in
subsection 1(a), the 60-day notice period may overlap the two-year
redemption period, and the deed may not be issued if redemption occurs
within that overlapping time. However, any length of time beyond the two-year redemption period that remains for the 60-day notice requirement to
run does not extend the time of redemption; rather, it delays the issuance
of the deed until the 60 days expires. It would be absurd to conclude that
the 60-day notice given during the two-year statutory redemption period
shortens the redemption period, and it is equally absurd to conclude that
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the 60-day period is a mandatory extension of the statutory redemption
period. Whether the owner may redeem within the 60 days after service of
the notice is governed by the length of the redemption period, not the length
of the notice after service. Therefore, if notice is given after the redemption
period, it simply delays the issuance of the deed but does not add time to
the redemption period because that period has already expired.
"Statutory provisions should, whenever possible, be read in
harmony provided that doing so does not violate the ascertained spirit and
intent of the legislature." City Council of City of Reno v. Reno Newspapers,
Inc., 105 Nev. 886, 892,
784 P.2d 974, 978 (1989). The statutory framework
makes clear that NRS 271.595 creates a two-year redemption period. First,
MRS 271.570, which governs the requirements for the certificate of sale,
mandates that the certificate of sale state "that the purchaser is entitled to
a deed upon the expiration of the applicable period of redemption as
determined pursuant to subsection 1 of NRS 271.595, unless redemption is
made." (Emphasis added.) If the 60-day period in MRS 271.595(4) was
meant to be a second redemption period, NRS 271.570's express reference
to NRS 271.595(1) would be illogical. Second, MRS 271.575 twice refers to
the "period of redemption as determined pursuant to subsection 1 of NRS
271.595." Thus, the specific references to the single redemption period in
subsection 1 of NRS 271.595 throughout the statutory framework
demonstrate that the notice provision in subsection 4 is not an additional
redemption period.
The only reasonable interpretation of the statute is the one that
gives full effect to the plain language of all of the provisions of the statute,
by recognizing that an owner has two years to redeem his or her property
from the date of the certificate of sale; a certificate holder must serve notice
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to the owner that he or she has the certificate and intends to seek a deed;
and the Treasurer must issue a deed if the property has not been redeemed
60 days before the expiration of the notice. Had the Legislature intended a
different redemption period, it would have created that time period in
subsection 1(a). See McGrath v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 123 Nev. 120,
123,
159 P.3d 239, 241 (2007) ("[W]e presume that the Legislature intended
to use words in their usual and natural meaning."). Indeed, as the majority
points out, the Legislature knows how to create an additional redemption
period, as it has expressly done so in a municipal redemption statute. Cf.
NRS 361.603(3) ("The last known owner may, within 90 days after the
notice, redeem the property by paying to the treasurer the amount of the
delinquent taxes, plus penalties, interest and costs."). Notably, the
Legislature did not do so in NRS Chapter 271.
Finally, the district court concluded, and the majority agrees,
that Pawlik's notice of intent to seek the deed was premature and ineffective
because he began his attempts to serve notice prior to the expiration of the
two-year redemption period. However, this determination is contrary to the
plain language of NRS 271.595. As noted earlier, there is nothing in NRS
271.595(3) or NRS 271.595(4) that states when the 60-day notice must be
given. Further, subsection 4 of NRS 271.595 expressly provides that "[iff
redemption is not made within 60 days after the date of service, or the date
of the first publication of the notice, . . . the holder of the certificate of sale is
entitled to a deed." (Emphasis added.) The district court's invalidation of
the service of the 60-day notice in this case runs contrary to the plain
language of subsection 4. In this case, Pawlik first published his notice of
intent to seek the deed on January 13, 2016. Thus, under NRS 271.595(4),
the 60-day period began running on that date and concluded on March 13,
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2016. However, the Dengs did not redeem until April 6, 2016. Even if NRS
271.595 creates two consecutive redemption periods, neither the district
court nor the majority explain how the notice was ineffective or how they
determine that the 60-day period can only commence after the two-year
redemption period expires. Accordingly, I conclude that the district court
erred in finding Pawlik's notice ineffective because nothing in NRS
271.595(3) or (4) requires the 60-day notice to be given after the two-year
redemption period expires.
Because NRS 271.595(1)(a)'s plain language creates a statutory
two-year period of redemption, and the Dengs failed to redeem the property
within that period, I would reverse the district court's order dismissing
Pawlik's quiet title action.
Aite," "AAA\ J.
Hardesty
We concur:
J.
Pickering
J.
Stiglich
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