Office of Director New Mexico
2019.11.15 Compilation
Commission
'00'07- 16:10:21
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: 2019-NMCA-070
Filing Date: August 22, 2019
No. A-1-CA-37208
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DIMITRICE EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY
Matthew E. Chandler, District Judge
Certiorari Denied, October 25, 2019, No. S-1-SC-37919. Released for Publication
November 26, 2019.
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Lauren J. Wolongevicz, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
John Bennett, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
OPINION
HANISEE, Judge.
{1} Defendant Dimitrice Edwards conditionally pled guilty to possession of a
controlled substance, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(E) (2011), and was
sentenced to eighteen months of supervised probation. Having reserved the right to
appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, Defendant now argues that
his constitutional rights were violated based upon an absence of reasonable suspicion
underlying the arresting officer’s Terry stop. Applying the United States Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), we conclude that
Defendant’s preexisting, independent, valid arrest warrant was an intervening cause
that attenuated any otherwise unlawful seizure of Defendant or evidence from his
person during a search incident to arrest. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial
of Defendant’s motion to suppress.
BACKGROUND
{2} Clovis Police Department Officer Christian Townsend was on patrol at
approximately 3:00 a.m. when he heard over his police radio that “shots had been fired”
at 2221 Llano Estacado, an event venue. Upon learning that a Curry County Sheriff’s
deputy was already at the scene and requesting assistance from other law enforcement
officers, Officer Townsend rushed to the location with his patrol unit’s emergency lights
and siren on, unaware if a shooter was present at the scene. Upon arrival, he saw
“people leaving the scene” and decided to position his vehicle to “block[] the eastbound
lanes of Llano Estacado [to prevent] traffic from moving.” Officer Townsend observed
there to be “approximately fifty people” in the roadway, in vehicles, and in the parking
lot.
{3} In order of proximity to him, Officer Townsend approached “the vehicles and
[asked occupants] what they had seen or heard, [their] names or phone numbers or
other basic information” and then, one by one, allowed them to leave. Defendant was a
passenger in the rear seat of the third or fourth vehicle Officer Townsend approached.
When questioned by Officer Townsend, the vehicle occupants collectively responded
that none had “seen or heard anything,” which was contrary to Officer Townsend’s
interviews with people in preceding vehicles. Also, the vehicle occupants claimed that
they came to “pick somebody up,” but had not yet done so, though all five seats in the
vehicle were already occupied.
{4} Suspicious, Officer Townsend began what he described as an “investigative
detention,” requesting identification from each person, including Defendant, who either
handed Officer Townsend identification or provided his name and date of birth. Officer
Townsend quickly discovered that Defendant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest,
arrested Defendant, and when Defendant was later searched incident to his arrest,
narcotics were found on his person. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence
associated therewith.
DISCUSSION
{5} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and
fact.” State v. Yazzie, 2019-NMSC-008, ¶ 13,
437 P.3d 182 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). First, we review the district court’s factual determinations for
substantial evidence, and then review the district court’s application of the law to those
facts de novo. State v. Tapia,
2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 10,
414 P.3d 332. Defendant has not
argued on appeal that “the New Mexico Constitution affords him greater protection than
that afforded under the United States Constitution[,]” and we review his claim only under
the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jason L.,
2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 9,
129 N.M. 119,
2 P.3d
856.
{6} Assuming without deciding the merit of Defendant’s challenges to the existence
of reasonable suspicion related to the on-scene deputy’s law enforcement bulletin and
Officer Townsend’s ensuing detention, identification, and arrest of Defendant, we turn
directly to the issue upon which we affirm. See State v. Gonzales, 2011-NMCA-007, ¶
13,
149 N.M. 226,
247 P.3d 1111 (“Even if we were to assume without deciding that [the
federal statute at issue] was violated in this case, [the d]efendant . . . is not entitled to
exclusion of the evidence.”). That is, we first resolve whether, under United States
Supreme Court precedent, Defendant’s preexisting arrest warrant operates to excuse
mistaken or unlawful police action preceding Defendant’s arrest. Defendant argues that
Strieff does not justify Officer Townsend’s detention of him because the State did not
“show how much time elapsed between [Officer Townsend’s] act of obtaining
[Defendant’s] identification and the discovery of the contraband, or any intervening
circumstances besides the discovery of the warrant via the impermissible request for
[Defendant’s] identification.” Defendant further contends that “the police conduct was
flagrant” because there were “three separate search-and-seizure violations of
[Defendant’s] rights.” Asserting that Defendant was seized from the moment Officer
Townsend initially began his interaction with the vehicle in which Defendant was a
passenger, Defendant argues that the lack of reasonable suspicion to request his
identification cannot be excused under Strieff.
{7} The State answers that under Strieff, the preexisting warrant for Defendant’s
arrest constitutes “an intervening circumstance” that in this instance excuses whatever
constitutional impropriety this Court might find preceded Defendant’s seizure,
identification, warrant-based arrest, and the discovery of contraband in the ensuing
search of Defendant’s person. Speaking to the collective facts of this case, the State
asserts “there is no evidence of police misconduct [despite the lack of evidence
regarding] . . . the lapsed time between the possible illegality and the acquisition of
evidence.” We agree with the State and explain.
Defendant’s Arrest Warrant Was an Intervening Cause That Attenuated His
Unlawful Seizure From Evidence Obtained After His Arrest
{8} Long ago, the United States Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled on other grounds by Mapp
v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), disallowing as trial evidence that seized in contravention
of the Fourth Amendment. See Mapp,
367 U.S. at 655 (declaring such evidence to be
inadmissible as well in state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause). However, under the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule is applied “only .
. . where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs,” consistent with
the principle that “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always been our last resort, not our
first impulse.” Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized several
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, one of which is the attenuation doctrine, addressed
in Strieff under very similar circumstances to those with which we are faced, and which
held that “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police
conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening
circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has
been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.”
136 S. Ct.
at 2061 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{9} Indeed, Strieff too evaluated an unconstitutional encounter during which an
officer requested the defendant’s identification, learned of a preexisting and valid arrest
warrant, arrested the defendant, and discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia during a
search incident to arrest. Id. at 2060. Considering three factors originally set forth in
Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975), namely: (1) the lapsed time between the
illegality and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) “the presence of intervening
circumstances,” and (3) “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,” the
Supreme Court in Strieff held that the “unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the
pre[]existing arrest warrant.” Streiff,
136 S. Ct. at 2062-63; see also Tapia, 2018-NMSC-
017, ¶ 15 (applying Brown factors to attenuation inquiry). Strieff noted as well that the
officer that initiated the mistaken stop acted lawfully thereafter, that the warrant check
“was a negligibly burdensome precaution for officer safety[,]” that the unlawful stop was
not “part of any systematic or recurrent police misconduct[,]” and that the officer’s
instance of negligence “occurred in connection with a bona fide investigation.”
136 S.
Ct. at 2063 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{10} We therefore turn to the facts of this case to ascertain whether or not the
attenuation doctrine, as applied to the preexisting, active arrest warrant in Strieff, acts
similarly here to permit the seizure of evidence from Defendant’s person following his
arrest, even if that seizure were otherwise unlawful. We proceed to apply the Brown
factors to this case determine “whether the discovery of a valid arrest warrant was a
sufficient intervening event to break the causal chain between the unlawful [detention of
Defendant] and the discovery of drug-related evidence on [Defendant’s] person.” Id. at
2061.
{11} Beginning with the first Brown factor, the lapsed time between the illegality and
the acquisition of the evidence, we agree with Defendant and the State that there is no
evidence regarding how much time elapsed between Officer Townsend’s unlawful
detention of Defendant when he initially made contact with his vehicle, or in the
alternative when Officer Townsend requested Defendant’s identification. See Tapia,
2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 35. Generally, this factor weighs in favor of suppression “unless
substantial time elapses between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained.”
Strieff,
136 S. Ct. at 2062 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because we lack
information that would assist us in determining this factor, we conclude that it favors
suppression.
{12} Second, we consider “any intervening circumstances that serve to attenuate the
illegal detention from the discovery of the evidence.” Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 36.
Here, because Defendant had a preexisting, untainted, valid arrest warrant, which
obligated Officer Townsend to arrest Defendant when he discovered it, this factor
“strongly favors” attenuation. See Strieff,
136 S. Ct. at 2062-63 (holding that the
existence of an arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance where it “was valid, it
predated [the officer’s] investigation, and it was entirely unconnected with the
[investigatory detention]”). Finally, “we assess the purpose and flagrancy of the police
misconduct.” Tapia,
2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 38. “For the violation to be flagrant, more
severe police misconduct is required than the mere absence of proper cause for the
seizure.” Strieff,
136 S. Ct. at 2064. Here, Officer Townsend’s investigation was clearly
not “a suspicionless fishing expedition in the hope that something would turn up.”
Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, Officer Townsend’s aim was to
investigate the report of a possible serious crime, a shooting, and so he sought to
interview potential departing witnesses in order to ascertain whether they had
information that could assist the investigation. At worst, Officer Townsend’s mistake in
detaining Defendant until he answered questions and provided his identity was
negligent insofar as he lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity related to
Defendant. This is especially so given that Officer Townsend was attempting to
investigate a purported shooting contemporaneous to its reported occurrence. There is
no evidence that Officer Townsend “approached and addressed Defendant for arbitrary
reasons[,]” and similarly “nothing suggests that admission of the evidence will embolden
police to engage in unconstitutional” investigatory detentions. Tapia,
2018-NMSC-017, ¶
38. We cannot conclude that Officer Townsend detained Defendant for an improper
purpose or that he was flagrant in his unlawful conduct. This factor, therefore, weighs in
favor of attenuation. Accordingly, based upon our application of the Brown factors in a
circumstance markedly similar to Strieff, we conclude that Defendant’s arrest warrant
was an intervening cause that broke the causal chain between Officer Townsend’s
unlawful detention of Defendant and the seizure of evidence from Defendant after his
arrest. As such, under the attenuation doctrine, the evidence discovered on Defendant’s
person is not subject to the exclusionary rule. We therefore affirm the district court. See
State v. Gallegos,
2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 26,
141 N.M. 185,
152 P.3d 828 (“[W]e will affirm
the [district] court’s decision if it was right for any reason so long as it is not unfair to the
appellant for us to do so.”).
CONCLUSION
{13} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s
motion to suppress.
{14} IT IS SO ORDERED.
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
WE CONCUR:
KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge
