The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
July 3, 2019
2019COA103
No. 17CA2299, People v. Medina — Criminal Law — Uniform
Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act; Courts and Court
Procedure — Jurisdiction of Courts — Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
A division of the court of appeals concludes that a
superintendent’s alleged failure to deliver a defendant’s request for
final disposition under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of
Detainers Act did not divest the court of jurisdiction, and, therefore,
the defendant waived his right to dismissal under section 16-14-
103, C.R.S. 2018, when he entered a guilty plea.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA103
Court of Appeals No. 17CA2299
City and County of Denver District Court No. 15CR3728
Honorable Sheila A. Rappaport, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Delano M. Medina,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FURMAN
Dailey and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
Prior Opinion Announced April 25, 2019, WITHDRAWN
OPINION PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED AS “NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO
C.A.R. 35(e)” ON APRIL 25, 2019, IS NOW DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Announced July 3, 2019
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Delano M. Medina, Pro Se
¶1 Defendant, Delano M. Medina, pleaded guilty to second degree
assault and was sentenced to four years in the custody of the
Department of Corrections. Medina then filed two motions asking
the court to dismiss his conviction under the Uniform Mandatory
Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), sections 16-14-101 to -108,
C.R.S. 2018. Medina’s first motion was a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), and his
second motion was a postconviction motion pursuant to Crim. P.
35(c). The district court construed both motions as a petition for
postconviction relief pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c). The court then
denied the motions.
¶2 On appeal, Medina contends that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea and should have dismissed the
case under section 16-14-104, C.R.S. 2018. His contention is
based on the premise that he was not brought to trial within the
statutorily required time period under the UMDDA. Because we
disagree with Medina’s contention, we affirm the district court’s
order.
I. UMDDA
1
¶3 Medina contends that he made a valid request for final
disposition in accordance with the requirements of the UMDDA,
and that the district court did not have jurisdiction under section
16-14-104 to accept his guilty plea because more than 182 days
had passed after his request. We are not persuaded.
A. Standard of Review
¶4 We review the summary denial of a postconviction motion de
novo. People v. Aguilar, 2012 COA 181, ¶ 6. In postconviction
proceedings, the legality of the judgment and the regularity of the
proceedings are presumed.
Id.
¶5 We note that in ruling on Medina’s motion, it appears that the
district court did not address the requirements of the UMDDA. But
a district court’s ruling may be upheld on any ground supported by
the record, regardless of whether that ground was relied upon or
even contemplated by the court. See People v. Scott,
116 P.3d 1231,
1233 (Colo. App. 2004).
B. Applicable Law under UMDDA
¶6 The UMDDA gives prisoners a mechanism for insisting on
speedy and final disposition of untried charges. People v. McKimmy,
2014 CO 76, ¶ 22. It allows “[a]ny person who is in the custody of
2
the department of corrections” to request a “final disposition of any
untried indictment, information, or criminal complaint.” § 16-14-
102(1), C.R.S. 2018. “The request shall be in writing addressed to
the court in which the indictment, information, or criminal
complaint is pending and to the prosecuting official.” Id. The
defendant must deliver the request to the superintendent where he
or she is confined, and the superintendent must in turn send a
registered copy to the court and prosecutor. § 16-14-103, C.R.S.
2018; McKimmy, ¶ 23.
¶7 Under the UMDDA, “no court of this state shall any longer
have jurisdiction” over the complaint if it is not brought to trial
“[w]ithin one hundred eighty-two days after the receipt of the
request by the court and the prosecuting official, or within such
additional time as the court for good cause shown in open court
may grant.” § 16-14-104(1); see McKimmy, ¶ 22. And because the
requirements of section 16-14-104 are jurisdictional, the defect is
not waived by a guilty plea. People v. Gess, 250 P.3d 734, 736
(Colo. App. 2010). But “substantial compliance alone is insufficient
to satisfactorily invoke a prisoner’s UMDDA rights.” McKimmy, ¶
24.
3
C. Medina’s UMDDA Request
¶8 Medina contends that he properly submitted the request for
final disposition by providing it to his superintendent. But he does
not contend that the district court and the prosecution ever
received the request.
¶9 We also note that the district court file and record on appeal
do not show that a UMDDA request was ever filed with the district
court, or even mentioned in court before Medina filed his
postconviction motion. And on appeal, Medina acknowledges that
“the request may not have been provided to the court and
prosecutor” and the request “appears nowhere in the Register of
Actions.”
¶ 10 The UMDDA “requires the court and the prosecution to
safeguard a defendant’s UMDDA rights once he actually invokes
them.” McKimmy, ¶ 30. But “logic dictates that the prosecution
can only effectuate the [UMDDA’s] goal of ensuring speedy trials if it
gains actual knowledge of a defendant’s UMDDA request.”
McKimmy, ¶ 30; see § 16-14-102(1) (a prisoner’s request must be
addressed to the court and to the prosecution). The court and
prosecution “cannot be expected to affirmatively enforce a
4
defendant’s UMDDA request . . . if [they] never learn[] of the request
in the first place.” McKimmy, ¶ 30.
¶ 11 Because the record does not show that the court or
prosecution ever received or were otherwise made aware of Medina’s
request, Medina’s request never triggered the 182-day period. See
People v. Roberts, 2013 COA 50, ¶ 23 (the defendant’s UMDDA
rights were not invoked until the court and prosecution had actual
knowledge of the request).
¶ 12 And because Medina did not submit a valid request for final
disposition, he has not alleged facts that establish that the district
court lacked jurisdiction under section 16-14-104 to accept his
guilty plea. Thus, the district court properly denied Medina’s
motion.
II. Superintendent’s Failure to Mail Request
¶ 13 Medina also contends, for the first time on appeal, that he is
entitled to relief under the provision of the UMDDA that requires a
superintendent of a correctional facility to “[s]end, by registered
mail, a copy of the request made by the prisoner” to “both the court
having jurisdiction of the untried offense and to the prosecuting
official charged with the duty of prosecuting the offense.” § 16-14-
5
103(1)(b). We conclude that the claim is not properly before us on
appeal and, at any rate, that Medina waived this argument.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 14 This issue also depends on the statutory construction of the
UMDDA, which we review de novo. Carr, 205 P.3d at 473.
¶ 15 Whether a defendant made a valid waiver of a right is also a
question of law subject to de novo review. Stackhouse v. People,
2015 CO 48, ¶ 4.
B. Issues Not Raised at the District Court and Waiver
¶ 16 Medina contends that he delivered a proper request under the
UMDDA to the superintendent of the correctional facility. And he
cites to cases that hold that his rights under the UMDDA “cannot
be defeated by the superintendent’s failure to comply with his
statutory duties under section 16-14-103.” People v. Trancoso, 776
P.2d 374, 380-81 (Colo. 1989); see also Martin v. People,
738 P.2d
789, 792 (Colo. 1987) (a superintendent’s failure to fulfill the duties
imposed by section 16-14-103 is a violation of the UMDDA that is
independent of any violation under section 16-14-104). Thus, in
his view, we must remand for the district court to dismiss the
charges against him.
6
¶ 17 We disagree, for two reasons. First, Medina did not present
this factual contention or the documents he attached to his opening
brief in the district court. See People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230,
251 (Colo. 1996) (holding that a defendant may not use his brief on
appeal to fortify issues inadequately raised or supported by his
motion); People v. Wolfe,
213 P.3d 1035, 1037 (Colo. App. 2009)
(issues not raised in a postconviction motion will not be considered
on appeal of the denial of that motion); see also People v.
Rubanowitz,
688 P.2d 231, 242 n.5 (Colo. 1984) (documents
attached to appellate brief but not presented in district court would
not be considered on appeal); People v. Lucero,
2013 COA 53, ¶ 15
(same), aff’d,
2017 CO 49. Because Medina did not properly raise
this issue in the district court, we need not consider it on appeal.
¶ 18 Second, Medina’s argument disregards that a defendant who
enters a guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional claims. See People v.
Wilson,
251 P.3d 507, 508 (Colo. App. 2010); People v. Carroll,
939
P.2d 452, 453-55 (Colo. App. 1996). And contrary to Medina’s
contention, the superintendent’s alleged failure to comply with
section 16-14-103 (duties of superintendent upon delivery of
request) here did not divest the court of jurisdiction.
7
¶ 19 Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by the constitution
and laws of the state. Wilson, 251 P.3d at 508; cf. People v.
McMurtry,
122 P.3d 237, 242 (Colo. 2005) (observing, among other
things, that “no words in the statute state that the right to a speedy
trial involves the issue of subject matter jurisdiction”).
¶ 20 There is no language in section 16-14-103 that indicates that
a violation of the superintendent’s duties would deprive the court of
jurisdiction. And we note that a superintendent’s violation of other
statutory duties under the UMDDA does not deprive a court of
jurisdiction. See People v. Slusher,
43 P.3d 647, 650 (Colo. App.
2001) (concluding that a superintendent’s failure to comply with
section 16-14-102(2)-(3) does not deprive a court of jurisdiction). In
fact, a superintendent’s failure to comply with section 16-14-103,
like the failure to comply with section 16-14-102(2)-(3), does not
justify dismissal of the charges if the People can establish that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the violation. Trancoso,
776 P.2d
at 382 n.12.
¶ 21 This contrasts with the effect of the court or prosecutor
violating section 16-14-104(1), discussed above, which requires that
8
“no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction” over the
matter.
¶ 22 Thus, we conclude that a violation of section 16-14-103, like a
violation of section 16-14-102(2)-(3), does not deprive the district
court of subject matter jurisdiction.
¶ 23 As a result, regardless of whether the superintendent failed to
properly forward Medina’s request for final disposition, Medina here
waived his right to dismissal under section 16-14-103 when he
entered a guilty plea.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 24 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE DAILEY and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.
9
